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ABSTRACT 
The main concern of th i s thesis is to explore the possibilit^y of 
d i scove r ing an a l t e rna t ive approach to the unde r s t and ing of person-
h o o d j cX.n approach which is not dominated eiiuher by severe empiricism 
on the one hand or extreme dualism on the o ther , bu t o.iv' which f i n d s 
a new way of u n r a v e l l i n g the mys te ry of what i t is to be a person. 
Chapter One is an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the thesis as a whole. Chapter Two 
is an expos i t ion of the dual is t posi t ion and p a r t i c u l a r l y that of Professor 
H . D . Lewis . Chap te r Three is o f f e r e d as a possible way f o r w a r d towards 
an a l t e rna t ive model of personhood. Chapter Four deals l a rge ly wi th the 
theological impl icat ions of the preceeding two chap te rs , and Chapter Five 
is a b r i e f conclusion of the d i scuss ion . 
The re has been a de l ibera te at tempt t h roughou t the thesis to aim at 
b r ead th and a broad based examination of the c r i t e r i a of personhood and 
perhaps the thesis w i l l s tand or f a l l by i ts success or othervvise in doing 
t h i s . 
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CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION 
I n 1950, Alan T u r i n g publ ished an ar t ic le in the j o u r n a l Mind ent i t led 
'Comput ing Machinery and In t e l l i gence ' . T u r i n g , a l though s t i l l in his 
t h i r t i e s , was a l ready at the f o r e f r o n t of research in to the electronic 
d i g i t a l computer in B r i t a i n , but the publ ica t ion of his paper gave him a 
un ique pos i t ion in the h i s t o r y of computer research wor ldwide . I n his papei 
he laid the g r o u n d w o r k f o r studies of ' a r t i f i c i a l in te l l igence ' . T u r i n g began 
his paper by address ing the quest ion 'Can machines t h i n k ? ' , which he 
recognised to be the cen t r a l problem of research in to a r t i f i c i a l in te l l igence . 
However , such a quest ion could so easily get bogged down in discussions 
of d e f i n i t i o n : What is a machine? I t was f o r this reason that T u r i n g 
replaced a normal discuss ion of the quest ion wi th an example which he 
called the ' imi ta t ion game' and which has since come to be known as the 
' T u r i n g t es t ' . 
His imi ta t ion game is p layed i n i t i a l l y by threepeople: a man, .A, 
a woman, B , and an i n t e r r o g a t o r (of e i ther s e x ) , C. Each person has 
a r o l e . The i n t e r r o g a t o r , who does not know the sex of e i ther A or B , 
has the job of d i s c o v e r i n g A's sex; and B's job is to help the i n t e r roga to r 
in w h i c h e v e r way she can . A's j o b , on the o ther hand , is to lead the 
i n t e r r o g a t o r down the w r o n g t r a c k . The three people are isolated in 
separate rooms, being able to communicate t h r o u g h an in te rmed ia ry or some 
device l ike a t e l e p r i n t e r that does not give any clues, by tone of voice or 
h a n d w r i t i n g , as to the sex of the in te r rogees . T u r i n g goes on to say: 
'We now ask the ques t ion , ''What w i l l happen when a machine 
takes the pa r t of A in th is game?'" Will the i n t e r r o g a t o r 
decide w r o n g l y as o f t en when the game is played between 
a man and a woman? These questions replace our 
o r i g i n a l , ' 'Can machines t h i n k ? ' 
No machine yet i n p r o d u c t i o n could successfu l ly communicate wi th 
an i n t e r r o g a t o r i n such a test and remain unrecognised as a machine. 
But perhaps the day is not f a r hence when a computer w i t h a h i g h l y 
sophis t ica ted p rogram may succeed. T u r i n g ant ic ipa ted that there would be 
var ious object ions to the idea that machines, whether they be h i g h l y 
advanced computers or no t , could possibly t h i n k . I n fact he ant ic ipated 
nine ob jec t ions : ''^^ 
(1) The theological ob jec t ion . Accord ing to th is v iew, thought is a 
f u n c t i o n of a person 's immortal sou l . Following Aquinas th is view argues 
that God has g iven a soul to each man and woman but not to animals or 
machines. On th is view a negative answer would have to be the rep ly to 
the ques t ion 'Can machines t h i n k ? ' 
(2) The 'heads in the sand' ob jec t ion: I f we ignore the idea that 
machines might be able to t h i n k , i t w i l l go away. 
(3) The mathematical ob jec t ion . A computer depends on a b u i l d e r , 
and a p rogram on a programmer . Each mathematical system and every 
p rog ram has elements w i t h i n i t that are unproven by the system. There fo re 
a computer , unable to move beyond the boundaries of i t s p rogram, w i l l not 
be able to answer some quest ions about i t se l f which may be p u t . 
(4) The argument f r o m consciousness. A computer cannot feel 
emotion, cannot compose poe t ry or a concer to , a n d , what is more, even i f 
i t could i t would not be able to know that i t had done so. 
(5) Argumen t s f r o m var ious d i sab i l i t i e s . A machine may be able 
to do some of the t h i n g s you r e q u i r e but i t can never be k i n d , r e s o u r c e f u l , 
b e a u t i f u l , f r i e n d l y , have i n i t i a t i v e , have a sense of humoxxr, make mistakes, 
enjoy s t r a w b e r r i e s and cream, f a l l in love etc . 
(6) Lady Lovelace 's ob jec t ion . Lady Lovelace commenting on Charles 
Babbage's ' A n a l y t i c a l Engine ' in the n ineteenth c e n t u r y said, 'The Ana ly t i ca l 
Engine has no pre tens ions to or ig ina te a n y t h i n g . I t can do whatever we 
know how to o r d e r i t to p e r f o r m ' . 
(7) Argumen t f r o m the c o n t i n u i t y in the nervous system. A machine 
is a d i sc re te state system w i t h ou tpu t being d i r e c t l y p ropor t iona l to i n p u t , 
whereas the nervous system is not . A small mistake in the in format ion 
about the ne rvous impulses of the body and the b ra in can make a s ign i f i can t 
d i f f e r e n c e i n the ou tgo ing behaviour . A person watching a f i lm of a car 
chase, f i lmed f r o m the p u r s u i n g car, may f l i n c h , lean over as the car goes 
a round a c o r n e r , even hide his eyes, but a machine would not ' react ' in 
these ways . 
(8) The argument f r o m i n f o r m a l i t y of behav iour . There are no 
d e f i n i t e ru les by w h i c h a l l people regulate the i r l i ve s . I f there were, they 
w o u l d . b e no be t te r than machines ( ! ) 
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(9) The argument f rom ex t ra -sensory percep t ion . I f a machine 
were compared w i t h a person hav ing telepathic powers in the ' imitat ion ^ : a i i H ' ' , 
the machine could only r e l y on s ta t i s t ica l chance in ascei ' taining the nun ber 
of cards the i n t e r r o g a t o r held in his hand , whereas the person wi th E. . f . P. 
would succeed more o f t e n . 
I n his paper T u r i n g answered each of these objec t ions , though there 
is no space here to r ecord and discuss these arguments . 'More important is 
that i t should be recognised that the objections that he ant ic ipated and ".he 
test tha t he i nven t ed s t r i k e at the heart of the debate concerning the 
exis tence of the human m i n d . The objections to the idea of t h i n k i n g machines 
are a l l put f r o m the sure recogni t ion that human beings are able to t h i n k . 
No one ser ious ly doubts that thought is a f u n c t i o n of personal exis tence. 
However , there is a great d ivergence of opinion on what t h i n k i n g actual'.y 
consists of and equal d i v e r s i t y as to what i t is that enables us to t h i n k . 
What categories should be used in a desc r ip t ion of human thought? Is 
t h o u g h t the f u n c t i o n of a myster ious e n t i t y which is fundamenta l ly 
impercept ib le - the human mind? Or is the process of t h i n k i n g ob jec t ive , 
open to the empir ica l inves t iga t ions of the scientist? I f t h i n k i n g can be 
reduced to a number of phys io logica l components - the ' f i r i n g ' of nervous 
impulses and the t ransmiss ion of e lec t r ica l impulses in the bra in - then the 
crea t ion of a machine that has the ab i l i t y to t h i n k is theore t ica l ly possib-e, 
and perhaps i t is on ly a matter of time u n t i l one is made. I f , however , 
t hough t is the myster ious process of the mind or soul a machine w i l l never 
be created that can t h i n k unless i t can somehow be made w i t h a mind as 
w e l l . 
Dualism in i t s broadest sense is based upon a phi losophical outlook 
that r equ i r e s some f o r m of d iv i s ion between two realms. Fundamentally 
dual ism postulates the existence of two d i f f e r e n t sorts of e n t i t y , one 
phys i ca l and the o ther mental . The phys ica l realm is of course open to al l 
the normal procedures of sense percept ion and exper ience , but the non-
phys i ca l is open to none of these. I n the na r rower sense wi th which this 
thesis is concerned - the phi losophy of mind - dualism postulates that a 
person is composed of two p a r t s , the body and the soul . Of course, the 
body , be ing par t of the phys ica l realm, is available to observat ion and 
empir ica l i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; however , the soul or mind is qui te d i f f e r e n t . The 
mind is i n a d i f f e r e n t ca tegory f r o m the body and is p r imar i l y a subject 
and not an ob jec t . Th is means that minds are not even d i r e c t l y available 
to o ther minds but are essential ly p r iva te to the i n d i v i d u a l . I t is in 
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this second and p a r t i c u l a r sense that dualism is referi-eci to in this thes's 
and it w i l l be inves t iga ted in relat ion to the work of H . D. Lewis. 
Empi r i c i sm, it would seem, covers a mul t i tude of approaches. Broad ly , 
it r e f e r s to an approach which accepts as p r imary the evidence of the f i 
senses in personal exper ience . Here i t w i l l be used as a shor thand way of 
d e s c r i b i n g an approach to the desc r ip t ion of a person which relies upon the 
empir ica l evidence of the various sciences, both phys ica l and behavioura . 
I t should be recognised that these two approaches are opera t ing wi th 
d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a , a d i f f e r e n t method, and even a d i f f e r e n t wor ld \ ' iew. The 
approach that accepts the existence of the mind recognises that the subjec-
t i v e evidence of se l f -knowledge and r e f l ec t i on is v i t a l in a complete 
d e s c r i p t i o n of a pe r son . The other approach relies only on those th ings 
wh ich are available to the senses. These two posit ions are broadly represented 
by the dual is t and the empi r i c i s t . 
Bo th approaches are in the end incompatible w i t h the evidence giv(m 
by the o the r and both f a l l s h o r t , i n the eyes of the o the r , in p r o v i d i n g an 
approach to the desc r ip t ion of a person . This is why the arguments of 
bo th sides of the debate seem qui te reasonable. Even the most c a r e fu l 
i n v e s t i g a t o r , h a v i n g accepted the i n i t i a l p resuppos i t ions , would agree th ; t 
both approaches seem i n h e r e n t l y r a t i o n a l . I f i t is accepted that each 
i n d i v i d u a l has a se l f -knowledge which is un l ike the knowledge we have of 
o ther t h i n g s , we are on the way to accepting the v a l i d i t y of some form of 
dua l i sm, because already there are two types of knowledge imp ly ing two 
k i n d s of e n t i t y . I f , on the o ther hand , we accept that on ly those th ings 
wh ich are d i r e c t l y observable can be admissible as evidence, we are on the 
way to d e n y i n g the existence of the mind and heading towards a f u l l - b l o w n 
empi r i c i sm. Many seem to be caught between the" two arguments , ambivalent 
about each and recogn i s ing the merits of b o t h . Douglas Hofs tad ter has 
expressed th i s ambivalent posi t ion well in his ou t s t and ing book G6del, 
(4) 
Escher , Bach: An Ete rna l Golden B r a i d . I n the same way that a 
p r i n t by M . C. Escher presents the observer w i t h more than one 
pe r spec t ive and f rame of re ference and produces an i l lus ion that the 
impossible has been c rea ted , so the var ious arguments f o r and against the 
existence of the mind create an ambivalent s i tua t ion f o r the hearer or 
reader of the a rgument s , because he is unable to accept both but is also 
unable to deny e i t he r . Escher is able to create the i l lus ion of a staircase; 
wh ich ascends whi l s t going a round the edge of a roo f , w i t h the top step 
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of the staircase j o i n i n g the bottom, wi thout c rea t ing a feel ing of disbeliel" 
in the obse rve r . The two main positions in the debate about the existence 
of the mind create a similar e f f e c t . One a rgument , l ike one perspecti\ 'e 
in an Esher p r i n t , can be fol lowed c lear ly anci yet so can the other - anti 
bo th seem mean ing fu l and reasonable. 
Is there a solut ion to th is problem? Will one or the other approach 
f i n a l l y produce conclusive evidence that w i l l r ende r the other approach 
untenable? I t would seem that the views of the empir ic is ts have gained 
ascendency, at least f o r the presen t , w i t h the dual i s t s being fo rced in to 
more of a t i g h t c o r n e r . But w i l l the f i n a l death s t roke ever be dealt ? 
For some the T u r i n g test promises to f u r n i s h the evidence that w i l l deal 
such a s t r o k e . A l t h o u g h the optimism of the ear ly computer scientists has 
g iven way to more caut ion and fewer prophecies , there are signs that a 
computer , descr ibed as a t h i n k i n g machine, may be possible. Already 
programs have been w r i t t e n and computers b u i l t that go some way to 
f u l f i l l i n g th i s aim. I n Gtidel , Escher , Bach , Hofs tad te r describes programs 
and computers which seem to have remarkable capabi l i t i es . SHRDLU is the 
name of a p rogram w h i c h , a l though r e s t r i c t e d to a r e l a t ive ly small frame of 
r e f e r e n c e , is able to 'converse ' w i t h the 'user ' and may be one of the few 
that seem to have an embryonic in te l l igence . Others which are probably 
less i n t e l l i g e n t bu t more famous are ' Pa r ry ' and 'Doc to r ' . Pa r ry is 
programmed to simulate the belief system of a paranoid ana Doctor is supposed 
to simulate the approach of a p sych ia t r i s t us ing n o n - d i r e c t i v e t he r apy . 
Doctor had the e f f e c t of becoming a p r i v a t e counsel l ing service f o r some v.^ ho 
came in to contact w i t h i t . Hofs tad te r records i t s c rea tor Joseph Weizenbaum 
t e l l i n g of the e f f ec t that Doctor 's i n i t i a l p rogram had on some who encountered 
i t : 
ELIZA ( the program f r o m which Doctor was made) created 
the most remarkable i l lus ion of hav ing unders tood in the 
minds of many people who conversed w i t h i t . . . They 
would o f t e n demand to be pe rmi t t ed to converse w i t h the 
system in p r i v a t e , and w o u l d , a f t e r conver s ing w i t h i t 
f o r a t ime, i n s i s t , in spi te of my explana t ions , that the 
machine rea l ly unders tood them. 
H o f s t a d t e r also records some of the conversa t ions that Pa r ry and the 
Doctor had when they encountered each o the r . The language is a l i t t l e 
s t i l t ed because they are programmed to speak to human beings, not to 
o ther p rog rams , but nevertheless the conversa t ion gives some idea of 
how f a r computer science has progressed: 
- 6 -
P a r r y : 1 don' t unders tand your motives 
Doctor: Why don' t you unders tand my motives? 
P a r r y : Shouldn ' t I be? 
Doctor : Why do you say that j u s t now? 
P a r r y : That ' s just the way it i s . 
Doctor : Suppose tha t ' s jus t the way it were not? 
P a r r y : So? 
Doctor : I am not sure I unders tand you f u l l y • 
P a r r y : You harp on the same quest ions too much 
Doctor : What does the s imi la r i ty suggest to you? 
P a r r y : I don ' t get you 
Doctor : Do you wish that you d id get I? 
P a r r y : I t ' s about time you showed some in teres t 
in my fee l ings . 
Doctor ; Oh? I showed some in te res t i n y o u r feelings? 
Doctor and P a r r y c lear ly have many l imita t ions and would not get ve ry 
f a r in a T u r i n g t e s t , but perhaps they indicate that passing such a test 
is not impossible . Would a p rogram and a computer able to achieve such a 
t h i n g s igna l the end of dualism? Perhaps, but what i f i t too believed that 
i t had a m i n d , what i f i t believed in God or bel ieved that somehow God had 
g iven i t the a b i l i t y to t h i n k , what then? Perhaps the dualis t and empiricist 
computers would have the same debates the scient is ts and philosophers heve 
today . I t does not seem cer ta in that the evidence f o r the mind based on 
se l f -knowledge need necessari ly disappear simply because a team of 
sc ient i s t s may be able to create a t h i n k i n g machine. Also, and more 
i m p o r t a n t , i t should be recognised that s imply making a machine that can 
be descr ibed as i n t e l l i g e n t , or able to t h i n k , does not mean that what has 
been created is a mechanical ' pe r son ' . Unless a person is descr ibed in 
on ly terms of t hough t or in te l l igence th is is impossible . In Chapter 3 
i t w i l l be shown tha't many th ings are r e q u i r e d f o r the development of 
personhood and unless these condi t ions are also f u l f i l l e d or rendered 
unnecessary no machine can ever be descr ibed as a person. I f computer 
sc ien t i s t s d i spu te th i s point they should at least be aware of the fact tha t , 
by making thought or in te l l igence p r imary in a descr ip t ions of personhood, 
they may be conceding g round to the dua l i s t s . I t would seem that a 
pos i t ion that allows a machine to be descr ibed as a person simply because 
i t can t h i n k is not f a r f r o m asser t ing that the basis of person existence 
is in the mind or soul . 
I t would appear that the two posi t ions , however popular Ihey may be 
r e l a t ive to one another , are as phi losophical ly s t i 'ong as they e\'er were. 
I t is possibly a mistake to conclude that if empir icism is not r i g h t , dual sm 
must be, and vice versa . I f they rea l ly are two d i f f e r e n t world views 
perhaps they should be accommodated r a the r than being brought into 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Both approaches seem reasonable but ne i the r , i t would seem, 
can contain or discount the o the r . People do not easily l ive w i t h paradox 
and ambigu i ty but u n t i l some other more acceptable approach is p rov ided , 
perhaps the only way is to recognise the meri ts of b o t h . 
As well as the i r fundamenta l d i f f e r ences these two approaches do .lavc 
s imi l a r i t i e s . They are similar in as much as they are both incomplete. In 
1931 the miathematician K u r t G6del publ i shed his c r i t i q u e of Ber t raf id Russell 
and A l f r e d N o r t h Whitehead's P r in ic ip ia Mathematica. The basis of the 
c r i t i q u e was that the Pr inc ip ia .Mathematica was not a complete system of 
mathematical t heo ry as i t claimed, because i t contained statements and p.-e-
suppos i t ions which had no proof w i t h i n the f r amework that Russell and 
Whitehead had p roduced . But i t was not only Pr inc ip ia Mathematica that 
Gddel's theorem a f f e c t e d , i t had a t r a n s f o r m i n g e f f ec t on the mathematics 
of the day and t h r o u g h that to the rest of science. Since Einstein the 
idea of t h ings being re la t ive to one another has been genera l ly assimilated 
by soc ie ty . But the r e l a t i v i s i n g e f f ec t that G6del's theorem had at the ime 
was r e v o l u t i o n a r y . I t would seem that even the most basic of presupposuions 
can now be chal lenged on th is basis. Even the simple rules of a r i thmet ic , 
as Hofs t ad te r points out i n Gftdel , Escher , Bach seem incomplete: 
There are cer ta in types of people who, as soon as some 
undeniable fact is w r i t t e n down , f i n d i t amusing to show 
why that ^'fact" is false a f t e r a l l . I am such a p e r s o n . . . 
People enjoy i n v e n t i n g slogans which violate basic 
ar i thmet ic but which i l l u s t r a t e "deeper" t r u t h s , such 
as 1 and 1 makes 1 ( f o r l ove r s ) or I plus 1 plus 1 equals 
1 ( the T r i n i t y ) . You can easily p ick holes in these 
slogans, showing w h y , f o r ins tance , us ing the plus sign 
is i nappropr i a t e i n bo th cases. But such cases 
p r o l i f e r a t e . Two ra indrops r u n n i n g down a windowpane 
merge; does one plus one make one? A cloud breaks 
up in to two clouds - more evidence f o r the same? I t 
is not at a l l easy to draw a sharp l ine between cases 
where what is happening could be called -'addition'^' 
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and wliere some other word is wan ted . I f yovi t h i n k 
about (he ques t ion , you wi l l p robably come up wi th some 
c r i t e r i o n i n v o l v i n g separation of the objects in space, 
and making sure that each one is c lear ly d is t inguishable 
f rom all the o thers . But then how could one count ideas? 
Or the number of gases compris ing the atmosphere? 
Somewhere, i f you look i t u p , you can probably f i n d a 
statement such as ' 'There are 17 languages in India and 
462 dialects". There is something s t range about precise 
statements l ike tha t , when the concepts " language ' ' and 
' 'd ialect ' ' are themselves f u z z y . '^^  ^ 
No th ing is more simple than one plus one - or so i t would seem. One 
stream plus another stream may equal a r i v e r , but they do not equal two 
s t reams. Dualism and empiricism are incomplete, i t would seem, in the 
same way that mathematical systems were shown to be by Gfidel . In the i r 
general express ion as phi losophical systems, and in the i r pa r t i cu la r 
express ion in the desc r ip t ion of personhood, they contain presupposi t ions 
and arguments that are not subs tant ia ted in terms of the r e f e ren t i a l 
f r a m e w o r k they cons t ruc t - they are incomplete . Perhaps one example f rom 
each w i l l s u f f i c e . 
A fundamen ta l p resuppos i t ion of dualism is that a f u l l and comolete 
de sc r i p t i on of the wor ld and of a person requ i res the existence of two 
ca tegor ies , two en t i t i e s , one phys ica l and one mental or s p i r i t u a l - hence the 
t i t l e dualism. This p resuppos i t ion is f o r most dual is ts dependent on experience, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s e l f -knowledge . Se l f -knowledge is that unde r s t and ing we gran 
of ourse lves by recognis ing that we are subjects of experience f i r s t before 
a l l else and that we are i nd iv idua l s who are aware of the i r thoughts and 
ac t iv i t i e s and are able to describe themselves in the f i r s t person s ingu la r . 
Th i s r ecogn i t ion led Descartes to doubt al l else except the existence of his 
own mind - th i s is the c r u x . Having allowed se l f -knowledge to gain such 
an impor tan t pos i t i on , Descartes' doubt seems well f ounded , so why dualism 
and not solipsism? The progress ion f rom the recogni t ion of the existence 
of the mind to the recogni t ion of the mind plus the physical wor ld is 
unsubs tan t i a t ed by the existence of the m i n d . .The recogni t ion of the 
exis tence of the mind is s e l f - subs t an t i a t i ng but does not substantiate the 
exis tence of the phys ica l w o r l d . This is perhaps why so many dualists 
t end towards solipsism and an idealist epis temology. Empiricism is incomplete 
in a similar way . Empiricism depends f o r i t s coherence on the reasonable-
ness of t ak ing the evidence of the f i v e senses in i ts cons t ruc t ion of a 
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p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y . Physical evidence can be t r i e d , tested and repeated to 
give rel iable resu l t s which can be used to describe events in time and 
space. But whose experience of the wor ld are we r e l y i n g upon? Is there 
any evidence to suggest that one percept ion or experience of the world is 
de f in i t i ve? Perhaps we should r e l y on common sense, but what is that? 
Perhaps we should r e ly on the exper ience and resu l t s of the scientists 
alone. But then what about the poets and painters - is not the i r 
exper ience of r ea l i t y also valid? I f we ai-e to allow only physical evidence 
as admissible , how do we ga ther , collate and i n t e r p r e t the great d i v e r s i t y 
of human exper ience of the world? This problem is not met by an 
empir ical cons t ruc t ion of r ea l i t y and t h e r e f o r e the epistemological basis 
upon which i t rel ies is not subs tan t ia ted or p roven by the system i t se l f . 
The incompleteness of the epistemologies of the two approaches has 
been i l l umina t ed , but i t may not be r e s t r i c t e d to these areas, i t may be that 
there are o ther areas where similar incompleteness can be shown. However, 
f o r the purposes of th is i n t r o d u c t i o n and th is thesis the important th ing 
is tha t they be recognised as incomplete . Also i t should be recognised 
that v e r y l i t t l e can be done by way of argument or the p roduc ing of 
evidence to r e c t i f y th is fundamenta l incompleteness. I f we attempt to 
produce an answer to th i s problem we i n v a r i a b l y draw a b lank , become 
i n v o l v e d in an i n f i n i t e regress or enmeshed in a c i r c u l a r argument . 
Th i s thesis is w r i t t e n in r ecogn i t ion of th is problem and attempts a 
method of presenta t ion that accounts f o r i t . Two approaches w i l l be 
presented here . One w i l l be that of Professor H . D . Lewis , p robably the 
most eminent dual i s t al ive at the moment. The other w i l l be an a l te rnat ive 
approach of my own d e v i s i n g , wh ich w i l l be b road ly empir icis t and wi l l 
seek to inc lude what I take to be some of the important areas of inf luence 
f o r a consis tent empir ic is t approach to the descr ip t ions of personhood. 
Both approaches w i l l be s imply presented w i t h c r i t ic i sm being d i rec ted 
towards the i n t e r n a l coherence of the approach in ques t ion . As f a r as 
possible they w i l l not be b r o u g h t in to c o n f r o n t a t i o n but w i l l be presented 
as a l t e rna t i ve s , as counterpoises . A chapter on the ' theo log ica l implications 
of each approach w i l l also be i n c l u d e d . The conc luding chapter w i l l attempt 
to weigh the meri ts of the two approaches and o f f e r f u r t h e r areas of s tudy 
and research , p a r t i c u l a r l y in theo logy , where a discussion of personhooc 
l ike that f o u n d in th is thesis might be app l i ed . I n th is way it is hoped 
that the two stances presented in this thesis w i l l not be seen so much a.; 
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opposites best expressed in a debate between two 'combatants' across a 
phi losophical and theological d i v i d e , but as two possible and a l te rnat ive 
models of personhood which have meri ts and weaknesses and are s imilar ly 
d e f i c i e n t . This thesis is not w r i t t e n to set up an argument between 
ant inomies; r a the r i t is presented as an attempt at d i scover ing the 
essential areas of debate and research w i t h i n the inves t iga t ion in to 
personhood and the soul . I n p u r s u i t of that aim we t u r n now to a 
discuss ion of Professor Hywel D . Lewis ' approach to personal existence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF H . D. LEWIS' APPROACH TO HUMAN EXISTENCE 
The Fla t - landers are c rea tures that l ive in two dimensions. I f we were 
able to see them, we would notice that some formed regular two-dimensional 
f i g u r e s such as t r i a n g l e s , squares , c i rc les and ovals , whilst others were 
i r r e g u l a r in f o r m . None of th i s sort of in format ion about the i r shape would 
be available to the F la t - l anders themselves however , because they can, and 
do, experience only those th ings which a two-dimensional wor ld al lows. 
T h e r e f o r e , they are wi thou t s i g h t . They can communicate - hear and ta lk -
and also feel the presence of o t h e r s . These along wi th many other ac t i v i t i e s , 
l ike movement f r o m one place to ano ther , are possible by the i r adaptat ion to 
the cont inua l f low of t i n y two-dimensional par t ic les of which t he i r wor ld is 
made. 
The F la t - landers cont inued f o r a long time in the belief that they had 
exp lo red t he i r wor ld and d i scovered the fundamentals of the i r existence and 
unders tood a l l that there was to l i f e . Then some of them began to ask why 
it was that they t h o u g h t of themselves as i nd iv idua l s - why i t was that they 
could d i s t i n g u i s h themselves f r o m one another and the rest of the w o r l d . 
Moreover , they wondered why i t was that they d id not , and i t appeared, 
could no t , over lap w i t h each o ther or encroach upon each other 's space. 
They reasoned tha t i f t h e i r s t r u l y was a two-dimensional wor ld there was 
no th ing to s jop them f r o m s l i d i n g over each other and ge t t ing all mixed up 
in to one big p o l y g o n . Some even t r i e d i t , t h i n k i n g that in the past they 
had been mis taken, but f o u n d i t impossible . 
Th i s issue became the main subject of debate in F la t land . Flat landers 
of eve ry age, f rom i n f a n t s to the o l d , ta lked about the problem and it soon 
became the fundamenta l ques t ion of the F la t - landers ' existence: Why am I an 
ind iv idua l? And many explanat ions were given and many part ies of opinion 
developed . They l a rge ly f e l l i n to two camps. One camp said that 'The 
Quest ion ' could on ly be expla ind i f there was a t h i r d dimension which was 
not available to the senses but wh ich gave each Fla t - lander his i d e n t i t y 
and s topped him f r o m encroaching on another ' s space. This camp called 
themselves the 'Dimensional i s t s ' . The o ther camp said that 'The Question' 
could be expla ined simply by an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the two dimensions of 
the wor ld and the people in i t . I t was impossible, they contended, to 
take ser iously a n y t h i n g that could not be experienced d i r e c t l y . The i r 
language o f t en inc luded phrases such as 'phys ica l laws ' , 'behaviour ' and 
'social cond i t i on ing ' and they called themselves the 'Exper ien t i a l i s t s ' . 
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These two camps cont inue to have many long and heated discussions 
and at times seem to get closei- together in thought, but then at other times 
they seem f u r t h e r apa r t . The many par t ies , which represent d i f f e r e n t 
shades of opinion w i t l i i n each camp, also argue amongst themselves and are 
ever seeking to c l a r i f y t h e i r pos i t ions . The arguments cont inue . 
I t seems that the argument and d iv i s ion of opinion amongst the Flat-
landers is similar to the state of the debate w i t h i n the philosophy of mind , 
and especially that pa r t of the debate which makes pa r t i cu la r reference to 
the d i s t i nc t i on between body and mind . Like the idea of the t h i r d dimension 
f o r some of the F l a t - l a n d e r s , the existence of a mind which is not dependent 
upon a body f o r i ts exis tence seems to p rov ide a tenable w o r k i n g mod.jl 
of personal ex is tence . And yet there are those who, l ike the Exper ien t ia l i s t 
F la t - l ande r s , w i l l ques t ion a n y t h i n g which empirical evidence cannot 
es tabl ish as possible . H . D . Lewis as a pa r t i c ipa to r i n the debate stands 
f i r m l y on the side of the dua l i s t s who, l ike the Dimensionalists in the 
i l l u s t r a t i o n , believe that o u r exper ience of l i f e , our unde r s t and ing and 
recogni t ion of ourse lves as i n d i v i d u a l s , leads to the i r r e f u t a b l e conclusion 
that we are more than o u r emp i r i c a l / phys i ca l exis tence. We have a mind 
which forms the essential and necessary par t of our self , and as such is the 
seat of our consciousness and i d e n t i t y . 
Lewis a f f i r m s that we know of the existence of our minds not obl iquely 
but d i r e c t l y , s imply by being ourse lves . I n fact he would go so f a r as to 
suggest that the v e r y not ion of look ing f o r our 'selves' is w r o n g : we are 
p r i m a r i l y subjects of exper ience and not objec ts , a l l experience involves 
the self and i f we pause to observe ourselves doing something the a c t i v i t y 
immediately changes. Our exper ience of l i f e leads us to the conclusion that 
we are more than a mixed bag of sensation and a c t i v i t y . Rather we are 
bodies w i t h minds and minds w i t h bodies. I t is f r o m this posi t ion that 
Lewis at tacks the empiricists who , l ike the Exper ien t ia l i s t s in the i l l u s t r a t i o n , 
believes that o ther than those t h i n g s which are available to the senses, 
no th ing can reasonably be a rgued f o r or phi losophical ly suppor t ed . As an 
empir ic i s t phi losopher of mind Gi lber t Ryle has been p a r t i c u l a r l y singted out 
by Lewis f o r a t t ack . Lewis r i g h t l y recognises Ryle 's s ta ture and posi t ion 
as an empir ic i s t t h i n k e r and the enormous inf luence of his work - especially 
his book The Concept of M i n d . I n many ways Lewis ' approach to personal 
existence becomes clear as he argues and disputes wi th Ryle . He defends 
Descartes and t r a d i t i o n a l dual ism f r o m the a t tacks of Ry le , and in res ta t ing 
dualism adds l i t t l e to the basic Cartesian model of body and soul , but 
adds much in the way of e x p o s i t i o n , explanat ion and i l luminat ion of the 
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appro i i ch . Some, whi ls t agreeing wi th the assessment of Lewis t l ius fai", 
would argue f u r t h e r that he has made the d i s t i nc t ion between body and mind 
more f lex ib le^ t l i e i r r e l a t ionsh ip being conceived of in more dynamic terms 
and the reby rendered more tenable and acceptable. I n all of this Lewis 
has p rov ided a valuable resource f o r both philosophers and in teres ted lay 
persons . 
This chapter w i l l i nves t iga te the ' b u i l d i n g blocks ' of Lewis ' approach 
and the evidence that he o f f e r s f o r the existence of the m i n d / s e l f / s o u l . 
These b u i l d i n g blocks w i l l p rov ide both an overview of Lewis ' approach and 
an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r c r i t i c i s m . The inves t iga t ion and c r i t i c i sm is not in tended 
to be exhaus t ive , but s u f f i c i e n t to p rov ide enough material to establish 
Lewis ' thesis as a possible model of personal existence. 
'E lus ive ' appears to be an impor tan t word f o r Lewis and a key word in 
his desc r ip t ion of s e l fhood . Th i s is made clear not only in the discussions 
f o u n d in Lewis ' works but also, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y , in the t i t les of his 
w o r k s : The Elusive M i n d , The Elusive Self and his fo r thcoming The Elusive 
Self and God. 
I t is qu i te clear that i t is the m i n d / s e l f / s o u l which is e lus ive , but 
what is i t e luding? The answer is qui te simply - empirical i nves t i ga t i on . 
Lewis contends that the self is by i ts v e r y na tu re elusive and the re fo re 
cannot be t rea ted l ike a n y t h i n g else. I t is not available to normal human 
sense percep t ion and cannot be b r o u g h t to the bar of our normal means of 
de sc r ib ing the w o r l d - the self cannot be descr ibed in words d rawn f rom 
e v e r y d a y exper ience . L ike the lost bar of soap in the bath the mind seems 
con t inua l ly to elude o u r g rasp and d e f y cap tu re . I n ho ld ing to th i s view 
of the self Lewis seems to be v e r y close to I . T . Ramsey in his celebrated 
paper 'The systematic elusiveness o f ' 1 " ' ^ ^ ^ 
I t would seem tha t the ' s e l f s u f f e r s the same problems of desc r ip t ion 
as does 'God ' . L i k e 'God ' , the terms ' m i n d ' , ' s e l f , 'soul ' conjure up 
p ic tu res which are not easily t rans la ted in to words - p ic tures of a shadowy 
w o r l d beyond the range of normal pe rcep t ion . Perhaps this is one of the 
reasons w h y , l ike the classical statements about God, descr ip t ions of the 
soul seem to r e q u i r e the use of the 'v ia nega t ivd ' . By desc r ib ing the soul 
as immor ta l , f o r ins tance , or in o ther words no t -mor ta l or n o t - l i f e - w i t h - a n -
end^^^^ statements about and discussions of the soul , by contrast w i t h 
what is empi r ica l ly known about the w o r l d , have been expressed in negat ive 
language. Th i s necessar i ly invo lves a r e s t r u c t u r i n g of epistemologies to 
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allow fo r such concepts . I n The Elusive Self, ( in the chapter of the same 
name), Lewis has descr ibed the problems of tallying about the self as l ike 
walk ing t h r o u g h a mine f i e l d . The d i f f i c u l t y exists because of the 
tendency to say too much on the one hand and say too l i t t l e (which could 
amount to no th ing at a l l ) on the o the r . The philosophy of mind , Lewis 'vould 
a f f i r m , presents everyone w i t h l i ngu i s t i c d i f f i c u l t i e s , but none more so than 
those who, l ike Lewis , wish to defend the dualis t pos i t ion . 
For Lewis the self is i r r e d u c i b l e ; the states of mind and body have no 
in f luence over the essential na ture of the self which simply ' i s ' . In 
response to a phi losophical t r e n d which began w i t h philosophers l ike Hume, 
Locke and Berke ley and has been expressed l a t t e r l y i n the work of Ry le , 
Lewis contends that our t hough t s are not ident ica l w i th our minds. The 
mind has t h o u g h t s , but that does not mean that i t is_ t hough t s . By this he 
is a f f i r m i n g the existence of some- ' th ing ' which t h i n k s , but which is ne i ther 
dependent upon the body nor i t s own thoughts f o r i ts exis tence. As f a r 
as the existence of the m i n d / s e l f / s o u l is concerned, Lewis argues f o r i ts 
complete independence. But th i s does not mean that Lewis is i n t end ing to 
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deny the importance of the body . I n The Self and Immorta l i ty , Lewis 
devotes a chapter to the ' importance of the body ' and states what he sees 
to be the great value and importance the body has f o r human existence. In 
his arguments Lewis seems v e r y close to his phi losophical p rogen i to r 
Descartes . On tne one hand he says how impor tant the body and i ts states 
are f o r human existence a n d , on the o the r , he suppor t s the idea of a non-
phys ica l substance which is whol ly independent of i ts states and all o ther 
' ex terna ls ' such as those signals which are t ransmi t ted t h r o u g h the sense 
organs . 
Descartes made i t qu i te clear that he believed the mind was a ' t h i n g ' 
or a substance ( r e s ) wh ich as such could exist alone. Lewis has been qu.ck 
to p i ck th is u p . Fol lowing on f r o m Descartes, Lewis suggests that a l thouf ,h 
the mind is able to exis t alone i t normal ly exists in some form of re la t ionship 
to the phys ica l w o r l d . Descartes believed that the essential nature of a 
phys ica l t h i n g is f o u n d in the faict that i t is ex tended , and that the essential 
na ture of the mind is to be f o u n d in that i t is able to t h i n k . Scott Dunbar 
in a recent a r t i c le in Rel igious Studies has said that Lewis attempts to 
sof ten th i s rad ica l d i s t i n c t i o n of Descartes and that in The Self and 
Immor ta l i ty he in jec t s more f l e x i b i l i t y in to his approach and faci l i ta tes 
grea ter o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the mind to have a re la t ionsh ip w i t h the physical 
w o r l d . T h i s , Dunbar sugges t s , Lewis achieves by moderating Descartes' 
approach to the mind's essential n a t u r e . Lewis does not describe the mind 
as a t h i n k i n g t h i n g but r a t h e r as 'a t h ing that has experience ' 
Whether or not this is a f a i r assessment of what Lewis is do ing , or t r y i n g to 
do, wi l l soon be made clear . 
The two substances i nvo lved in the mind-body re la t ionship are so 
d i f f e r e n t that the r e l a t ionsh ip is not jus t p a r t i c u l a r l y intimate but also 
e n t i r e l y un ique . A l t h o u g h d i f f e r e n t , the two substances have, i n Lewis ' 
v iew, a pecu l i a r ly close connect ion and involvement w i t h each o ther . We 
know this ourselves by the way we experience the physical w o r l d , and 
most p a r t i c u l a r l y in our sensat ions. These are communicated to us t h r o u g h 
the phys ica l wor ld and are r ece ived , unders tood and responded to in our 
minds . 
The exper ience of the w o r l d t h r o u g h sense data made Descartes 
descr ibe his apprehens ion of h imsel f , his mind and his body toge ther , as 
being mixed u p : 
Nature also teaches by these sensations of pa in , hunger 
and t h i r s t , e t c . , that I am not present i n my body merely 
as a pi lot is present in a sh ip ; I am most t i g h t l y bound to 
it and as i t were mixed up w i t h i t , so that I and i t fo rm 
a u n i t . O the rwise , when the body is h u r t , I who am 
simply a conscious b e i n g , would not feel pain on that 
account , bu t would perceive the i n j u r y by a pure act of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as the pi lot perceives by s ight any 
breakages there may be i n the sh ip ; and when the body-
needs food or d r i n k , I should e x p l i c i t l y unders tand the 
f a c t , and not have confused sensations of hunger and 
t h i r s t . 
I f t h i s is what Descartes rea l ly wants to say about how we experience the 
phys ica l w o r l d then his asser t ion that the mind is a t h i n g that t h i n k s must 
inc lude the idea of the mind as a t h i n g that exper iences . Also, by 
d e s c r i b i n g the mind as 'a t h i n g that exper iences ' , Lewis does not appear 
to be c o r r e c t i n g Descar tes , a n d , c o n t r a r y to what Dunbar contends , 
appears to be merely r e d e f i n i n g Descartes' posi t ion and making i t clearer to 
con temporary readers - admi t t ed ly by a d i f f e r e n t use of language. Descartes 
u n d o u b t e d l y believes that the mind is a t h i n g which is in t imate ly bound to 
the body , at least i n a l l that i t experiences of the w o r l d , i f not in i ts 
i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o c i n a t i o n . 
Sensation appears to be v i t a l in the unde r s t and ing of the re la t ionship 
between body and m i n d . The great q u a n t i t y and va r i e ty of sense data 
which the mind receives must be communicated t h r o u g h the body in some 
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way and if this channel or connection can be i l lus t ra ted and explained wi' 
w i l l have gone some way towards unde r s t and ing the pcculiai- dynamics of 
the mind-body r e l a t i onsh ip . Lewis notes that Descartes had a few problems 
(wh ich were never rea l ly reso lved) associated wi th smells and colours , 
which w i t h the aid of the many sc ien t i f i c advances since Descartes' day 
should no longer present d i f f i c u l t i e s , but he does not focus on these 
p a r t i c u l a r and o f t e n d i f u s e d sensations. Pain is both common and memorable 
and f u r t h e r m o r e is a more impor tan t issue and can the re fo re be e f f e c t i v e l / 
used as a focus f o r an explanat ion of mind and body - and this Lewis 
at tempts to do. 
Whereas Descartes uses the i l l u s t r a t i o n of a pilot in a sh ip , Lewis 
uses that of a t a x i d r i v e r in his cab to make th is po in t . Unlike a taxi 
and i t s d r i v e r ou r minds do not simply con t ro l our bodies f r o m a distance 
in some mechanistic way , and equal ly our bodies are not f o r e i g n to us -
we do not s u r v e y them f o r evidence of pa in . Pain is not experienced as 
a f f e c t i n g a n y t h i n g o ther than our 'selves ' . There is no th ing closer to a 
person than his p a i n . I t is impossible to separate a person f r o m his pa in , 
because in a v e r y rea l sense the pain is his - he is in pain - no th ing else. 
A l t h o u g h we exper ience pain ' i n ' one p a r t i c u l a r par t of the body i t is not 
s imply the body wh ich is i n pa in . I n the experience of pain we normally 
associate ourselves w i t h our bodies, Lewis would contend , and the pain we 
exper ience is usua l ly most in t ima te ly associated with, ourse lves , a l though it 
may be focussed in one or more par t s of the body. 
I t is clear tha t Lewis does not want to say that dualism requi res a 
tenuous l i n k between our bodies and minds; they are not connected by som.; 
spec t ra l umbi l ica l c o r d ; ou r exper ience of pain indicates that they are much 
closer than t ha t , b u t , h a v i n g said t h i s , Lewis is also c a r e f u l to point out 
that the r e l a t ionsh ip between mind and body is not one where we can take 
the f u r t h e r step of r e d u c i n g ourselves s t r i c t l y to our percept ions and 
sensat ions; that would be a mis take . For Lewis the evidence of sel f -
knowledge - the fac t that I always know that I exist wi thout the need f o r 
e x t e r n a l evidence - goes c o n t r a r y to the conclusion that ' I ' am my 
pe rcep t ions . I t is the same ' I ' who has had a l l these successive experiences 
and in that sense we are ' bound ' to our sensations, whether they be of 
pain or of p leasure . Thus the s i tua t ion which pers is t s i n the re la t ionship 
of mind and body has f o r Lewis no s t r i c t pa ra l le l . My t h o u g h t s , sensations, 
exper iences are mind because ' I ' have them. But my mind is none of these. 
I n f a c t , ( accord ing to Lewis) ou r minds are no more dependant upon our 
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exper ienccs than the ex te rna l wor ld is dependent upon our pe rcc iv i i i g i l . 
To r e t u r n to the example of pa in ; Lewis would assert that there can 
be no meaning at tached to pain unless it is ' I ' who experiences i t . 
(8) 
'F loat ing pain ' is an incoherent concept . We may be in doubt or 
mistaken about the exact whereabouts and extent of our i n j u r i e s but we 
can be in no doubt that i t is we who are in pa in . Also because sensation 
and pain are essent ia l ly p r i v a t e there is a way in which o ther persons are 
(9) 
a ' rad ica l mys t e ry ' to us . We cannot have the same knowledge of 
someone else and t h e i r sensations as we have of ourse lves . A l though pain 
behav iour is one t h i n g and being in pain another , we can ascribe to others 
an exper ience of pa in , because there is no th ing to suggest to us that 
o thers do not have the same awareness of themselves as we have. We should 
take the behaviour of o thers s e r ious ly , and should use i t as a clue to what 
is ac tua l ly being exper ienced by them. The body in this sense, Lewis would 
say, is a ' m i r r o r ' ^^^"^ of the sou l . I t may be imperfec t in i ts r e f l e c t i o n , 
even c r a c k e d , but never theless convey ing in many ways what a person is 
ac tua l ly expe r i enc ing and fee l ing at any one t ime. There is a sense, 
however , in which we remain a m y s t e r y ; i t is no good asking us to describe 
ou r t h o u g h t s by g i v i n g t h e i r phys ica l correlates (except in a v e r y meta-
phor ica l sense) because these descr ip t ions do not exhaust our t hough t s . 
We can on ly ask how long we have been t h i n k i n g because, a l though the soul 
remains unchanged t h r o u g h time and i ts though.ts have no location in space, 
they are s t i l l ' i n ' t ime. 
I n his d iscuss ions , Lewis c lear ly believes that the soul is 'outside ' of 
space but ' i n ' t ime, g i v i n g c o n t i n u i t y , co-ord ina t ion and order to the 
objec t ive real i t ies of exper ience . I n fac t in a review of I . T . Ramsey's 
Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y , which f i r s t appeared in the Hibber t Journa l ^^ ^^  
and then again as a chapter i n Lewis ' Freedom and H i s t o r y , Lewis cr i t ic ises 
Ramsey f o r his suggest ion that the soul t ransends both time and space. As 
he says: 
Some misgiving is caused also by the desc r ip t ion of a f ree 
decision as ' spa t io- tempora l and more ' . That a choice is 
not jus t an occurrence in space is p l a i n . But al l our 
conduct is s u r e l y tempora l . We may also be said in some 
senses to t ranscend t ime, in memory f o r instance and in 
an t i c ipa t ion of the f u t u r e . (Bu t there seems no th ing 
here pecul ia r to impor tan t decisions or ethical c h p i c e ) . . . 
we must beware of p resen t ing th i s in terms that take us 
back again to the notion of a timeless self . 
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I f I^ewis believes the soul is not r e s t r i c t ed to space but is condit ioned by 
time, what view of space-time does th is presuppose? A n d , more p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
what p a r t i c u l a r view of time does Lewis hold which does not r equ i re some 
sort of change - i f the soul is in time but does not change? Is there 
n o t h i n g analogous to phys ica l g r o w t h in which the soul participates? Or 
is the soul a conta iner wh ich becomes f u l l e r and f u l l e r as we get older and 
gain more exper ience and informat ion? Al l these along wi th o ther questions 
which arise w i l l have to be considered later in the chapter . 
A l t h o u g h Lewis does believe that some of the problems associated wi th 
Descartes ' app^roach do need removing ( t h o u g h these may exist more f r o m 
mistakes i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Descartes r a the r than being philosophical 
e r r o r s ) he is in fundamenta l agreement w i t h the Cartesian approach to the 
r e l a t ionsh ip between body and m i n d . Descartes was not an occasionalist 
l ike some of his la ter f o l l o w e r s , who believed that there was no real connection 
between mind and body , jus t some sort of psycho-phys ica l paral le l ism. 
Occasionalists believe that the only reason that the ac t iv i t ies of mind and 
body do concur is that they were in i t i a t ed - 'wound up ' - at the same 
time by God and cont inue in para l le l under normal c i rcumstances , u n t i l the 
end of phys ica l l i f e . Nei ther was Descartes an epiphenomenalist ; he d id not 
believe that the mind was bound to the phys ica l changes of the body . I f 
i t were , i t would on ly appear that we w i l l t h ings to happen wi th our minds, 
the t r u t h being that t h i n g s are done to our minds by the outside w o r l d . 
Descartes, and now l a t t e r l y Lewis , holds ra the r an ' i n t e r a c t i o n i s f v iew, 
because he bel ieved that the material wor ld a f f ec t s the mind l a rge ly t h r o u g h 
the body , wh ich we call our o w n , and the mind , in t u r n , a f fec t s the body 
and t h r o u g h that the rest of the w o r l d . 
However , metaphorical descr ip t ions which at tempt to i l luminate the 
r e l a t ionsh ip between the body and mind i n v a r i a b l y break down . Metaphors 
l ike ' h a v i n g ' (a mind) and 'be ing related to' (my body) are, f o r Lewis , ' 
l a rge ly i napp rop r i a t e except where they are used in a general sense. I n 
t r y i n g to walk the t i g h t r o p e between making the mind reducible to i ts 
exper iences and making i t so abs t rac t and unre la ted to the physical wor ld 
that he begins to lay himself open to the dangers of solipsism, Lewis , l ike 
Descartes before h im, seems able only to use negat ive metaphors - the 
soul is not l ike a t a x i d r i v e r in his cab and i t is not l ike a pi lot in a 
s h i p . 
P r ivacy of t hough t and p r i v a t e access to ou r own thoughts is another 
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b u i l d i n g block in Lewis ' approach . In Philosophy of Religion ^^^^ and 
(14) 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y in The Elusive ,\iind Lewis , mainly in opposi t ion 
to Ry le , establishes the importance of p r iva te access to thoughts and thereby 
access ( t h o u g h not objec t ive access) to our own mind . The self may elude 
empir ical i nves t iga t ion but i t is not a m y s t e r y . I t is unobservable but 
remains knowable . The self is not known obl ique ly but d i r e c t l y . But the 
' v e r y notion of ' l ook ing ' f o r the self is mistaken; Hume' s comment that 
whenever he looks f o r himself he always ' t r i p s ' ^ "'^ ^ ^on some percept ion or 
o t h e r , is wide of the mark . We are mistaken i f we under take the en te rpr i se 
of look ing f o r our ' se lves ' . I n t rospec t ion as such is only use fu l in 
disco v e r i n g the way we fee l or t h i n k about something, not in obse rv ing 
our minds . In The Self and I m m o r t a l i t y , Lewis gives two examples of the 
d i f f i c u l t y of o b s e r v i n g ourse lves , to which I have b r i e f l y a l luded at the 
beg inn ing of the chap te r : 
. . . i f we pause in the course of some a c t i v i t y , or of 
something we u n d e r g o , l ike a fee l ing of anger or f ea r , 
th i s a f f ec t s the course of that a c t i v i t y i t se l f and we do 
not t h e r e f o r e have a f a i r express ion of i t . 
( I f I were to t r y to observe myself w r i t i n g now, I would e i ther have to 
slow down and t h e r e f o r e d i s t u r b my ' f l ow ' or end up w r i t i n g gobbledegook) . 
. . . t h e Self as subject can never observe i t se l f as an 
object f o r i t is always essential ly sub jec t . 
Look ing f o r the self is not on ly impossible but may def lec t someone away f rom 
the se l f ' s essential n a t u r e . Th i s seeking and looking f o r the self may, 
t h e r e f o r e , r esu l t i n f u r t h e r problems, not least the problem of cont inuous 
i d e n t i t y . The problem of cont inuous i d e n t i t y only arises because of the 
confus ion which is caused by phi losophers (and lay persons) looking fo r 
t he i r ' se lves ' , as i f they were objects of percept ion l ike other t h i n g s . I f 
we recognised that we are our 'selves' at this moment none of these problems 
would a r i se . I t seems f a i r l y clear where Lewis is leading but i t is p robably 
w o r t h l e t t i n g him have the o p p o r t u n i t y to speak f o r himself . I f we ask him 
'How do we know ourselves? ' he rep l ies : 
The answer is that the self , f a r f r o m being a myster ious 
r ea l i ty behind the scenes is in fact what we know best . 
But we know i t i n a v e r y special way in the v e r y fact 
of being i t and hav ing the experience we do have, 
i n c l u d i n g the ac t iv i t i es we ourselves in i t i a te , 
(We know ourselves s imply by being ourselves - no more, no less) • 
Lewis ' approach to i n d i v i d u a l agency is again d ic ta ted by his dualism 
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a n d , aga in , is lai^gely expressed in opposi t ion to other approaches. In the 
same way that t hough t is fundamenta l ly p r i v a t e , so too are those bases fo r 
a c t i v i t y which are revealed in motivation and i n t e n t i o n . In t en t ion belongs 
to the i nv i s ib l e and p r iva t e realm of the mind which f o r Lewis is self-
ex i s ten t and s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . When this process of thought or in ten t ion 
is l i nked to the body then in t en t ion is made manifes t . Th is is not meant 
to relegate the body to a less impor tan t posi t ion that that which i t should 
h o l d . As we have seen, Lewis is at pains to stress the importance of the 
body - at least u n t i l we d ie . He says in The Elusive Self: 
No one ser ious ly denies that under the condi t ions which 
we know, there are pers is ten t and v i t a l phys ica l 
cond i t ions of al l mental states and processes. Our 
bodies have the utmost impor tance , at least f o r a l l 
o u r present e x i s t e n c e . . . 
But however impor tan t the body remains, the mind appears to be p r imary in 
al l that would normal ly be considered to make up personal exis tence, 
i n c l u d i n g vo l i t i ona l a c t i v i t y . I n v o l u n t a r y nervous twi tches and unin tended 
spasms by d e f i n i t i o n could not be inc luded in the category of vo l i t iona l 
a c t i v i t y . Lewis notes one i n t e r e s t i n g paral le l between in ten t ions and 
pe r cep t i on : i n t e n t i o n l ike percept ion requ i res 'meaning ' . Sensory percept ion 
rel ies not s imply on what the re t ina receives , but on the associations and 
r e su l t an t meaning which the mind cons t ruc t s on the basis of the received 
data . L ikewise , i n t e n t i o n has i ts founda t ion in 'meaning ' , since in ten t ion 
implies tha t at the root of a c t i v i t y there is some meaning. This meaning 
need no t , i t is t r u e , be ra t iona l or even founded on any object ive phys ica l 
f a c t , but s t i l l t h i s meaning, which again is l a rge ly p r i v a t e , remains at the 
core of a l l vo l i t i ona l a c t i v i t y . Because meaning is essent ial ly p r iva t e and 
persona l , the mot iva t ion and in t en t ion f o r any given a c t i v i t y may not be 
s e l f - e v i d e n t . 
Lewis would say that a l though there are some subconscious e f fec t s 
wh ich the mind has on the body which may resu l t in someone's heart beating 
f a s t e r or in someone look ing pale or f l u s h e d , the most impor tant and normal 
way a body is changed is by w i l l i n g or i n t end ing a change. The change in 
the body must i n t u r n b r i n g about a change in the w o r l d , so f o r a person 
to change his env i ronment in some way he must f i r s t b r i n g about a change 
in his b o d y . As a l l agency and in t en t ion is i n e x t r i c a b l y bound to the 
existence of the mind ( i n re la t ionsh ip to the body) i t is possible f o r Lewis to 
make sense of a number of phi losophical problems, such as; f reedom of choice 
and decis ion making aesthetic apprecia t ion and a r t i s t i c c rea t ion . However, 
a l though Lewis is undoub t ed ly in te res ted in these areas ( p a r t i c u l a r l y 
f reedom) he does not make an e f f o r t to discuss them. 
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Lewis slates many of his arguments in opposi t ion to Gilbert Ry lc , who, 
consis tent w i t h his slogan of 'one wor ld not t w o ' , re jects the appi-oach of 
Cartesian dual ism and i ts i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of human agency. In The Concept 
of iVlind, Ryle says that the Cartesian approach to vo l i t ion and human agency 
is dependent on two a c t i v i t i e s , one mental and one p h y s i c a l . For each 
vo l i t i ona l act , states Ry le , there appears to be some ghos t ly counterpar t in 
the mind which shows the body what to do. Ryle seems to be saying that 
the body reacts much in the way that a s tudent dancer copies the movements 
of the teacher whom he can see r e f l ec ted in the m i r r o r - i f the teacher 
l i f t s his foot the s tudent l i f t s his foo t . 
Lewis would contend tha t not on ly has Ryle misrepresented Descartes 
and o ther dua l i s t s l ike h imself , he has also missed the po in t . He has 
' p igeon-ho led ' mental and phys ica l events in to separate categories; and this 
is in no way j u s t i f i e d . L ike Descartes, Lewis believes that al l vol i t ional 
a c t i v i t y is one event - one a c t i v i t y - but w i t h two ( inseparable) component 
p a r t s : l i ke two cogs moving by the i r i n t e r l o c k i n g t ee th , one cog being 
phys ica l and co rporea l , and the o ther mental and non-co rpo rea l . The mental 
component which is non-observable and non-spa t ia l is s t i l l temporal and is 
t h e r e f o r e l i n k e d to the temporal existence of the body ( t h o u g h not to i ts 
spat ial e x t e n s i o n ) . Lewis would say that the mind and body may be in two 
d i f f e r e n t categories or have two d i f f e r e n t natures but they combine in 
a c t i v i t y to p roduce a s ingle event , not two . 
To th i s c r i t i c i s m Lewis adds a f i n a l 'Par th ian sho t ' : Ryle seems unable 
to see the moral i ssue . Praise and blame, f reedom and vo l i t ion are al l t ied 
up in a c t i v i t y , and R y l e , i n Lewis ' v iew, has not p r o p e r l y accounted f o r 
them. Th i s same point has been expressed in similar terms by J . R. Lucas 
(18") 
in his paper 'The Soul ' and it remains one of the major cr i t ic isms of 
Ryle ' s approach to a c t i v i t y and v o l i t i o n . 
I n The Elusive Mind Lewis goes on to c r i t i c i se Ryle 's famous argument 
f o r ' k n o w i n g how' and ' knowing t h a t ' . I n that argument Ryle reverses the 
genera l ly accepted approach to knowledge which he believes is based upon 
the 'Car tes ian m y t h ' and suggests that knowing how to do a pa r t i cu la r 
a c t i v i t y is p r i m a r y in human knowledge and agency. I t comes before knowing 
that a n y t h i n g is the case; and he gives var ious examples of enterpr ises 
where k n o w i n g how seems to be p r i m a r y : p l ay ing f o o t b a l l , p l ay ing chess 
or e x e r c i s i n g a na tu r a l w i t . To th is Lewis responds by saying that even 
knowing how to play foo tba l l or p lay ing chess has a mental component. 
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Any sk i l l ed a c l i v i l y , i f it is vo l i t i ona l , must have a mental process which 
is app rop r i a t e to i t . Lewis would argue that Ryle is too simplistic and too 
ready to impose his presupposi t ions on any o ther approach . Mental 
processes are not , as Ryle mistakenly t h i n k s , isolable events which can be 
t imed , but are processes which are cons tant ly c h a n g i n g , f l owing f rom 
consciousness to subconsciousness and back again . 
Obv ious ly Lewis sees Ryle as one i f not the most important opponent 
to his posi t ion as a dua l i s t . I t seems that Lewis is almost always prepared 
to devote some space in his books to a defence of the dual is t posit ion f rom 
the a rguments of Ryle - p a r t i c u l a r l y those in The Concept of Mind , where 
he states his belief that Descartes was the f o u n d i n g f a t h e r of the ' o f f i c i a l 
t i oc t r i ne ' as Ryle calls i t , which is the popular and misguided approach to 
personal existence and the basis of the dualism which is in common c u r r e n c y . 
Lewis , as we have seen, agrees and suppor t s Descartes ' approach in almost 
eve ry way . I t is t he re fo re not s u r p r i s i n g that there is a tendency in Lewis' 
w o r k towards a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the Rylean v iew. 
I n The Concept of M i n d , Ryle describes how he intends to deal wi th 
the 'Car tes ian myth ' 
I shal l o f t e n speak of i t w i t h del iberate abusiveness as the 
'dogma of the Ghost in the Machine ' . I hope to prove that 
i t is e n t i r e l y fa lse , and false not in deta i l but i n p r i n c i p l e . 
I t is not merely an assemblage of p a r t i c u l a r mistakes. I t 
is one b ig mistake and a mistake of a special k i n d . I t is 
(19) 
namely a ca tegory mistake. 
The idea of ca tegory mistake is at the v e r y heart of Ryle 's t he s i s . . The 
mistake was not obvious in Ryle 's v i ew, because i t appeared to be a part 
of the normal vocabula ry used to descr ibe a pe r son . The sort of mistake 
he is t a l k i n g about is one l ike the one contained in the sentence: ' the 
house was pa in ted in warm co lour s ' . Only i f th i s sentence is reduced to i ts 
components par t s does the real conceptual problem become apparent ; how can 
a co lour be warm? T r u e , i t may evoke a f ee l ing similar to that experienced 
when a person is warm, but that is not the same t h i n g , the colour i t se l f is 
not wa rm. Terms such as ' t h i n k i n g ' , ' k n o w i n g ' and ' b e l i e v i n g ' , when used 
in sentences wh ich invo lve an in fe rence of two ent i t ies (body and soul) 
w i t h i n a pe r son , are category mistakes of the same o r d e r . 
Ryle i l l u s t r a t e s category mistakes supe rb ly (as he does many other 
poin t s ) by using a s t o r y . This is the now famous i l l u s t r a t i o n of the v i s i to r 
to O x f o r d who, a f t e r hav ing seen al l the ancient bu i ld ings and Colleges, 
asked i f he could be shown the U n i v e r s i t y . The mistake is found in the 
v i s i t o r not r ecogn is ing that there was no th ing else to see - no other 
c a t e g o r y , no f u r t h e r e n t i t y - which could be seen and which could be called 
the U n i v e r s i t y . Likewise w i t h persons there is no unseen ca tegory , no 
unperce ived substance which f u r t h e r describes and def ines a person. 
With the r ecogn i t ion of th i s ca tegory mistake Ryle was able to go on 
to exp la in his approach to cover t and over t human a c t i v i t y . These Ryle 
desc r ibed in terms of d ispos i t ions which cons t i tu te a l i a b i l i t y or tendency 
to do or to f a i l to do cer ta in t h ings in pa r t i cu l a r c i rcumstances. Because 
these d ispos i t ions are t ied to circumstance and resu l t in cer ta in behaviour , 
i t fo l lows that such behaviour is p red ic t ab le . This p r ed i c t ab i l i t y gives us 
what Ryle calls an ' in fe rence t i c k e t ' , which may lead to law- l ike statements 
about behav iour . Ry le , as William Lyons points out i n his I n t r o d u c t i o n to 
the Phi losophy of Gi lber t R y l e , appears to subs t i t u t e behavioural disposi t ions 
f o r Car tes ian mental ac t iv i t i es and substance. ^^'^^ 
I n his at tempt to t u r n the tables on Ry le , Lewis shows that category 
mistakes are as b ig a problem f o r Ryle 's approach as f o r that of Descartes. 
Lewis poin ts out that Ryle 's insis tence in The Concept of Mind on being 
shown a mental even t , o r evidence of a r e l a t ionsh ip between mind and body, 
is j.ust such a mistake. Ryle appears to be expec t ing that mental reali t ies 
should be inves t iga ted in the same way as phys ica l real i t ies and therefore 
be b r o u g h t to the bar of empir ical i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I n Lewis ' v iew, mind is not 
mate r ia l , i t is not even special ly r e f i n e d mater ia l , and i t is a category 
mistake to t rea t i t as t hough i t were . The ca tegory mistake is best i l l u s -
t r a t e d in the sort of language Ryle uses to descr ibe the dual is t pos i t ion . 
He w r i t e s in his i n t r o d u c t i o n to The Concept of M i n d : 
Some would p r e f e r to say that every human being is both 
body and mind . His body and mind are o r d i n a r i l y 
harnessed toge the r , a f t e r death of the body his mind may 
cont inue to exis t and f u n c t i o n . 
To th i s p a r t i c u l a r passage Lewis responds d i r e c t l y : 
The term 'harnessed' as used is s i g n i f i c a n t . I t is hard 
to avoid some metaphor in de sc r ib ing the re la t ion of 
mind and body . Bu t i t is revea l ing t h a t , at the v e r y 
ou tse t , Professor Ryle should be us ing a metaphor which 
suggests v e r y s t r o n g l y that he is t h i n k i n g of mental 
processes, as envisaged in the Cartes ian pos i t ion , as 
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closely analogous material ones or , as he later a f f i r m s 
(21) 
to be the case, dupl icates of them. 
I n The Elusive Mind he again expresses this point and suggests 
that the mind and i t s re la t ionsh ip to the body is unique and not available 
to empir ica l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I n Lewis ' view the re fo re i t is a serious category-
mistake to "xpect i t to behave as phys ica l mater ia l , and this mistake is 
s u f f i c i e n t l y large to put in jeopardy Ryle 's whole thes is , and v i r t u a l l y to 
d iscount his c r i t i c i sm of Cartesian dual ism. 
As well as th is Lewis is qu i ck to castigate Ryle f o r his r id i cu le of 
Descartes . He contends that i t is u n j u s t to blame and r id icu le Descartes 
f o r be ing misguided by the science available to him in placing the precise 
area of in t e rac t ion between the mind and body in the pineal g land , between 
the two b ra in hemispheres . Also the c r i t i c i sm level led by Ryle at Descartes' 
use of language and p a r t i c u l a r l y his negat ive mechanistic language is again 
u n j u s t because these were the only tools available to him at the t ime. Lewis 
concludes that i f these sor ts of problems are over looked , as they should be, 
then Descartes ' basic approach , i n c l u d i n g a fundamenta l d i s t inc t ion between 
mind and body , and s e l f -knowledge , based upon an ind ispu tab le recogni t ion 
of our own exis tence , are v e r y c o n v i n c i n g . 
Lewis obv ious ly does not value much of Ryle 's work as he says: 
. . . P r o f e s s o r Ryle declares that he in tends to proceed 
w i t h 'de l ibera te abus iveness ' , and I t h i n k that in th i s 
at least he undoub t ed ly succeeds. ^ 
F u r t h e r m o r e , Lewis sharpens his a t tack on material is ts l ike Ryle in 
The Elusive Self , where he quest ions why they bother cons t ruc t i ng 
a rguments at a l l , because these are undoub t ed ly in tended to change our 
minds and modi fy our behaviour which in theory are predic table and are 
d ic ta ted by d ispos i t ions and tendencies : 
Indeed i t is ha rd to unde r s t and the zest and even pr ide 
wi th wh ich some severe mater ial is ts press the i r case when 
th i s i t se l f invo lves the r epud ia t ion of the force of a r g u -
ment as such to modi fy the cause of our t h i n k i n g . . . 
Sooner or la ter we have a r educ t io ad absurdum of the 
desperate r epud ia t ion of what is so obvious a fact of 
(23) 
exper ience . 
I t seems that in Ryle and Lewis we have two irrecoi^ilable positions based 
upon d i f f e r e n t p resuppos i t ions and epistemologies. They seem to act 
as i f they were two exp lo re r s who come across a new creature as 
yet unknown to science. The c rea ture wa lks , hears , 
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sees, ta lks and seems to answer the quest ions of the exp lore rs i n t e l l i g e n t l y . 
A l t h o u g h both are exci ted about the i r new f i n d they both in t e rp re t what they 
have f o u n d in completely d i f f e r e n t ways . One suggests the creature is an 
as yet undiscovered breed of animal, which is ext remely in t e l l i gen t . The 
o ther sees no reason fo r desc r ib ing it as a n y t h i n g but a person, perhaps even 
a lost b ranch of the human race. 
I t has been seen that Lewis f i n d s l i t t l e to commend in the views of 
empi r ic i s t s l ike Ry le . This is to some extent also t r u e of other approaches to 
personal existence in general which do not in some way enshrine t rad i t iona l 
dua l i sm. Minimal dual is ts l ike P. F . Strawson are not f ree f rom c r i t i c i sm. 
I n his book I n d i v i d u a l s , Strawson suggests that we can know other minds 
t h r o u g h o b s e r v i n g someone's behaviour because, being fundamenta l ly simple 
c r ea tu r e s , our t hough t s are expressed in our bodi ly states. For Lewis this 
is o b v i o u s l y too close to Ryle 's posi t ion which denies any d i s t inc t mental 
ca tegory and the re fo re argues f o r a behavioura l unde r s t and ing of human 
p e r s o n a l i t y . Lewis responds to Strawson in much the same way as he does 
to R y l e , by a r g u i n g that we are essent ia l ly p r iva t e in our thoughts and 
a l t hough we can make ourselves known t h r o u g h our bodies we do not have to 
and r e f r a i n f r o m doing so i f we so w i s h . Not ing the t r e n d of his own argument 
and the p o s s i b i l i t y of c r i t i c i s m , Lewis is qu ick to p a r r y any suggestions that 
might accuse him of a tendency towards sol ipsism, by a f f i r m i n g the importance 
of the body to r communication both received and g i v e n . 
Before we move on to c r i t i c i s e Lewis ' approach there are two important 
areas in Lewis ' thesis which should be covered and even th is w i l l leave others 
( w h i c h , to be su re , are of less impor tance) such as 'dreaming ' and ' h i s to ry ' 
und i scussed . These two areas are 'memory' and ' immor t a l i t y ' . For Lewis 
memory has a close connect ion w i t h i d e n t i t y . Memory of past events seems 
to es tab l i sh a c o n t i n u i t y of i d e n t i t y . Memory of a past event or experience 
and r e f l e c t i o n upon the present es tabl ish tha t i t is the same subject of 
exper ience then as now: the person I remember hav ing experiences in the past 
is the same person exper i enc ing now - that i s , me. Lewis goes on to 
suggest i n both The Elusive Self and The Self and Immor ta l i ty that memory is 
the most impor tan t c r i t e r i o n in es tab l i sh ing cont inuous i d e n t i t y . By re -c rea t ing 
the past by our rememberance of i t we f i n d that we are the same person then 
as now. A c t i v i t i e s and events wh ich are remembered always have 'us' placed 
in then or in re la t ion to them. Even poor ly remembered or p rev ious ly 
unremembered events can be s lot ted in to the ove ra l l p i c tu re of our past because 
our iden t i t i e s are a l ready es tab l i shed . I n the case of memory loss, or even 
to ta l amnesia, however , i d e n t i t y may s t i l l be es tab l i shed , because, Lewis 
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points ou t , 1 am s t i l l myself now! T h e r e f o r e , i d e n t i t y is heavil /y dependent 
upon memory fo r the establishment of c o n t i n u i t y t h roughou t our livt^s, but is 
not dependent upon it in the f i n a l and complete sense, because iden t i ty is both 
s e l f - ex i s t en t and s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . 
So that we are clear what i t is he is s ay ing , Lewis unpacks his approach 
to memory. He suggests that there are two fundamenta l types of memory. 
The f i r s t is a memory of some f a c t : ' I remember the date of the Battle of 
H a s t i n g s . ' The second invo lves a memory of myself in re la t ion to the event 
' I remember my b r e a k f a s t . ' The second of these two types of memory is the 
more impor t an t f o r the establ ishment of i d e n t i t y . .As we have seen, c o n t i n u i t y 
of i d e n t i t y f o r Lewis depends on the r e l a t i onsh ip of a person to his remembered 
exper ience and also the r e l a t ionsh ip of that experience to other events , both 
past and presen t . 
The second area that should be covered is that of immor ta l i ty . Lewis ' 
approach to immor ta l i ty o r ig ina tes in his approach to personal existence and 
is t h e r e f o r e less of a ' b u i l d i n g block ' and more of an applicat ion of his 
ove ra l l thes is . Lewis recognises the heavy dependence which his view 
has on his dualism when he says: 
I do not t h i n k that any case f o r immor ta l i ty can begin 
to get o f f the g r o u n d i f we f a i l to make a case f o r 
, r (24) dual ism. 
At the beg inn ing of The Self and I m m o r t a l i t y , Lewis spells out what appears 
to be the one c e r t a i n t y of human exis tence - we w i l l a l l d ie . But i f the evidence 
f o r the existence of the soul is tenable and his arguments are acceptable, 
Lewis would argue that he has the answer f o r the cont inuat ion of the self 
beyond dea th . The self is not dependent upon the body f o r i ts existence 
and t h e r e f o r e cou ld , in t heo ry at any r a t e , cont inue a f t e r the dissolut ion of 
the b o d y . His approach to persons , who comprise two d i s t inc t and disparate 
p a r t s , leads Lewis to postulate a f o r m of disembodied existence in a l i fe a f t e r 
death of the body. P ick ing up on some of H . H . Price's ideas of disembodied 
ex is tence , Lewis speculates tha t any n o n - p h y s i c a l f u t u r e existence could 
cont inue w i t h : 
(1) No cont inued existence in phys ica l space, but cont inued existence 
in t ime. 
(2) Communication between disembodied souls by te lepathy. 
(3) The poss ib i l i ty of existence in an 'image w o r l d ' w i t h an 'image body ' 
created e i ther by God or by each i n d i v i d u a l ' s mental perception 
of h imself , which is p ro jec ted and communicates to others te lepa t i i i ca l ly . 
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(4) Memory of past l i fe which would prov ide reference material 
for new l i f e , i n c l u d i n g the 'image w o r l d ' and 'image body ' . 
Resur rec t ion seems, f o r Lewis , both impossible and unnecessary; it 
is impossible because there is no way that the body can be reconst i tu ted 
a f t e r i ts d issolu t ion and decay; and unnecessary because persons are 
essent ia l ly mental substances and the body is not r e q u i r e d in any d e f i n i t i o n 
of the self . Persons descr ibed in terms of the mind or soul means that the 
body can be removed wi thou t any i l l e f fec t s being experienced by the self . 
Only i f the body is in some way synonymous w i t h , or important f o r , the 
desc r ip t i on of a person is r e s u r r e c t i o n a f t e r death necessary. 
Some of Lewis ' c r i t i c s have suggested that disembodied existence seems 
r a t h e r r a r e f i e d and u n a t t r a c t i v e and compares un favou rab ly wi th our present 
exis tence . Also they point out that the problems of solipsism seem v e r y great 
in an existence which is t o t a l l y dependent upon the mind . To these and other 
object ions Lewis suggests that we cannot f u l l y appreciate the oppor tun i t ies 
and qual i t ies which such an existence o f f e r s . However, the c r i t i c s remain 
and most ob jec t , not s imply to his views on f u t u r e existence, but to his 
dua l i sm. I f Lewis is success fu l in his arguments f o r the existence of the 
m i n d / s e l f / s o u l then his pos i t ion on disembodied existence seems secure. I f 
th i s is the case then i t is impor tan t to move to a c r i t i c i sm of Lewis ' approach 
to personal ciListencc and an examination of whether his arguments hold u p . 
From the summary of Lewis ' thesis a number of questions would seem 
to ar i se : Does Lewis ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and development of the basic evidence of 
an i n d i v i d u a l ' s self-awareness exclude a l l others? Is Cartesian in teract ionism 
the best express ion of dualism? Are his basic assumptions and arguments 
which fo rm the founda t ion of his approach correct? Of these questions the 
last is p robab ly the most i m p o r t a n t , because f r o m i t arise many ( i f not a l l ) 
of the answers to the o ther ques t ions . This chapter has so f a r attempted 
to p rov ide an overv iew of Lewis ' a rguments f o r the existence of the soul and 
his appl ica t ion of the fundamenta l d i s t i n c t i o n between body and soul . But 
are there major weaknesses, and i f there are , where are they to be found? 
I f Lewis were asked the ques t i on : What is the position of the soul in 
space and time? He would answer by saying that the soul or the mind is 
not in space but in t ime. That i s , he would argue that our experience of 
ourselves leads us to the conclus ion that our minds are temporal but logic 
leads us to conclude that they are not spa t ia l . We experience a succession 
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ol thoughts but are unable to place the mind in any place - the mind has 
no spatial p roper t i es at a l l . T h i s , of course, is consistent wi th the idea 
that the soul is a non-phys ica l substance which is nevertheless related to 
our bodies t h r o u g h the i r temporal i n t e rac t ions . I f the body and soul are 
to in t e rac t at al l i t is clear that the idea of a temporal soul would he lp . 
This unde r s t and ing of the r e l a t ionsh ip between body and soul is at the heart 
of Lewis ' c r i t i c i sm of I . T . Ramsey who in his book Freedom and Immor ta l i t y , 
argues f o r a mind which t ranscends both space and t ime. Lewis does not 
wish to r e t u r n to the platonic not ion of a timeless self because he believes 
that i t is beset by phi losophical problems. The problems would f a l l in to two 
main areas. F i r s t , a timeless self would make the l i n k between body and 
mind v e r y ten^uous. Argumen t s f o r the existence of the soul could not r e ly 
on any evidence o ther than some sort of shared i n d i v i d u a l apprehension, 
which might easily f a l l i n to con jec tu re and specula t ion. Also this would 
create an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the spectres of occasionalism and ep^iphenomenalism 
to raise t h e i r u g l y heads, and f o r Lewis nei ther is acceptable. Secondly, 
and f o r Lewis p robab ly more i m p o r t a n t , the idea of a timeless sell seems to 
r u n c o n t r a r y to the evidence of exper ience . Our thoughts do succeed one 
ano ther , they can be t imed , we can say what we thought a minute ago and 
what we t h i n k now. Our exper ience is successive and appears in some way 
to be t ied to ou r bod i ly t e m p o r a l i t y . But th is is not t r u e of any special 
c o n t i n u i t y . The m i n d , i t would seem, cannot be placed anywhere in space -
i f i t c o u l d , then i t would be available to our senses and to science and would 
no longer remain an empir ica l m y s t e r y . But there is a serious problem here . 
I f the mind is in time and not in space then two th ings must be t r u e : time 
and space must be d i s t i n c t and separable (not jus t in theory but in f a c t ) 
and time as d i s t inc t f r o m space must p rov ide an acceptable environment f o r 
the soul . 
Is i t possible to separate space and time? On the face of i t there seems 
no problem. We all know that w i t h i n our eve ryday experience the ' t ime' 
that we work to , the time on our w r i s t - w a t c h e s , has no d i rec t relat ion to 
our posi t ion in space. However , i t would seem that modern phys ics , based 
v e r y much on a single model of the universe p rov ided by Eins te in , would 
deny the poss ib i l i ty of any separat ion of the two. The use of phrases l ike 
'space-time' and ' spa t io - tempora l ' have been drawn f rom the sc ien t i f ic wor ld 
and themselves t e s t i f y to the common unde r s t and ing of the re la t ionship 
between space and t ime. I t is w o r t h no t ing some of the background to this 
content ion that space and time are inseparable . 
Sir Isaac Newton produced a view of the universe which postulateti 
that it was dominated, and in many ways de te rmined , by the twp constants 
of space and t ime. Space was th ree dimensional and p rov ided the 
'conta iner ' f o r a l l that o c c u r r e d . The un iversa l container though i n f i n i t e 
was s t i l l a conta iner or a ' receptacle ' ^^^^and as such was a constant and 
f i x e d . Time was also cons tan t , i t was the cont inua l f low of change and 
motion w i t h i n the un ive r se wh ich f lowed at a f i x e d rate and as such could 
be measured. I n some ways i t was the number ing of before and a l t e r . 
Th i s explanat ion of time gave r i se to the common i l l u s t r a t i on of time being 
l ike a r i v e r cons tan t ly f l o w i n g t h r o u g h the present f rom the past into the 
f u t u r e w i t h a l l t h ings c a r r i e d along as vessels in i ts s t rong c u r r e n t . 
Hav ing descr ibed the u n i v e r s e , Newton was then able to presentproof f o r 
his view of thermodynamics which seemed to be unal terable and always 
t r u e . Newton was not alone in p romulga t ing such an approach, but gave 
i t i t s f u l l e s t and most systematic t reatment and the reby p rov ided an 
inva luable legacy f o r the modern era . I t would be t ho rough ly consistent 
w i t h th i s approach to separate space and time and on that basis H . D. 
Lev/is would seem to have suppor t f o r his view of a temporal but non-
spat ial sou l . 
I f i t were not f o r A l b e r t E ins t e in , Lewis would have no problems. 
Eins te in has g iven supreme express ion to the re la t ional view of space and 
t ime. His medi ta t ion upon fou r -d imens iona l geometry led him lo reject l i ie 
absolute and u n i v e r s a l constants of time and space and caused him to 
postulate a un ive r se which was t h o r o u g h l y r e l a t i ve . Space and time are 
re la t ive to one another and also to the posi t ion of the exper iencer . I n some 
senses Einste in has p r o v i d e d a sc ien t i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Humean empiricism 
and epis temology. He, un l ike many of his predecessors , developed the 
importance of the i n d i v i d u a l i n his model of the un ive r se . Einstein stands 
at the head of a t r a d i t i o n of t hough t which f i n d s i ts earliest roots in 
P l a t o ^ ^ ^ ^ who i n f l uenced the Ear ly C h u r c h Fathers to adopt a re la t ional 
view of the u n i v e r s e . The view that was la ter r e i n t e r p r e t e d in the work 
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of Huygens and L e i b n i t z . Space and time are , according to E ins te in , 
two of the fundamenta l components of the universe but as such are not 
cons tants bu t f u n c t i o n s of one ano ther . An i l l u s t r a t i o n f i r s t told by 
Eins te in which has since had almost as many vers ions as tel lers w i l l , I 
hope, s u f f i c e to exp la in what r e la t ive space and time means. 
I n th i s i l l u s t r a t i o n there are three men. Two men are s tanding on top 
of a t r a i n , one near the f r o n t , one near the back. The f h i r d man is some 
way o f f , s t and ing on a h i l l s ide watch ing the t r a in joui 'ney across the p l i i r : 
below. Suddenly the t r a i n is s t r u c k by two bolts of l i g h t n i n g . One s t r ikes 
the f i r s t car r iage on which one of the men is s t and ing , the other s t r iken 
the t r a i n at the back - on the car r iage on which the second man is s t and ing . 
To both men on the t r a i n i t seems that the l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k simultaneously. 
The man on the h i l l s i d e , however , notices f rom his posit ion that the 
l i g h t n i n g was not simultaneous but the l i g h t n i n g which s t r u c k the f r o n t of 
the t r a i n was marg ina l ly before the bolt that s t ruck the back of the t r a i n . 
Also the concomitant t h u n d e r which would have appeared to the men on 'he 
t r a i n to be simiultaneous w i t h the l i g h t n i n g would reach the man on the 
hi l l s ide some time a f t e r he saw the l i g h t n i n g s t r i k e . The t iming of these 
events would be re la t ive to the posi t ions of the observers , all the events 
could be timed but i t would depend on where you were as to when the 
events would seem to have happened . Time is re la t ive to space and vice 
versa . Also both are re la t ive to the i n d i v i d u a l observer . 
Even in our da i ly exper ience space and time are found to be i n e x t r i c a b l y 
l i n k e d toge ther and re l a t ive to one another . I f I look out of the window the 
visual images seem to have an observable posit ion in space re la t ive to 
mysel f . Bu t these v i sua l images also have a posi t ion in t ime. The image; 
a r r i v e at my re t ina at the speed of l i g h t which a l though v e r y fast does tf ke 
some t ime. That time is d ic ta ted by the distance between myself and the 
objec ts . Sensation o ther than s igh t also bears out th is approach. I f I 
close my eyes and measure the l eng th of the table wi th my fingci-s the 
process takes t ime. Spatial dimensions are re la t ive to temporal condi t ions . 
The distance between two poin ts is condi t ioned as much by the time i t 
( 2 8 ) 
takes to t r a v e l (even at the speed of l i g h t ) between them as i t is by the 
measurement in metres - measurement of distance is i t se l f temporal ly 
cond i t ioned . This u n d e r s t a n d i n g of space-time lies at the heart of post-
Einste inian p h y s i c s . I t would seem impossible simply to separate space and 
time because the one cannot be descr ibed wi thou t the o ther . The only 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a separat ion in ou r language is one of convenience and to 
fac i l i t a t e f u r t h e r d i scuss ion , o therwise i t would seem that the universe 
is a s ingle complex space-time con t inuum. 
Why does Lewis believe he can separate space and time in to two separate 
entit ies? He never explains w h y , he simply assumes it is possible. I t 
would seem that Lewis is dependent f o r his i n t e rp re t a t i on of the in te rac t ion 
between the body and soul on an outmoded Newtonial /Classical model of 
space and t ime. Lewis ' whole approach is dependent upon, the poss ib i l i ty 
of doing this it must cause serious problems for Lewis ' argument . I f time 
cannot be separateci f r o m space in the way that Lewis r equ i res , he wi l l be 
forced e i ther to re ject the model of space-time which denies any separation 
of the two, or to r e t h i n k his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the body-soul dynamic. I f 
he re jec ts Eins te in ian phys ics he r u n s the r i sk of losing any c r e d i b i l i t y 
which he might have had . Could Lewis f i n d a new way to express the body-
soul in terac t ion? Is i t possible that Lewis could f i n d a way out of this 
dilemma wi thou t r e j e c t i n g Eins te in ian physics? There seem only three 
possible so lu t ions . F i r s t , Lewis could describe the soul in terms of space 
and t ime. But th i s would mean that i t is available to normal inves t iga t ion 
and not s imply to phi losophica l specula t ion . Secondly, Lev.'is could posti.Jate 
a d i f f e r e n t sor t of time w h i c h was not t ied to the temporal i ty of the body 
and t h e r e f o r e r e l a t ive to space, but a ' soul - t ime ' . This is possible. Eir.stein 
would not say that his approach excluded al l others in every c i rcumstance. 
But there would be problems in exp la in ing the exact re la t ionship between 
soul-t inie: and space-time since i t would seem to complicate an approach which 
Lewis has said to be simple and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and not complex. T h i r c l y , 
Lewis could j e t t i son the whole approach of a temporal soul and assert w i t h 
I . T . Ramsey that i t t ranscends the normal condi t ions of space and t ime. 
Maybe a non- tempora l soul would a f t e r a l l be palatable to Lewis - especi^lly 
i f he faced the p o s s i b i l i t y of los ing al l c r e d i b i l i t y . Lewis ' f a i l u r e to exp ain 
what he means by a ' temporal soul ' may have resul ted in the developmen': of 
a f a t a l f law in his approach . 
There is another ques t ion which one might ask: Is Lewis over - s impl i s t i c 
in his approach to personal existence? Lewis seems to pr ide himself in the 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d n e s s of his v iews , but is he neglect ing th ings which he should 
consider in the f o r m u l a t i o n of his arguments? One area in which this seems 
to be t r u e is tha t of memory. Memory, as Lewis recognises, is one of t l ie 
fundamenta l mental f acu l t i e s of a person , but has he ignored some notior s 
of memory which we could j u s t i f i a b l y have expected him to have considered? 
I n The Elusive Self Lewis does t r y , apparen t ly success fu l ly , to meet the 
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challenge of the sor t of causal memory that Professor Richard VVolheim o f f e r s , 
But there is another sor t of memory - another facet of the mental f a c u l t y 
we call memory to wh ich Lewis has n o f addressed himself . 
Scott Dunbar in his a r t i c le 'The Concept of Self: Some Reflect ions on 
H . D . Lewis ' 'The Self and I m m o r t a l i t y " ^^^^ which has been r e f e r r e d to 
p r e v i o u s l y , suggests that Lewis does not recognise the importance, or it 
would seem the exis tence , of any subconscious or unar t icu la ted memory. 
-33-
which Dunbar suggests has a real effect on our l ives . This is shown in 
the way that subconscious memories or unrecognised perceptions af fec t our 
a c t i v i t y . Dunbar i l l u s t r a t e s his argument by using a personal example from 
his own exper ience . He expla ins : 
Several years ago I was g iven a wa te r -co lour , by a f r i e n d 
who is a pa in t e r . The p i c t u r e , a s t i l l - l i f e , has hung in 
my s i t t i n g room w i t h o ther pa in t ings , since I received i t . 
About two years ago I decided to buy some new dishes 
f o r e v e r y d a y use. I had in mind plates w i th a simple 
green b o r d e r . Yet i t seemed impossible to f i n d the 
dishes I wan ted . And I had almost reconciled myself 
to cont inue to l ive w i t h the dishes I have been using fo r 
yea r s . One ciay I happened to go into a local shop, 
and was immediately a t t r ac ted by a pa r t i cu la r plate on 
d i s p l a y . H a p p i l y , the plate was one of a set of 
d ishes ; I bought them, b rough t them home, and immediately 
pu t them to use. Some months la te r , I had a f r i e n d to 
d i n n e r , and la te r i n the evening he asked i f he might look 
at my p a i n t i n g s . I began to look at the pa in t ings w i t h 
h i m , and d iscovered that the plate in the s t i l l - l i f e was 
v e r y s imi la r , i f not i den t i ca l , to plates we had used at 
d i n n e r . How are we to unders tand these occurrences? 
One might say that the s imi la r i ty between the plate in 
the p i c t u r e and the one I saw in the shop, and la ter 
b o u g h t , was a r a r e , but nonetheless simple, coincidence. 
Or one might say, as I would myself say, that one 
can and sometimes does unconsciously remember and 
reco l lec t , and that th i s is an instance of i t . ^^" ' ' ^ 
Many people, i t would seem, can t e s t i f y to th is sort of t h i n g t ak ing 
place where they are unconsc ious ly in f luenced to do or t h i n k something. 
But is i t the sort of t h i n g that happens r a r e ly or is i t s u f f i c i e n t l y 
f r e q u e n t and impor tan t f o r us to draw conclusions f rom it? Those w o r k i n g 
in the mainstream of the behavioura l sciences t ak ing the i r lead f rom F r e u d , 
Jung and E r i k s o n , would ce r t a in ly contend that our present behaviour , 
habi ts and tendencies , have a v e r y real foo tho ld in the past and tha t , 
a l t hough o f t e n un recogn i sed , everyone is dependent upon the subconscious 
levels of the mind to a great e x t e n t . Freudian psychologis ts would say that 
the* i d ' a n d ' s u p e r e g o ' c e r t a i n l y a f fec t us and that our behaviour is rooted 
in the memories and images b u i l t up in these var ious levels of our psyc T C 
f r o m b i r t h onwards . A l t h o u g h Dunbar ' s 'unconscious memory' may not D C 
d i r e c t l y associated w i t h Freudian Md' and 'superego', he s t i l l seer.is to be 
saying that we must not expect human beings to act and t h i n k in response 
to conscious memory and percept ion and to f i n d the i r motivation for a c t i v i t y 
in the simple fac t s of t he i r present exis tence. Lewis seems inva i ' i ab ly to 
take the s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and simple approach to a number of t h ings . 
A l t h o u g h th i s is o f t e n r e f r e s h i n g and s t imula t ing i t can at times lead to 
an ove r - s imp l i s t i c view of the way th ings are . Lewis gives no a t tent ion 
to innate or subconscious tendencies and memories in personal exis tence. 
He does not seem to recognise that we are also both unconscious and 
sub-conscious beings and that we are more available to our subl iminal levels 
of consciousness than we o f t en recognise . Why this is t rue of Lewis is 
something of a m y s t e r y . Perhaps he fears the determinis t ic f l a v o u r of a 
lot of modern psychology or perhaps i t is too close to some of the th ings 
that Ryle has said f r o m w h i c h ' h e appears s t i l l to be smar t ing . What is sure , 
however , is that by leaving th i s area almost en t i r e ly uncons idered , Lewi? 
leaves l i t t l e room in his arguments f o r a more developmental approach to 
human i d e n t i t y . Can we be sure that we are not con t inua l ly r e d e f i n i n g 
ourselves in terms of our past and present? Is i t not possible that 
unconscious u n a r t i c u l a t e d memories and images bu i ld up layer by layer tc 
mould the people we are? I n d i v i d u a t i o n , the process whereby a person [,rows 
and develops to become what they are in the present , seems to p rov ide r 
r a t h e r more dynamic approach to personal existence than Lewis ' static 
categories of body and m i n d . Maybe percept ion or apprehension of ones 
own i n d i v i d u a l i t y does lead to some form of dual ism. Perhaps Lewis is 
cor rec t in sugges t ing that se l f -knowledge does lead to the recogni t ion of 
some sort of ' m i n d ' , but has he p rov ided the best model? Does his argument 
f o r a ' temporal mind ' make sense in a pos t -Eins te in ian era? I t would see.m 
that i n his at tempt to rescue dualism f r o m the ravages of empir icism Lew's 
has become too closely associated w i t h a theory of body and mind which is 
unable to cope w i t h the modern in t e rp re t a t i ons of the phys ica l and behax'ioural 
sciences. Lewis ' idea of d i s cove r ing our present ident i t ies and his basic 
evidence of s e l f -knowledge and our recogni t ion of ourselves as subjects of 
exper ience does seem j u s t i f i e d . But the jump that he then makes to 
Cartesian dualism seems to t a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d . I n i t se l f this might be 
defens ib le but not on g rounds that i t is a logal progress ion f r o m one po nt 




1. 1. T . Ramsey, ' T h e Systematic Elusivencss o f ' T " ' i n his Chr i s t i an 
Empir^icism (Sheldon Press, 1974) . 
2. See I . T . Ramsey, Freedom and Immorta l i ty ( S . C . W . , 1960) p.94 . 
3. Thomas Nagel , who approaches this subject f r o m a d i f f e r e n t d i rec t ion 
f r o m Lewis , has expressed similar thoughts in his Mortal Questions 
(Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1979): see especially chapter 'What is 
i t l ike to be a bat ' . 
4. H . D . Lewis , The Self and Immorta l i ty (Macmillan, 1971); see 
p a r t i c u l a r l y p . 115. 
5. S. Dunba r , ' T h e concept of self: Some re f lec t ions on H . D. Lewis ' 
"The Self and Immortah tv ' " , Rehgious Studies , v o l . 16, No. 1, 1980 . 
6. H . D . Lewis , The Self and Immor t a l i t y . p . 2 0 -
7. R . Descar tes , Descartes ' Philosophical W r i t i n g s , ed . by D. Anscombe 
and P. Geach (Ne lson , 1954), p.117, 
8. See H . D . Lewis , The Self and Immor t a l i t y , p p . 19 - 20-
9. H . D . Lewis , The Elusive Self (MacmiUan, 1981), pp . 56 - 7. 
10. H . D . Lewis , The Self and I m m o r t a l i t y . p . l 3 7 -
11 . H ibbe r t J o u r n a l , January 196L 
12. H . D . Lewis , Freedom and Hi s to ry (George, Allen and U n w i n , 1962) 
p .305. 
13. H . D . Lewis , Phi losophy of Rel igion (Teach Yourse l f Books, U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, 1965),chapter 24. 
14. H . D . Lewis , The Elusive M i n d , (Al len & U n w i n , 1952), p.275-
15. D . Hume, An Abs t r ac t of a Treat ise of Human Nature , 1760 (Langmans, 
Green & C o . , 1938), b k . 1, p t . 4, sec. 6. 
16. A l l quota t ions in th i s section f r o m H . D. Lewis , The Self and 
I m m o r t a l i t y , p p . 343 - 5. 
17. H . D . Lewis , The Elusive Self , p.13. 
18. J . R. Lucas , 'The soul ' . in Faith and Log ic , ed . by B . Mitchell 
(A l l en & U n w i n , 1958), 
• 36. 
Chapter 2 con t . . 
19. G. R y l e , The Concept of Mind (Hutch inson ' s , U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , 
1949), p.15. 
20. W. L y o n s , I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Philosophy of Gilbert Ryle 
(1980). 
2 1 . H . D . Lewis , Philosophy of Religion , p . 277. There is also an 
i n t e r e s t i n g para l le l to the use of 'harnessed' as a metaphor of the 
connect ion between body and soul in Plato's Phaedrus 246 (The 
L i b r a r y of L i b e r a l A r t s , 1956), p .28 . 
22. H . D . Lewis , Phi losophy of Re l ig ion , p .276 , 
23. H . D . L e w i s , The Elusive Self , p . 18, 
24. H . D . Lewis , Persons and L i f e A f t e r Death (Macmillan, 1978), p . 131. 
25. T . F . T o r r a n c e , Space, Time and Incarna t ion ( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, 1969), p . 4 . 
26. See T . F. T o r r a n c e , Space, Time and I n c a r n a t i o n , pp . 4 f f . 
27. I b i d . , p .38 , 
28. E ins te in d i scovered that l i g h t t rave l led at a constant speed. There fo re 
a beam of l i g h t f r o m a moving object (however f a s t ) would always 
t r a v e l at the same speed. This fact suggests that l i gh t is a constant . 
I n f a c t , as i t t u r n s ou t , i t is the only constant in the un iverse . 
29. R. Wolhein, 'Memory: Expe r i en t i a l memory and personal i d e n t i t y ' . 
Percept ion and I d e n t i t y , 1973. 
30. S. D u n b a r , 'The Concept of S e l f . 
31. I b i d . , p . 4 5 . 
CHAPTER 3 
AN A L T E R N A T I V E DESCRIPTION OF PERSON 
Section 1 
The Octapoids resemble no th ing which might be called human and yet 
they are i n t e l l i gen t c rea tures able to communicate, to plan f o r the f u t u r e 
and r e f l e c t on the past . They also have a h i g h l y developed and sophisticated 
socie ty and f o r m in t imate and long las t ing re la t ionships w i t h one another . 
Never theless we and they are d i f f e r e n t and the main way in which we d i f f e r 
is in phys ica l appearance and c o n s t i t u t i o n . They look l ike r a the r benign 
d r y - l a n d octopuses (whence comes the i r name), w i t h a great number of 
tentacles and a large bulbous body . They also have v e r y pecul iar f lesh 
which on contact attaches i t se l f to al l sorts of t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g other 
octopoicls. Hav ing become s tuck to something they are , f o r a shor t whi le , 
able to detach themselves qui te easily f r o m the th ings to which they have 
become a t t ached , but i f l e f t too long the bond becomes f i r m e r and the 
adhesion complete. Octapoids jo in themselves to a l l sorts of t h i n g s . Of ten 
they become f o n d of p a r t i c u l a r places and t he i r tentacles b u r r o w deep into 
the g r o u n d and f i x them to the spot - they call this ' p u t t i n g down roo t s ' . 
Others are more mobile and as an a l t e rna t ive to p u t t i n g down roots become 
at tached to small movable objects which they c a r r y a round w i t h them. I t i s , 
however , w i t h o ther Octapoids that they develop t he i r s t rongest t ies . 
Hav ing allowed a bond to develop an Octapoid need not remain s tuck 
f o r e v e r , but i f t hey do separate themselves f r o m something or someone it 
is not uncommon f o r t he i r f l e sh to tear away leaving par ts of the i r tentacles 
s t i l l a t t ached . 
As soon as they are born they s ta r t to s t i ck to t h i n g s . At f i r s t they 
f o r m a un ion w i t h t h e i r mother . This re la t ionsh ip is v i t a l f o r the young 
Octapoids ' s ecu r i t y and heal th but soon the process of removing the tentacles 
one by one begins . As the ch i ld grows so the number of connections 
decreases u n t i l on ly one or two remain . Most of them make the step of 
i n i t i a t i n g t h e i r g radua l detachment success fu l ly w i t h only a l i t t l e pain on 
e i the r s ide . Others f i n d i t more d i f f i c u l t ; some remain f u l l y attached to th ' ; i r 
mothers t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r l i v e s , whi ls t o thers o f t en leave large pieces of 
themselves behind or even take pieces away. I t is said that you can 
sometimes see Octapoids c a r r y i n g the i r mother 's breast a round w i t h them, 
but these are shy c rea tu res , r a r e ly seen, who e i ther disguise the fact or 
keep themselves f r o m the public eye. 
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There arc of course o ther important at tachments that Octapoids must 
make i f they are to grow into heal thy normal adu l t s , but many continue to 
believe that the one w i t h the i r mother is the most impor t an t . 
The process of attachment and detachment, making bonds and tear ing 
away, is a slow and o f t en p a i n f u l a f f a i r , but there need be no i l l e f f e c t s . 
On the c o n t r a r y , the Octapoids are able to replace t he i r lost members ve ry 
easily and in the process of fo rming bonds (bo th w i t h other Octapoids and 
to some ex ten t w i t h places and t h i n g s ) , d isconnect ing and r e g r o w i n g 
severed p a r t s , they grow in s ta ture and phys ica l m a t u r i t y . I n fact i t might 
be said that th i s process is not on ly h e l p f u l but essential to t h e i r g r o w t h 
and development . 
The problem is that the r e g r o w t h of t he i r severed par ts depends vcr^ 
much upon the Octapoids themselves. They can only replace par ts as they 
remember them to have been. This creates complicat ions. I f the detached 
par t is v e r y large - l ike a whole tentacle - i t is d i f f i c u l t f o r them to 
remember what i t looked l ike before i t became at tached to something else. 
Because r e g r o w t h depends to a large extent upon memory th is can create 
v a r y i n g degrees of d i s a b i l i t y . Success in r e g r o w t h depends on how aware 
the Octapoid was of the precise na ture of the union and on how fo r tuna t e 
they are in not los ing a v e r y large par t of themselves. The most successful 
at th i s process grow to become the largest i n d i v i d u a l s . Som.e of these help 
the more severe ly disabled by encouraging them to recognise the way m 
which they f o r m bonds and reca l l what the i r limbs would have looked l ike 
before t h e i r at tachment was f o r m e d . I n doing th i s the Octapoids are able 
to p u l l o f f t h e i r imper fec t limbs and grow new ones. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the 
pain i n v o l v e d in th i s process deters many but there have been some 
remarkable resu l t s and some Octapoids who were once c r ipp led f i n d that 
they are again l i v i n g and g r o w i n g normal ly . 
The i l l u s t r a t i o n at tempts to i l luminate some par ts of the process of 
psycholog ica l development by p ro j ec t i ng some of the essential elements in to 
a phys i ca l realm. The i nven t ed creatures exh ib i t in the i r phys ica l atachment 
and detachment something which is impor tan t about the e f fec t that persona! 
re la t ionsh ips and our envi ronment have upon our development and 
i n d i v i d u a t i o n . I n the same way that i t is in the fo rma t ion , development, 
r e d e f i n i t i o n and loss of p a r t i c u l a r re la t ionships which enable the Octapoids 
to g row, so i t is in the f o r m i n g , deve lop ing , r e d e f i n i n g and losing of 
in t e l l ec tua l and emotional bonds that human beings grow as i n d i v i d u a l s . 
The i l l u s t r a t i o n recognises that there are stages to psychological g rowth 
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and that th is o f t e n means that one k ind of i-elationship must e i ther terminate 
or be replaced in o r d e r that o the r s , which prov ide d i f f e r e n t th ings and 
sometimes less in the way of emotional n u r t u r i n g and s u p p o r t , may be formed. 
The i l l u s t r a t i o n also reveals the need to recognise that there is an equa. 
importance in the r e d e f i n i t i o n and s tage- l ike development of re la t ionships 
as there is in the n u r t u r i n g and secur i ty which a stable stage in a re la ' ionsh ip 
may p r o v i d e ; there are oppor tun i t i e s f o r personal g r o w t h both in the 
f o s t e r i n g and in the r e d e f i n i t i o n of re la t ionsh ips . 
I d e n t i t y accord ing to th is view is not a static ca tegory , but is 
something wh ich has i t s roots i n our ear ly l i f e and experiences and is in a 
process of becoming. 
Th i s becoming is not merely a passive exper ience or f o r that matter 
a case of act ive i n i t i a t i o n by another person , but is a complex of ex te rna l 
e f f e c t s and personal i n i t i a t i v e . I t is to be stressed that time is important 
in t h i s process; we are indeb ted to our past and present f o r what we ai'e 
now and w i l l be in the f u t u r e , and because development and i n d i v i d u a t i c n 
are so t h r o u g h l y re la ted to the temporal process our iden t i t i e s develop and 
change. Time and change penetrate the deepest levels of our psyche. 
Amongst the countless events , people and places which we have 
exper ienced in our l ives there are some which are ot p a r t i c u l a r importance. 
There are stages when dependency . re la t ionships , l ike that of the nu r s ing 
couple or the adolescent and peer g r o u p , f o r m the focus of our development. 
The mutual dependence, n u r t u r i n g and f o s t e r i n g of these re la t ionships is 
impor t an t bu t they do have a n a t u r a l l i f e and a l imit beyond which the i r 
usefu lness decreases. A stage is reached when the re la t ionsh ip requi res 
development and r e d e f i n i t i o n ; a suck l ing ch i ld must s u f f e r the loss of the 
breast at some stage and the teenager the loss of an int imate group of 
peers . I t is i n these experiences that we are f o r ced to face the need f c r a 
sense of autonomy, i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y and independence. The bereavem,ent 
exper ienced in the loss of a p a r t i c u l a r sort of re la t ionsh ip and i t s replacement 
by another can be t r aumat ic , but can also o f f e r new potent ia l in our 
development . 
I n Eve lyn Waugh's classic novel Brideshead Revis i ted there is an 
episode v>/hich i l l u s t r a t e s th is po in t . Charles R y d e r , hav ing invoked the 
w r a t h of Lady Marchmain is ' expel led ' f rom Br ideshead , maybe never to 
r e t u r n again . With the doors of the house h a v i n g been closed behind h^m, 
R y d e r recal ls how he f e l t : 
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1 was unmoved: there was no pviYt of me remotely 
touched by her d i s t r e s s . I t was as I had o f t en imagined 
being expelled f r o m school. I almost expected to hear 
her say "-'I have already w r i t t e n to i n f o r m your unhappy 
fa ther ' ' . But as I d rove away and t u r n e d back in the 
car to take what promised to be my last view of the 
house, I f e l t that I was leaving par t of myself beh ind , 
and there wherever I went a f t e r w a r d s I should feel the 
lack of i t , and search f o r i t hopelessly, as ghosts are 
said to do, f r e q u e n t i n g the spots where they bur ied 
material t reasures wi thou t which they cannot pay the i r 
way to the ne ther w o r l d . 
We have al l exper ienced ' leaving par t of ourselves behind ' when we 
have s u f f e r e d the loss of a re la t ionsh ip w i t h a person or place. The 
approach o f f e r e d in th i s chapter recognises the r ea l i t y of that experience 
and bu i lds upon the process of which these experiences are pa r t i cu la r 
examples. Most of us perceive that ce r ta in p a r t i c u l a r l y s ign i f i can t even';s 
can become l i f e - c h a n g i n g periods in our l i ves ; the content ion in this 
chap te r is tha t these intense experiences h i g h l i g h t a process which is 
common to us a l l . 
I t is clear that th is approach is heavi ly dependent upon the behaviaural 
sciences and more p a r t i c u l a r l y on developmental psycho logy . However, .t 
should be made clear that a l though references w i l l be made to the approach 
of a number of major theories of developmental psychology no single 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i l l be used e x c l u s i v e l y . Also , a l though what is said in this 
chap te r is in general based upon developmental psychology i t is not intended 
tha t the p a r t i c u l a r approach to human existence and i d e n t i t y adopted here 
should s tand or f a l l on any single theor i s t ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
but r a t h e r the basic and general unde r s t and ing that people are in a process 
of development and i n d i v i d u a t i o n . This is a widely shared view and i t 
would take a major academic r evo lu t ion to o v e r t h r o w i t . There fo re it is 
acknowledged that the t h r u s t of the major models of human psychology 
p r o v i d e much of the motive force to the arguments presented here . The 
method v.'ill not be to expand on these models but w i l l be to draw out a line 
of a rgumen t , a s t r and of t h o u g h t , which as i t is d rawn wi l l be seen les;> 
as dependent on psychology and more on a p a r t i c u l a r phi losophy of person. 
T h e r e f o r e there w i l l be no focus on psychological s tandpoints l ike those of 
behaviour i sm and psychoanalys is , or on mental i l lness , bu t , as the 
a rgument w i l l draw upon psychology , some of the major models of psychological 
makeup and development which are consistent w i t h this approach wi l l be 
b r i e f l y i n t r o d u c e d . 
There are two fundamenta l models of human consciousness. Psychologists 
fecognise that in accept ing one they need not discount the o ther , because 
as models of i n d i v i d u a l consciousness they pe r fo rm d i f f e r e n t roles, in fac t , 
more o f t en then not , they are held in para l le l . The f i r s t model is basic to 
all modern psychology and is the Conscious-Subconscious-Unconscious model. 
What this model does is to d i v i d e the mind in to three levels of opera t ion . 
The boundaries between the levels are permeable and are characterised by 
t h e i r content and i n t e r a c t i o n . The conscious mind is described in terms 
of al l the experiences of which we might say we are aware. A descr ip t ion 
of the subconscious mind would rest on those experiences of which we are 
not aware at th is moment, but which could easily move in to the conscious 
realm i f motivated to do so. The unconscious mind contains ins t inc t s and 
d r i v e s , experiences and recol lect ions which are deeply rooted in our past , 
and which do not o f t en become available to our conscious mind in the normal 
course of even ts . Richard Lowe in his book The Growth of Personality .nas 
sum.marised these three levels v e r y well when he says: 
T a k i n g y o u , the reader , as an example, your conscious mind 
consists of e v e r y t h i n g you are f u l l y aware of at this 
moment; f o r example, t h i s p r i n t e d page. Your sub-
conscious mind consists of those experiences which you 
are not aware of at th is moment, but could become so i f you 
wanted to . . . Notice also t h i t o t h e r people may, by drawing 
y o u r a t t en t ion to some c u r r e n t experience of which you are 
not f u l l y aware, p u l l that experience in to y o u r conscious 
mind and make you f u l l y aware of i t . At th is moment, 
f o r example, you are not f u l l y aware of the taste in your 
mouth - but you are now . . . . Your unconscious mind 
contains a l l those exper iences , impulses , d r ives and 
feel ings of which you cannot become aware under o r d i n a r y 
circumstances . . . . (Hov. 'ever) sometimes even in every 
day l i v i n g our unconscious fee l ings may almost reach our 
conscious minds and indeed may d is t ress or bewilder us 
when they d o . . . T h u s , when expec t ing unwelcome guests 
we might greet t h e i r a r r i v a l w i t h "What, so soon?" instead 
of our in tended " A h , at las t ! ' ' and on t h e i r depar ture 
b l u r t out >'Ah, at last! ' ' ins tead of "What, so soon?" 
The second model is one which d iv ides the psyche into ego, superego 
and i d . The ego is the name g iven to the awareness of self which we 
all have. I n our use of ' I ' and 'me' i t is the ego to which we are usually 
r e f e r r i n g . The superego is r o u g h l y paral le l to what is commonly 
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descr ibed as our conscience and the id is the collection of ins t inc t s and 
d]-ives whic l i urge the self to immediate g r a t i f i c a t i o n . Again the d i s t inc t ion 
between the three par t s is not open to a f i n a l d e f i n i t i o n because the 
boundaries are f l ex ib l e and the three par ts f r e e l y in teract to create, control 
and in i t i a te our response to the w o r l d . A simple example may serve to 
elucidate the in te rac t ions between the pa r t s . I f a person were h u n g r y and 
saw a chocolate bar on a shop coun te r , the i d , c lamouring f o r f u l f i l m e n t , 
would demand that the bar be taken and eaten. The superego would say 
' N o ! ' , the chocolate bar is not ' ou r s ' , i t is wrong to steal and as 'we' h?.ve 
no money 'we' w i l l have to do w i t h o u t . The ego would be requ i red to respond 
to t h i s d ive rgen t counsel . The actual course of action o f ten t u r n s out to be 
some sort of compromise between the two c o n f l i c t i n g forces - perhaps the 
person would f i n d someone to lend him the money so that he could buy 
the chocolate bar.^^"* In a normal person the in teract ions between these 
three elements of our psyche would be in constant f l u x and would be well 
i n t eg ra t ed in to a c t i v i t y which was, as f a r as possible, pleasurable to the 
i n d i v i d u a l and acceptable to the p r e v a i l i n g social cons t ra in t s . 
Both of these models are v e r y closely related and in many ways arc 
para l le l descr ip t ions of i n d i v i d u a l psychological make-up. They both speak 
of a constant in te rchange of i n fo rma t ion f r o m one level of our psyche to 
ano ther , p o i n t i n g towards a desc r ip t ion of a person which is complex. Data 
is cons tan t ly f l o w i n g between the var ious par t s and a c t i v i t y is not generated 
by a single mental i n t en t i on but by many d i v e r g e n t , even con t r ad i c to ry , 
elements i n our make-up . Another t h i n g which both these models express 
v e r y c lea r ly is that consciousness, i n c l u d i n g a c t i v i t y and sensation, is only 
the t i p of an i c e b e r g . The largest t rac t s of our psyche are not constant ly 
or cons i s ten t ly available to our conscious minds and ve ry s ign i f ican t areas 
of our psychological apparatus lie beneath the surface of consciousness, 
uncha r t ed and even u n k n o w n . 
Ano the r t h i n g that the models presuppose is development. When a 
ch i ld is born he does not have a f u l l y developed psychological f r amework , 
he is d ic ta ted to and his behaviour determined by the ins t inc t s and basic 
needs of s u r v i v a l . Only g r a d u a l l y does the f ramework begin to form and 
the c h i l d gain autonomy and i d e n t i t y . At f i r s t a ch i ld is to ta l ly dependent 
upon his mother , but g radua l ly he learns independence and how to l ive 
w i thou t the p a r t i c u l a r s ecu r i t y and phys ica l sustenance which parents provide 
and to p rov ide f o r h imsel f . 
U n t i l E r i k s o n , psychological development was understood to continue 
only to the end of chi ldhood where many believe that it came to an almost 
complete ha l t . Freud was the main cause of th is bel ief . His monumental 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to psychology and p s y c h i a t r y concentra ted most of i ts a t tent ion 
on ch i ldhood . Most of the impor tant stages were seen to take place in 
ch i ldhood and these became de te rmina t ive f o r adul t l i f e . E r i k s o n , who in 
his ear ly years s tudied w i t h Freud in Vienna , took the Freudian programme 
of personal development a stage f u i ' t h e r - i n to adul t l i f e . T h r o u g h his 
social and b iographica l work Er ikson came to realise that there were 
impor tan t stages which most people encountered a f t e r ch i ldhood. His s t r eng th 
was to accept much of the Freudian corpus but use i t as a foundat ion f o r 
f u r t h e r inves t iga t ion and exp lana t ion , not as a f i n a l and d e f i n i t i v e statement. 
E r i k s o n p i c t u r e d l i f e as a process of development f r o m the cradle to the 
g r a v e , w i t h a major c r i s i s about eve ry decade or so. The phrase 'the 
e ight stages of man' has been coined to descr ibe his approach. They are 
summarised b r i e f l y below: 
( i ) T r u s t v s . Mis t ru s t 
The f i r s t stage covers the f i r s t year or so of an i n f a n t ' s l i f e . I t is broadly-
para l le l to the Freudian 'o ra l stage' when the mouth is the focus of the chi le ' s 
exper ience . Accord ing to Freud the re la t ionsh ip between the mother and 
ch i ld at th i s stage is cen t r a l and , f o r the c h i l d , is dominated by the positive' 
and negat ive experiences of wean ing . E r i k s o n , whi l s t not deny ing that 
t h i s phase of a ch i ld ' s l i f e is in some ways character ised by the o ra l , broadens 
the concept to inc lude more of a social d e f i n i t i o n . The dependency that the 
ch i ld experiences i n th i s per iod of his l i f e bui lds up an unders tand ing of 
t r u s t on the one hand and mis t rus t on the o the r . 
A c h i l d w i l l develop a t r u s t i n people and his wor ld i f his needs are 
met and i f the t h i n g s which make his l i f e unpleasant are q u i c k l y removed. 
Love wh ich is expressed in phys ica l ways helps the ch i ld to develop a basic 
t r u s t wh ich w i l l be ca r r i ed i n to f u t u r e l i f e and w i l l f o rm par t of the foundat ion 
of the ch i ld ' s pe r sona l i t y . I f the care is inconsis tent or negligent the ch i ld 
w i l l l earn that the v^orld is a place where he cannot expect his needs to 
be acted upon and catered f o r and somewhere where his wishes remain 
u n f u l f i l l e d . This exper ience of u n f u l f i l l e d expecta t ion generates a mis t rus t 
of people and the e'- 'vironment wh ich w i l l s imi la r ly be ca r r ied in to f u t u r e l i f e . 
A l t h o u g h th is stage is of v i t a l importance i n the development of 
pe r sona l i t y the pos i t ive or negat ive experiences can be redressed in later 
s tages. No one stage of development is e n t i r e l y de te rmina t ive , 
( i i ) Autonomy vs . shame and doubt 
Between the ages of two and f o u r , d u r i n g the Freudian 'ana! stage' a ch i ld 
w i l l develop and begin to emerge as an autonomous person". The new- found 
ab i l i t i e s , both motor and mental , wi l l f o rm the basis of the chi ld ' s sense of 
w o r t h and i d e n t i t y , on the one hand , and , i f he is cont inual ly corrected 
- I l k . 
on the o the r . 
A f t e r the pragmatic monism of the f i r s t stage the chi ld begins to 
recognise the d i s t inc t ions between Jiimself and the rest of r e a l i t y . The ch i ld 
becomes more autonomous and is p repared to experiment wi th his s t r e n g t h . 
I t is at th i s stage that the ch i ld begins to learn the boundaries of his 
exper ience . He learns that some th ings can and others cannot be done 
wi thou t causing i n j u r y to oneself . His wor ld is expanding .all the time and 
at a v e r y rap id r a t e . I f his envi ronment is character ised by o v e r - p r o t e c t i v e 
parents the ch i ld w i l l not d i scover the real boundaries and w i l l learn to 
doubt his a b i l i t y to do t h i n g s . I f g u i l t is created by excessive c r i t i c i sm 
of what the ch i ld does, th i s w i l l be ca r r i ed on in to the next stage of the 
ch i ld ' s development . 
( i i i ) I n i t i a t i v e vs . g u i l t 
The nex t major phase of development is b r ie f and takes place between the 
ages of f o u r and f i v e . I n many ways this stage, which in classical Freudian 
psychoanalysis is called the ' gen i t a l s tage ' , compounds and extends the 
exper ience of the p rev ious stages wi thou t the add i t ion of any new s ign i f i can t 
f a c t o r s . The development of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy leads to the t ak ing of 
g rea te r and grea ter i n i t i a t i v e d u r i n g th i s stage. A recogni t ion of the 
a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l and dominate may deve lop . A ch i ld w i l l take on projects 
and no longer sim.ply depend on imi ta t ion f o r l e a r n i n g . I n short he begins to 
manipulate his env i ronmen t . However , i f a ch i ld has grown up w i t h a sense 
of shame and doubt and his exper ience is s t i l l dominated by c r i t i c i sm and 
pun i shment , he w i l l soon develop g u i l t complexes and s tar t to in t ro jec t and 
believe he is personal ly responsib le f o r many of the problems in the home and 
f a m i l y . 
( i V ) I n d u s t r y vs . i n f e r i o r i t y 
Stage f o u r takes place d u r i n g the ear ly school age between the f i f t h and 
t en th year of the ch i ld ' s l i f e . A ch i ld may at th is stage develop a fascinat ior 
f o r the way th ings w o r k and are made. A boy or g i r l may recognise that 
they have competence in ce r ta in areas. He or she may want to become an 
athlete or a dancer . C h i l d r e n take in te res t i n games; they are now able 
to fo l low and obey the ru les and jugg le w i t h the ideas behind the game to 
f i n d the best way to w i n . The wor ld has again been extended to include 
many more places and people. School has p r o v i d e d a circle of f r i e n d s wi th 
whom a ch i ld can learn and play and develop bonds which may continue 
in to adul t l i f e . 
I f the ch i ld has developed w i t h an excessive amount of gui l t and 
shame the seeds of i n f e i - i o r i t y have been sown and th is stage may become 
dominated by a c o n t i n u i n g sense of gu i l t and a r a p i d l y developing sense of 
f a i l u r e and i n f e r i o r i t y . But l ike all the other stages the negative e f fec t s 
of th is stage can be neu t ra l i sed la ter in l i f e . 
( V ) I d e n t i t y vs . role confus ion ( i d e n t i t y d i f f u s i o n ) 
D u r i n g the adolescent years between the ages of twelve and eighteen many 
psychologica l changes take place. There is a r ap id maturat ion of the 
p e r s o n a l i t y , and mental facu l t ies are charpened . I t is at this stage that 
the f i r s t major r ecap i tu la t ion of a person's previous l i f e takes place. Many 
of the f ac to r s and in f luences of a young person's previous hfe s ta r t to ' f a l l 
i n to place ' . Th i s is a stage of major i n t eg ra t i on and a d i scovery of i d e n t i t y . 
With the d i s cove ry of t h e i r role ( b o t h sexual and social) and the emancipation 
f r o m pa ren t s , a y o u n g person begins to take r e spons ib i l i t y f o r his own l i f e . 
Phi losophica l , r e l ig ious and social in te res t s become topics f o r argument and 
conce rn , o f t en t a k i n g an impor tan t par t in the decisions that young people 
make, mot iva t ing them to do something l ike j o in ing a pol i t ica l g roup or maybe 
p r o t e s t i n g about ce r ta in moral and social issues. 
I f a person is unsucces s fu l i n the process of i n t eg ra t ion then his or 
her i d e n t i t y may remain u n d e f i n e d . Unresolved problems and fears f r o m 
past l i f e may work against i n t e g r a t i o n and may engender a sense of i d e n t i t y 
d i f f u s i o n . The adolescent quest ion 'Who am I? ' remains f i n a l l y unanswered 
and the i d e n t i t y d i f f u s i o n creates a role con fus ion , so that normal r e l a t i on -
ships become d i f f i c u l t and a person may f i n d himself becoming increas ing ly 
i so la ted . 
The sor t of i d e n t i t y which a young person recognises and develops is 
v e r y much dependent upon t h e i r p rev ious h i s t o r y , the re la t ionships which 
they engage in and the qua l i t y of care they have received wi th in those 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . His or her social milieu w i l l also dominate the young person's 
approach to the w o r l d . A t reeless , concrete environment which is also 
charac te r i sed by aggress ion and violence w i l l d ictate what the young 
person w i l l grow to t h i n k of the w o r l d . A society which is male-dominated 
and where women are second-class ci t izens w i l l create an environment where 
y o u n g women w i l l f i n d i t more d i f f i c u l t to a t ta in a sense of i n t e g r i t y and 
i d e n t i t y wh ich is valued by them and respected by o thers . 
A g a i n , i t should be pointed out that Er ikson is not proposing a 
f a t a l i s t i c approach . Fai lure to gain a sense of i d e n t i t y at this stage does not 
mean that a pei-son is doomed to an existence of f a i l u r e th roughout Hfe; 
o i l i e r chances w i l l present themselves. 
( V i ) In t imacy v s . isolation 
Young adul thood is the next stage which contains no major physical changes 
but wh ich is charac ter ised by the re la t ionships which are formed at this t ime. 
Th i s is the per iod when a person develops close and intimate re la t ionships , 
both sexual and social , w i t h o thers of both sexes. The lessons of previous 
l i f e are put in to e f f ec t in the care and love that is generated f o r those 
a r o u n d . In t imacy need not invo lve s exua l i t y , a l though it o f t en does and may 
be expressed in the close bonds developed in pa r t i cu l a r f r i e n d s h i p s . I f a 
person fa i l s to develop in t imate re la t ionsh ips at th i s stage they become 
g r a d u a l l y more isolated and more se l f -absorbed - wi thou t anyone wi th whom 
they can share t he i r l i f e . 
( v i i ) Gene ra t iv i t y v s . s e l f - abso rp t i on 
This phase occurs f r o m about t h i r t y t h r o u g h middle age to about the age 
of s i x t y - f i v e and r e t i r emen t . Acco rd ing to Er ikson this is the stage which 
is e i the r dominated by a long per iod of g e n e r a t i v i t y or by a period of 
g r o w i n g s e l f - abso rp t ion and i n d i v i d u a l s tagna t ion . The genera t iv i ty can 
be d i r ec t ed towards a number of areas i n c l u d i n g f ami ly , f r i e n d s , career or 
personal i n t e r e s t s . A person becomes concerned f o r people beyond the 
c i rc le of fami ly and may be mot ivated towards a l t ru i s t i c aims f o r society botn 
local and at l a rge . A person need not be a parent to engage in these 
genera t ive en te rpr i ses but must be concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h people. 
Se l f - abso rp t i on is the same process w o r k i n g in the opposite d i r e c t i o n . 
A person becomes more and more disengaged f r o m his or her f ami ly , f r i e n d s , 
society and even env i ronmen t . The major in teres ts are wi th the self and 
w i t h the cosseting and comfor t of the i n d i v i d u a l . Personal needs maintain 
a p r i m a r y place on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s agenda. 
( v i i i ) I n t e g r i t y v s . despair 
F ina l ly there is the e i gh th s tage, wh ich covers the period f r o m re t i rement 
to dea th . The major concerns and pro jec ts of a person's l i fe are coming to 
completion and an end . This is the second major stage of recapi tu la t ion 
when the re is time f o r r e f l ec t ion and recol lect ion and fo r the enjoyment of 
en te rp r i ses completed. I n t e g r i t y is the f i n a l resu l t of a l i fe viewed wi th 
s a t i s f ac t ion . At the o ther extreme is despair at a l i f e of misdirected projects 
and missed o p p o r t u n i t i e s . The f i n a l event is dea th . 
Having b r i e f l y i n t r o d u c e d developmental psychology , one might ask: 
Is there a n y t h i n g else that can be added or is the background to the 
a l t e rna t ive approach complete? Having sketched our psychological make-up 
and development as a process s t a r t i n g at b i r t h , should we not ask whether 
we b r i n g a n y t h i n g in to the wor ld w i t h us at b i r th? 
Mary Midgley believes that we are born wi th a nature - by which she 
means a collection of innate tendencies and ins t inc t s which we c a r r y w i t h us 
t h r o u g h l i f e and pass on to our c h i l d r e n . I n her ou t s tand ing book Beast 
and Man: The Roots of Human N a t u r e , she l u c i d l y argues f o r the existence 
of a human na ture a n d , wh i l s t agree ing that we develop f rom b i r t h , suggests 
that i f we become overdependent upon society and re la t ionships as a basis 
f o r our approach to human behav iour , we r u n the r i s k of g i v i n g up th ings 
which are impor tan t about human l i f e , i n c l u d i n g human f reedom. This in 
i t se l f is i n t e r e s t i n g because the existence of a human nature has o f ten been 
seen to be a challenge to the existence of human f reedom. Midgley counters 
th i s argument and also suggests that many of our misconceptions about 
human na ture arise f r o m an u n f a i r and un in fo rmed comparison between us 
and the animal w o r l d . I n her i n t r o d u c t i o n she lays the foundat ion of her 
a rguments . On the subjec t of f reedom's re la t ion to na ture and society she 
says: 
Man has his own n a t u r e , not that of any other species. 
He cannot , t h e r e f o r e , be degraded by comparison, i f i t 
is c a r e f u l and honest , but i t w i l l b r i n g out his pecul ia r i t i es , 
i t w i l l show what is un ique about him as well as what is 
no t . Ce r t a in ly he is more f r ee than other species. But 
that ex t r a f reedom f lows f r o m something na tu ra l to him -
his special k i n d of in te l l igence and the character t r a i t s 
that go w i t h i t . I t is no t , and does not have to be, 
u n l i m i t e d . ( I n f a c t , un l imi ted freedom is an incoherent 
not ion) . I t is not something added by his own w i l l 
(4) 
a f t e r b i r t h , or by some ex te rna l force called c u l t u r e . 
She goes on to suggest tha t we cannot be indeterminate at b i r t h and that 
development and f reedom cannot be based squarely on the in f luence that 
society has upon us: 
I f we were genuine ly plastic and indeterminate at b i r t h , 
there could be no reason why society should not stamp 
us in to any shape that might sui t i t . ^ ^ ^ 
She goes f u r t h e r to suggest t l i t the phi losophical basis of the belief that 
we develop f r o m n o t h i n g to what we are as adul ts is misguided: 
The dogma, in i t s sociological f o r m , where it says that 
man is e n t i r e l y the p roduc t of his society must , as I 
have sugges ted , des t roy al l the cent ra l arguments f o r 
f r eedom. I n i ts Ex i s t en t i a l i s t f o r m , where i t says that 
we create ourselves out of n o t h i n g , i t does not make 
(6) 
sense. 
On the subject of the u n f a i r and un informed comparisons between us 
and o ther animals she says: 
We are not j u s t r a t h e r l ike animals; we are animals. 
Our d i f f e r e n c e f r o m o the r species may be s t r i k i n g , but 
comparisons w i t h them have always been, and must be, 
c ruc i a l to ou r view of o u r s e l v e s . . . . The gap between 
man and o ther animals comes, I bel ieve, in a s l i g h t l y 
d i f f e r e n t place f r o m the one where t r a d i t i o n puts i t , 
as well as being r a t h e r n a r r o w e r . ^ 
Having b u i l t her b r idges and la id her route Midgley begins her main 
argument in earnes t . With her superb t u r n of phrase and the f o r c e f u l 
way in vyhich she a rgues , she is most c o n v i n c i n g . F i r s t , she points out 
that the quest ions we ask about man are not only v i t a l to the task and 
w i l l determine the sor t of answers g iven but thev themselves are also o f t en 
determined by dogma and ideo logy . She contends t ha t , i f wc arc prepared 
to s h i f t g round and look at the issue f r o m a d i f f e r e n t angle, the idea of 
i n h e r i t e d i n s t i nc t s as a basis f o r behaviour is not so r i d i c u l o u s . I f we 
are p repared to d r o p the dogma that the only t h i n g that can cause behaviour 
is that ' c rea t ive d i v i n i t y ' , ' soc ie ty ' , then there is no reason why there 
should not be such a t h i n g as innate tendencies . Having re l ied on a cer ta in 
amount of academic inqu i s i t i veness and hav ing tempted us to come out into 
the f r e s h non-dogmatic a i r , she then proceeds to advance her a rgument . 
She asserts that i f there is n o t h i n g at stake in 'society ' i t se l f and that i f 
we are p repared to believe in more than a ' phys ica l ' connection to the rest 
of the animal k ingdom and what 's more, i f we accept the main arguments of 
the evo lu t i ona ry pe r spec t ive , then we should be prepared to believe in 
i n h e r i t e d tendencies and i n s t i n c t s - in s h o r t , human na tu re . 
To i l l u s t r a t e her point that we are closer to o ther animals than we 
t h i n k , f o r ins tance , she comments that we may have a more developed social 
s t r u c t u r e than the apes bu t that they are s imilar to us in o ther ways . We 
may be more in t e l l i gen t than elephants but our family s t ruc tu re s do bear 
- ^ 9 -
a resemblance. The clifJ'erencc between us and other animals is not di^pcndant 
upon us being supe r io r beings but upon the d i f f e r e n t ways in which we ha\'--
evo lved . Midgley points out that we have evolved wi th a h igh ly developed 
bra in and it is that which gives us our s imi la r i ty w i th the apes: but we ha\'i.^  
also developed w i t h a pro longed i n f a n c y when the chi ld is ve ry dependent 
upon parents f o r both food and pro tec t ion and it is that which makes our 
family s t r u c t u r e s similar to those of the elephant . 
As we are so close to the animals - and in many more ways than we 
would at f i r s t recognise - we can be in formed by the way in which ins t inc t s 
and i n h e r i t e d tendencies work in them. Midgley would contend that there 
are two k inds of i n s t i n c t ; 'open' and 'c losed ' . The closed sort of in s t inc t is 
that which has been shown to exis t in creatures that have been reared in 
i so la t ion . Honey bees s t i l l p e r f o r m t h e i r honey dance i f reared alone and 
weaver b i r d s who have been b r o u g h t up in the same way are able to bu i ld 
t he i r i n t r i c a t e and complicated nes ts . Open ins t inc t s are those which are 
e x h i b i t e d in o the r b i r d s , l i ke ducks o r ch ickens , who are programmed to 
fol low the i r mother but have no clear p i c tu re of what mother w i l l look l ike -
t h e r e f o r e they w i l l o f t en fol low o ther creatures which are not the i r mother, 
even people. Midgley says that there is evidence to suggest that the more 
in t e l l i gen t the animal the f ewer closed i n s t i nc t s and the more open ins t inc t s 
they have . These are less speci f ic and have more gaps in t he i r p rogramming . 
Human beings would of course q u a l i f y f o r \ ' c ry few closed i n s t i n c t s . 
There are a number of t h i n g s which character ise us as a species, al l 
of wh ich could be subsumed under the general heading of behaviour , and 
behaviour i s , in some measure, determined by how our ins t inc t s are related 
to one another and our env i ronmenta l con tex t . One of the most i n t e r e s t i ng 
t h ings about human beings is t h e i r a l t r u i s m . This has caused all sorts of 
problems f o r phys ica l i s t s who see motives in terms of bra in states; 
behav iour i s t s who see them in terms of behaviour ; and the sociobiologists 
f o l l o w i n g . E. 0 . Wilson who in be l i ev ing in the ' se l f i sh gene' can only 
categorise behaviour i n terms of how i t 'pays ' the i n d i v i d u a l . A l t r u i s m does 
not f i t nea t ly in to these categories and th i s remains a ' p rob lem' . Also 
a l t r u i sm is not conf ined to the w o r l d of man but seems to be associated w i t h 
a number of species. Midgley suggests that i t may be connected in some way 
w i t h the r e a r i n g of y o u n g . I f so, the r e a r i n g of human ch i ld ren - the most 
vu lne rab le and dependent y o u n g of all - would not only be a way in which 
a l t ru i sm is focussed but may p rov ide a reason f o r i ts exis tence. Whichever 
way i t is seen, i t cannot be denied that i t ex i s t s , and t he -bu rden is upon 
those who do not believe that it has an i n s t i n c t u a l basis to prove o therwise . ^ ^ 
-so-
f t would seem that .Midgley has given sound reasons fo r bel ieving that 
i nhe r i t ed ins t inc t s do e x i s t . We come into the wor ld w i th something. The 
legacy that Loclce l e f t the wor ld - the blank paper theory - can be torn up 
and th>-own ou t . But th i s does not imply that we do not develop f rom b i r t h , 
it s imply means that we know where we develop f r o m . Put in to the language 
of classical p sycho logy , we are born w i t h an i d ; but this is no su rp r i se 
and in some ways i t should be a re l ief f o r many developmental psychologis ts 
that Midg ley , s t a r t i n g f r o m a v e r y d i f f e r e n t place, has come up wi th these 
conclusions . Many psychologis t s believe that we are born w i t h a rud imen ta ry 
Id and that th i s d ic ta tes our ear ly response to the w o r l d . As Lowe has put 
i t : 
A baby i s , psychologica l ly speak ing , almost pure I d . 
The moment he feels an i n s t i n c t i v e urge he clamours f o r 
i ts i n s t an t g r a t i f i c a t i o n ; and i t is only his re la t ive 
helplessness and phys ica l ine f fec t iveness that stops him 
f r o m ac t ing on impulse . ^^^^ 
To r o u n d o f f th i s b r i e f expos i t ion of Mary Midgley 's argument f o r the 
existence of human n a t u r e , we r e t u r n to where we began - human f reedom. 
For Midgley f reedom does not consist in being in a state where no th ing 
determines our ac t ions , or by being omnipotent , but consists in being 
able to be oneself and doing what is in one to do. To stand alone is not 
the most impor tan t t h i n g . Wc arc social creatures and the fundan-iental uni t 
of human existence is common to us a l l - the f a m i l y . 
Human beings have , r e la t ive to the rest of the animal k ingdom, a long 
l i f e . One of the most s i g n i f i c a n t t h ings about that long l i f e is the l eng th 
of time we spend dependent upon others f o r food and p ro t ec t i on . In 
a d d i t i o n , we spend a long time dependent upon others f o r our education ( in 
the broadest sense) ; we need o thers to de f ine , explain and answer the 
quest ions that arise eve ry day . A l l ch i ld r en want to ' know ' , al l ch i ld ren 
ask 'Why?' and they r e l y v e r y heavi ly upon adu l t s , and especially the i r 
pa ren t s , f o r the i n f o r m a t i o n they need. An thony S t o r r , a psychologis t and 
ph i losopher , has examined th i s fact of human existence and has come up 
w i t h some i n t e r e s t i n g conclusions about personal a c t i v i t y and an i nd iv idua l ' s 
i n t e rac t ion w i t h his or her env i ronment and society. In The Dynamics of 
Creat ion S t o r r examines c r e a t i v i t y and creat ive in te rac t ion and concludes 
that i ts explanat ion is to be f o u n d in the dependency of ch i ldhood . I t is 
not a mys t e ry and is no t , as many bel ieve, the province of the soul . 
- S I 
Sto r r is indeb ted to the Freudian analysis of c r e a t i v i t y , which Freud 
s tudied in the p a r t i c u l a r senses of sc ien t i f ic and a r t i s t i c creat ive achiesemenl 
But as well as being indebted to Freud and also to others such as Desmond 
MoiTis and A r t h u r Koes t le r , he is concerned to redress the balance by 
cha l lenging many of Freud ' s assumptions. Freud recognised a psychopath-
ological basis f o r much that was considered c rea t ive . I nd iv idua l s l ike 
Newton and Van Gogh seemed to bear out his content ion that social and 
sexual dev ia t ion have g iven b i r t h to many of the great creat ive en terpr i ses 
of h i s t o r y . Whilst accept ing that Freud may have a po in t , S to r r seeks to 
inves t iga te the basis of a more general c rea t ive a c t i v i t y in which we al l 
pa r t i c ipa te and t h i s , S t o r r asser ts , has a v e r y d i f f e r e n t f o u n d a t i o n . 
S t o r r c a r e f u l l y and systemat ical ly develops his argument ; he becomes 
less dependent on F reud as the argument continues and by the end of the 
thesis he is deve lop ing his own o r i g i n a l and speculat ive i n s i g h t s . Some way 
in to his a rgument he u t i l i ses the work of Desmond Morr i s and t h r o u g h th is 
seeks to f i n d a connect ion between d i f f e r e n t sorts of creat ive a c t i v i t y , 
namely 'p lay ' and ' a r t ' . S t o r r f i n d s a fundamenta l s imi la r i ty in the way that 
each a c t i v i t y f u n c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in i ts most p r i m i t i v e fo rms : amongst 
c h i l d r e n , a b o r i g i n a l t r i be s and o ther pr imates . The connection may at f i r s t 
seem r a t h e r s impl is t ic bu t i t is the basis of S to r r ' s theses. 
Bo th a r t and play i n v o l v e and develop cer ta in ru les and r i t ua l s which 
f u n c t i o n as a c o n t r o l o r a p r i n c i p l e of o r d e r in what might otherwise be l e f t 
to chance or charac te r i sed by chaos. ^^ ^^  There are o ther connections in 
that both may have phys io log ica l and social cons t i tuen t s , but the idea of 
o r d e r or con t ro l seems to be the most impor tan t f ac to r in S to r r ' s unde r -
s t and ing of the dynamics of c r e a t i v i t y . Both play and ar t by the i r ve ry 
na tu re r e q u i r e that the p a r t i c i p a n t has observed his environment and the 
apparent c o n f l i c t s and con t rad ic t ions inheren t w i t h i n i t . I f play is seen 
as the r i t u a l i s i n g of such t h i n g s as aggression or sexua l i ty , then the 
p a r t i c i p a n t must g rapp le and come to terms wi th his innate ins t inc t s and 
d i scover the boundar ies of his in t e rac t ion w i t h o thers . I f aggression gets 
'out of hand ' then the game r a p i d l y d i s in tegra tes along wi th i ts concomitant 
pleasure and exci tement . Also i f a ch i ld is going to draw or paint one of 
his pa ren t s or his home, then he must f i r s t s tar t to grapple wi th these 
t h i n g s as ob jec t s , w i t h spat ial qua l i t i e s , and then t r y to t r a n s f e r the 
impress ions onto paper . Both a r t and play can be seen to develop along 
f a i r l y f i x e d l ines amongst most normal people. As motor func t ions and bra in 
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size increase so does the ar t or p lay , becoming ever more elaborate and also 
a closer represen ta t ion (especial ly in the case of a r t ) o'f the woi^ld a r o u n d . 
S to r r sums up his argument by say ing : 
At f i r s t s i g h t , both ac t iv i t i es seem to stand apart f rom the 
' ser ious ' business of l i f e . Both are d i s in t e res t ed , and 
ne i the r appear to be d i r e c t l y associated wi th the immediate 
sa t i s fac t ion of biological needs, in the way that h u n t i n g or 
meeting c lea r ly a re . Both a r t and play are concerned 
w i t h ru l e and r i t u a l : and both t end , t h e r e f o r e , to impose 
a ce r t a in f o r m upon what otherwise might remain c h a o t i c . . . 
Moreover , bo th play and c r e a t i v i t y can be looked upon as 
adapt ive in the sense of p r o v i d i n g addi t ional i npu t to 
s t imulate and a ler t the nervous system . . . (also) . . . a good 
case could be made out f o r r e g a r d i n g play as adapt ive in 
that i t p r o v i d e d a se t t ing in which aggressive and sexual 
impulses could be l ea rned , tamed and r i tua l i sed in such 
a way tha t the i n d i v i d u a l could preserve his aggressive 
and sexual po ten t ia l b u t , at the same t ime, modi fy his 
p r i m i t i v e d r i v e s in such a way that the social g roup was 
not d i s r u p t e d . ^ ^ 
The idea of r e c o g n i t i o n , rea l i sa t ion , and the o r d e r i n g of percept ions is 
a v e r y impor tan t one. S to r r uses a fasc ina t ing example to i l l u s t r a t e his 
p o i n t . 
The example records the account of an an th ropo log i s t , F rober ius , who 
asked some A f r i c a n pygmies to shoot an antelope f o r h im. To his s u r p r i s e , 
before the h u n t the pygmies cleared a piece of g round of plants and weeds 
and d rew the ante lope, called upon the sun f o r help and then shot an 
a r row at the drav. 'ing of the antelope. This d r a w i n g , l ike the cave pain t ings 
of the palaeoli thic p e r i o d , served a purpose . I t gave an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r 
a dynamic apprehens ion of the q u a r r y . L ike s tudents r e v i s i n g before 
examinat ions , the pygmies were a t t empt ing f u l l y to grasp the i r object of 
i n t e r e s t . As S t o r r says: 
The prepara t ions descr ibed by Frober ius cLl"C 3. K ind of 
r i t u a l , and might be dismissed as no th ing but a useless 
exercise in sympathet ic magic. In fact the r i t u a l is one 
which enhances the apprec ia t ion of r e a l i t y . The man who 
had observed the antelope s u f f i c i e n t l y closely to" be able 
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to make a l i f e - l i k e d r awing of i t was, in t r u t h , bet ter 
equipped to pursue and despatch i t . ^"'^^ 
I n th i s sense S t o r r sees ar t or any creat ive en te rpr i se as adapt ive in that 
i t enables the a r t i s t to recognise and come to terms w i t h the rea l i ty of the 
wor ld a round h i m , and th is must help the a r t i s t to s u r v i v e and develop. 
A l l c rea t ive a c t i v i t y rel ies upon an in te rac t ion between the subject and his 
wor ld and th i s i n t e r ac t i on enables the subject f u r t h e r to apprehend r e a l i t y . 
Th i s c o n t e n t i o n , S t o r r bel ieves, applies to all human beings whether they 
see themselves as p a r t i c u l a r l y crea t ive or not . The a b i l i t y to apprehend , 
which we al l e x h i b i t , leads to the a b i l i t y of abs t rac t ion and the conceptual -
isa t ion of t h o u g h t , wh ich f u n c t i o n s as a real isat ion and an ' in te rna l i sa t ion ' 
of objects and symbols both remembered and pe rce ived . 
When a c h i l d is newly b o r n , most psychologis ts bel ieve, i t is 
unable to d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t se l f f rom the objects a r o u n d . As a chi ld gradual ly 
becomes aware of the d i f f e r e n c e between himself and his s u r r o u n d i n g s he 
also becomes aware of the boundaries of his own body and phys ica l 
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i n f l u e n c e . S t o r r contends that development and g r o w t h in i t ia tes a 
r ecogn i t i on of the d i f f e r e n c e between subject and object and a g i v i n g up of 
the monis t / egocen t r i c w o r l d which characterises the ear ly phases of l i f e . 
The r e c o g n i t i o n of our r e l a t ionsh ip to objects and the re la t ionships between 
ob jec t s , bo th persons and o ther t h i n g s , gives us our sense of i d e n t i t y and 
par t of our model of the w o r l d . Part of the process of g rasp ing and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between th ings is creat ive and is expressed in a number of 
d i f f e r e n t ways - f o r ins tance , i n play and a r t . Ob jec t i f i ca t ion is invo lved 
in o ther ac t iv i t i e s as w e l l . Memory helps us to o b j e c t i f y our past and even 
express i t t h r o u g h some phys ica l medium. Language, too, can have the 
e f f e c t of c a p t u r i n g t hough t s and events and express ing them in an ordered 
and under s t andab le way . We can f i n d great sa t is fact ion in the o r d e r i n g of 
o u r w o r l d and in making sense of what at f i r s t seems d i f f i c u l t and obscure . 
Th i s may be one of the reasons why human beings pers is t in creat ive 
a c t i v i t y . 
The main o r i g i n s of c r e a t i v i t y are , as has a l ready been pointed ou t , 
f o u n d i n c h i l d h o o d . A ch i ld is born w i t h a bra in 23% per cent of i ts 
adu l t s ize; his body is small and helpless and i ts motor f unc t i ons are ve ry 
p r i m i t i v e . Development takes place at d i f f e r e n t rates f o r d i f f e r e n t par ts 
of the b o d y . Th i s may mean that the bra in is developed enough f o r the 
ch i ld to achieve some a c t i v i t y whi ls t his motor co-ord ina t ion and other 
f u n c t i o n s are no t . T h i s , coupled wi th a long period of dependency upon 
othei-s, creates what S to r r describes as a ' d iv ine d i scon ten t ' . This 
f r u s t r a t i o n or d iscontent w i t h our own abi l i t ies and dependence is the mot i -
v a t i o n , the s p u r , towards the g rasp ing and o r d e r i n g of r ea l i t y which the 
c h i l d and later the adul t rel ies on in his in te rac t ion w i t h the w o r l d . In 
s h o r t , f r u s t r a t i o n is the developmental basis of c r e a t i v i t y . 
The connect ion between f r u s t r a t i o n and c r e a t i v i t y is made by the fact 
that f r u s t r a t i o n leads to the development of a wor ld of imagination to which 
we asp i re , created by us , where symbols and images def ine and deliniate 
the w o r l d . The combination and accommodation of the two wor lds , one 
' i n t e r n a l ' , the o t h e r ' e x t e r n a l ' to one another is what conver t s f r u s t r a t i o n 
and con fus ion in to o r d e r . C r e a t i v i t y is what enables the accommodation 
and the r e o r d e r i n g of the two wor lds - the o ther wor ld of physical objects 
and the i nne r wor ld of imaginat ion and symbol - to take place. Human 
beings do not l ike and cannot easily l ive w i t h inconsis tency and confus ion . 
We need o r d e r and recogni t ion to enable us to make choices and act 
e f f e c t i v e l y in the w o r l d in which we f i n d ourse lves . I t is f o r th is reason 
that we have sought to ' cap ture ' and 'realise ' our wor ld in our various 
c rea t ive e n t e r p r i s e s . 
S t o r r has i n t r o d u c e d some of the devleopmental reasons f o r c r e a t i v i t y 
and has shown that i t is an impor tan t cons t i tuent i n our a c t i v i t y and thought , 
He has not however g iven much in the way of an unde r s t and ing of the 
mechanics of c r e a t i v i t y . For th is another w r i t e r w i l l need to be consul ted . 
I n his book The Act of Crea t ion , A r t h u r Koestler seeks to give an 
explana t ion of c r e a t i v i t y by u n r a v e l l i n g the mechanisms invo lved in creat ive 
a c t i v i t y . The book remains d e f i n i t i v e as an express ion of the na tu re , 
exis tence and e f f ec t of c r e a t i v i t y in a person's l i f e . The breadth of the 
work is enormous and f o r th i s reason a f u l l exposi t ion w i l l not be a t tempted. 
However , the basic presuppos i t ions and major t h r u s t of Koestler 's thesis can 
and w i l l be i nd i ca t ed . 
For Koes t le r , c r e a t i v i t y is evident when two 'frames of reference ' or 
'matr ices ' i n t e rac t in a p a r t i c u l a r way. These 'matrices ' or 'associative 
con tex t s ' may be simply descr ibed as the ' ru les ' or 'codes of conduct ' f o r 
any g iven a c t i v i t y . Mathematics has a number of ru les based in logic which 
must be adhered to i f the a c t i v i t y is to cont inue to be descr ibed as mathe-
matics. Likewise any p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y such as r i d i n g a b ike , p laying 
foo tba l l or pa in t ing a p i c tu re has rules which need to be recognised fo r 
the a c t i v i t y to be a success and f o r it to be recognised as that a c t i v i t y . 
These ru les or matrices can be r e f i n e d and devleoped and become iden t i f i ed 
as a ' s k i l l ' . Because a spider 'knows ' the rules of the game of web-making 
it i s , by i n s t i n c t , able to produce a cobweb which can be recognised as 
such on any number of occasions; i t s web w i l l always fol low cer ta in ru les : 
the la tera l threads w i l l always be in tersec ted by the radials at equal angles 
to the o ther in te rsec t ions and the centre of the web wi l l always be the 
centre of g r a v i t y . As well as these f i x e d rules which determine frames of 
r e fe rence or sk i l l s there are also ones which are more f l ex ib l e and which may 
be adapted to the circumstances of the env i ronmen t . A spider can have 
a n y t h i n g between three and twelve points of attachment which form the 
radia l th reads of i ts web, the number of at tachments depending ve ry much 
upon the condi t ions of the env i ronment . 
Creat ion occurs when one mat r ix (wh ich may be expressed in a s k i l l 
or in knowledge about one set of t h i n g s ) in te rac t s and combines wi th another . 
Koest ler uses many, many i l l u s t r a t ions to i l luminate this f a c t , h i g h l i g h t i n g 
c r e a t i v i t y in a number of areas of human l i f e . I n d i f f e r e n t ways he describes 
the i n t e r a c t i o n and association of independent matrices in the d i f f e r e n t areas 
of l i f e . Koest ler describes how humour i s dependent upon separate frames 
of r e fe rence ' c o l l i d i n g ' to produce l augh te r as a response: the absent-minded 
don bo i l i ng his watch whi l s t he clutches an egg . In academic ac t iv i t ies 
where a new in te l l ec tua l synthes is is p roduced , Koestler p r e f e r s the idea of 
the matrices ' f u s i n g ' : E = Mc^. I n an aesthetic experience the idea of 
' c o n f r o n t a t i o n ' between two associative contexts is p r e f e r r e d : witness the 
i l l u s ion of d e p t h , hue and perspect ive produced by the Impressionis ts app ly ing 
'b lobs ' of colour to the canvas. 
Whatever the desc r ip t ion in p a r t i c u l a r , in general , c r e a t i v i t y is descr ibed 
( b y Koes t l e r ) as the coming together of two independent , p rev ious ly u n i n -
t e g r a t e d , f rames of re fe rence in a given con tex t . This he calls 'bisociat ion ' 
or 'b i soc ia t ive t h i n k i n g ' . An example of th is was g iven to me r ecen t ly ; 
consider a fami ly p l ay ing a 'word association game'. One evening before 
the son and daugh te r go to bed they play a shor t vers ion of the game wi th 
t h e i r paren ts where one person s tar t s w i t h any word and is followed by 
the nex t person who gives a w o r d which is associated w i t h the f i r s t ' , and so 
on a round the g r o u p . I f you get ' s tuck ' or f a i l to explain the connection 
between the p rev ious word and your own word (on being challenged) you 
are ' o u t ' . One of the rounds goes something l ike t h i s : Car, Rolls Royce, 
m i n i , s k i r t , hedge, c l i p p e r s , sa i l , s h o p . . . At th is point the small g i r l who 
said 'shop' is chal lenged by her b r o t h e r . The family decide a f t e r much 
discuss ion that the g i r l is not 'out ' because a l though she knew that 'sail ' 
was not the same as 'sale' they both sounded the same and could be in t e r -
p re ted e i the r way. What has happened in fac t is that e i ther by chance or 
by d e s i g n , the small g i r l has fused two d i f f e r e n t frames of re fe rence . 
To some ex ten t th i s 'b isocia t ion ' of d i f f e r e n t frames of reference occurs 
amongst animals, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of a h ighe r in te l l igence . Koestler quotes 
f r o m exper iments conducted i n the early par t of th is c e n t u r y and recorded 
by the psychologis t who had conducted them - Wolfgang Kohler - in his 
The Menta l i ty of Apes . The exper iments were e f f ec t ed amongst chimpanzees 
and began as a test of in te l l igence . The chimp is g iven a s t ick to play wi th 
wh ich i t does u n t i l i t becomes bored and looks f o r o ther enter ta inment . 
At th i s point a bunch of bananas is placed beyond the reach of the chimp -
outs ide the bars of i ts enclosure . The chimp, in obvious d i s t ress , t r ies in 
vain to reach the bananas - u n t i l i t casts i ts eye on the s t i c k . Immediatelv. 
i t uses the implement to d rag the bananas to w i t h i n arms^ reach and consume 
i ts deserved feas t . On subsequent occasions the same chimp t u r n e d more 
q u i c k l y to the s t i ck to draw the bananas closer , u n t i l f i n a l l y , when presented 
w i t h the same prob lem, the chimp immediately t u r n e d to the s t i ck without 
a t t emp t ing a n y t h i n g else. 
The combination of the s t i ck and the bananas out ot reach was an 
example of b i soc ia t ion , and , as an example, te l ls us something more about the 
mechanics of c r e a t i v i t y . I n many ways the chimps were ideal ly sui ted to this 
sor t of task and as a problem it d id not lie outs ide of the i r in te l lec tua l 
capaci t ies . I f you give a s t ick to a dog , as Koest ler points ou t , a ve ry 
d i f f e r e n t t h i n g would happen . This fac t leads Koest ler to believe in an 
' appropr i a t eness ' , a ' r ipeness ' w i t h i n all c rea t ive i n d i v i d u a l s , which leads to 
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c r e a t i v i t y as less of a myster ious in sp i r a t iona l f l a s h , 
and more as an appropr i a t e response by an i n d i v i d u a l to a pa r t i cu l a r 
e n v i r o n m e n t . This enables Koest ler to separate chance c r e a t i v i t y f rom 
c r e a t i v i t y which resu l t s f rom a number of f ac to r s and variables gradual ly 
coming closer toge ther ; as in the case of a sc ient is t w o r k i n g towards the 
d i s c o v e r y of a new theo ry or law. One of the bes t -known examples of this 
is that of Archimedes d i scove r ing that displacement is equal to the mass of 
an object - by g e t t i n g in to his ba th . (Eureka! the s o l u t i o n ) . The solution 
d id no t , however , s imply come f r o m no th ing or nowhere , it was the result 
of a speci f ic problem given to him by his p ro t ec to r , Hiero of Syracuse: 
namely to d iscover the way in which he could be sure that the crown given 
to his r u l e r was real ly made of gold and not contaminated by some other mett 1 
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Archimedes was able to recognise , assimilate and repeat his ' solut ion ' 
because he was ' r i pe ' f o r i t . Th is is the s to ry of so many great achievements. 
I f a person is not available who is r ipe to d iscover something, i f the e n v i r -
onment does not exist where the solut ion to a problem is r e q u i r e d , then there 
w i l l be no d i s c o v e r y . I t took many hundreds of years f o r the art of block 
p r i n t i n g d iscovered by the Chinese to bear f r u i t in the modern p r i n t i n g press. 
Equal ly i t took many hundreds of years f o r Hero's toy steam engine to f i n d 
a use and so play such an impor tan t role in the ' I n d u s t r i a l Revo lu t ion ' . 
T h e r e f o r e , as well as the combination of the two matr ices , the circumstances 
must be r i g h t f o r the in t e rac t ion to take place and the reby create something. 
An exce l l en t example of bisociat ion is to be f o u n d in Richard Bach's 
d e l i g h t f u l s t o r y of a seagull and his quest f o r a grea ter unders tand ing of 
f l i g h t : Jonathan L i v i n g s t o n Seagull . Consider the point in the s to ry where 
Jona than , hav ing fa i l ed in an attempt to f l y fas t in to a d ive and p u l l out 
before h i t t i n g the sea, recovers consciousness f l o a t i n g on his back. 
When he came to , i t was well a f t e r d a r k , and he f loated 
in the moonlight on the surface of the ocean. His wings 
were ragged bars of lead, but the weight of f a i l u r e was 
even heavier on his b a c k . . . He pushed wear i ly away 
f r o m the d a r k wate r . . . 
(Fa i lu re and a g r o w i n g f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h the apparent imposs ib i l i ty of the 
s i tua t ion - but also a g r o w i n g po ten t i a l ; a r ipeness) 
. . . T h e r e would be no more ties now to the force that 
had d r i v e n him to l e a r n , there would be no more challenge 
and no more f a i l u r e . And i t was p r e t t y , jus t to stop 
t h i n k i n g , and f l y t h r o u g h the da f 'K , towards the l i gh t s 
above the beach. Da rk ! The hollow voice cracked in 
a larm. Seagulls never f l y in the d a r k ! . . . Get down! 
Seagulls never f l y i n the d a r k ! I f you were meant 
to f l y in the d a r k , you 'd have the eyes of an owl! 
You 'd have char t s f o r b ra ins ! You 'd have a falcon's 
shor t w i n g s ! . . . Short w i n g s . A fa lcon 's shor t wings! 
That ' s the answer! What a foo l I ' ve been! AH I need 
is a t i n y l i t t l e w i n g , a l l I need is to f o l d most of my 
wings and f l y on j u s t the t ips alone! Shor t w ings . 
( F a i l u r e , and the recogni t ion that he could never f l y l ike a hawk gives 
Jonathan the much needed leap f r o m one frame of re fe rence to another . He 
has shown an example of bisociat ive t h i n k i n g ) . 
. . . he b rough t his fo rewings t i g h t l y in to his body , le f t 
on ly the nar row swept daggers of his w ing t ip s extended 
in to the w i n d , and f e l l in to a ve r t i ca l d i v e . . . he eased 
out of the d ive and shot above the waves, a grey 
cannonbal l under the moon. 
(Success, and the solut ion to a problem f o r which he had become r ipe to solve) 
There is a connection between Kos t le r ' s use of ' r ipeness ' and S tor r ' s 
use of f r u s t r a t i o n and the ' d iv ine d i scon ten t ' , both of which are recognised 
as the basis of c rea t ive a c t i v i t y . Creat ion i t se l f is a matter of ei ther the 
ac t ive seeking a f t e r or the chance in te rconnec t ion of two d i f f e r e n t , even 
d i spara te f rames of r e f e r ence . I n no way could i t be descr ibed as a creat io 
ex n ih i lo as Koes t ler w r i t e s : 
Th i s c rea t ive act is not an act of creat ion in the sense 
of the Old Testament . I t does not create something out 
of n o t h i n g : i t uncove r s , selects, r e s h u f f l e s , combines, 
synthesises already e x i s t i n g fac ts ideas, f acu l t i e s , 
s k i l l s . The more fami l i a r the p a r t s , the more s t r i k i n g 
the new whole . 
Koest ler has p r o v i d e d an i n s i g h t in to the mechanics of c r e a t i v i t y , he 
contends that i t is i n v o l v e d in many par ts of human l i f e and may be recognised 
i n many a c t i v i t i e s . How impor tan t is c r e a t i v i t y t h o u g h , does i t only help us 
to descr ibe human a c t i v i t y o r can i t be used f u r t h e r ? Charles Har tshorne in 
the development of his 'process ph i losophy ' has examined the nature of 
c r e a t i v i t y v e r y closely and has devoted much in the way of time and e f f o r t 
to show tha t c r e a t i v i t y is fundamenta l to our whole exis tence. He believes 
that c r e a t i v i t y is at the heart of any p roper desc r ip t ion of person. He also 
believes that c r e a t i v i t y is at the hear t of any p rope r explanat ion or i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of the u n i v e r s e . His phi losophical stance does, in i ts overa l l 
exp re s s ion , seem r a t h e r o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c , asser t ing as i t does that 'creat ive 
becoming' i n the u n i v e r s e , which f i n d s express ion in s u c h ' t h i n g s as evo lu t ion , 
is heading towards an ul t imate f u l f i l m e n t . But f o r al l the apparent weak-
nesses of his ph i losophy , wh ich are , some would say, p a r t i c u l a r l y evident 
when g iven a theological app l i ca t i on , Hartshorn€,has p rov ided many valuable 
i n s i g h t s i n to the ex ten t and na ture of c r e a t i v i t y in human existence. 
I n Crea t ive Synthes is and Philosophic Method, Har tshornCintroduces his 
now f u l l y developed approach to 'becoming' as a 'c reat ive synthesis ' w i th in 
human exper ience a n d , by doing t h i s , has shown that c r e a t i v i t y is at the 
basis of epis temology. A l t h o u g h his overa l l phi losophical approach is in 
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many ways dependent upon his epistemology one does not necessarily imply the 
o the r . His epistemology can remain in tac t as an approach to human experience 
and knowledge wi thou t r e q u i r i n g that any f u r t h e r philosophical or theological 
speculat ions be accepted. As f a r as c r e a t i v i t y is concerned, Hartshorn*-
believes that i t is al l pervas ive w i t h i n human exper ience: 
To be is to crea te . A c c o r d i n g to th i s v iew, when we 
praise cer ta in i n d i v i d u a l s as ' c r ea t i ve ' , we can p roper ly 
mean only that what they create is impor tant or extens ive , 
while what o thers create is t r i v i a l or s l i g h t . But what 
they create cannot be zero, so long as the ind iv idua ls 
. , (17) e x i s t . 
Here Har t sho rn t out l ines his thesis - no static Ar i s to te l i an constants 
and categories of being f o r him - being is descr ibed in terms of becoming. 
E x t e n d i n g c r e a t i v i t y to the point where we al l become creat ive ind iv idua ls 
is not d i f f i c u l t f o r H a r s h o r n i a s he w r i t e s : 
I n every moment each of us accomplishes a remarkable 
c rea t ive act . What do we create? Our own experience 
(18) 
at the moment. 
From th i s basis Har t shorne moves on to expla in what he means and to describe 
how a person is able to synthesise many causal f ac to r s in to a single experience 
of the w o r l d at any one moment. Acco rd ing to Har t shorne , there is no di rect 
causal l i n k between our percept ions and our exper ience . The sum of all 
sense data does not simply resu l t in our exper ience; there i s , i t might be sa'd 
an 'epistemological gap' between the col lect ion of sense data and our experience 
of the w o r l d , upon which we base our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ourselves and our 
e n v i r o n m e n t . I t is our crea t ive capaci ty which makes our scattered and 
va r ious percept ions in to coherent exper iences . There is no th ing inherent in 
the phys i ca l w o r l d which leads to coherent and consistent experiences. Also 
there is no h in t of solipsism in Hartshorffids ph i losophy , which would lead to 
a bel ief that even i f the phys ica l w o r l d d id ex is t i t would not a f fec t our 
exper i ence . For th i s reason Colin Gunton in an exposi t ion and cr i t i c i sm 
Q. (19) 
of Har tshorni ' s ideas in his Becoming and Being has dubbed Hartsi^orne's 
epistemology Idea l i s t /Rea l i s t or Sub jec t i ve /Ob jec t i ve - not because it fa l ls 
between two stools but because i t makes a serious attempt at synthes is ing the 
s t r e n g t h s of both approaches. As such Har t shorne has provided an 
epistemology w h i c h , a l though based upon the in s igh t s of Bergson, Pierce and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Whitehead, is un ique . 
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Har tshorne contends t ha t , because actual experiences cannot be simply 
reduced to the i r cons t i tuen t causes - which would lead to a somewhat de te r -
minis t ic epis tomology, we are to recognise the u n i t y of experience which is the 
resu l t of the f ree creat ion of the i n d i v i d u a l . The u n i t y of any experience does 
include events remembered f r o m the past and also data f r o m the present , but 
the coming together - the making - is dependent upon the person, and no 
two people wi l l create the same experience f rom the same data. The step f rom 
the jumble of memories and percept ions to a 'self created ac tua l i ty ' ^ ^ is 
not a logical one but a f r ee c rea t ion . There is w i t h each experience a new 
crea t ive synthes is of ' the many' to f o r m a new 'one' , which cannot be 
p r e d i c t e d us ing logic . Creat ive synthes is t ied as i t is to the idea of u n i t y is 
an impor tan t element in Har t shorne ' s approach . U n i t y has a pr imary posi t ion 
over p l u r i t y in the monist ph i lo sophy , and the concept which lies behind th i s 
con ten t ion is crea t ive syn thes i s . The con t inua l movement w i th in the universe 
away f r o m the many par t s to the whole, away f r o m p l u r a l i t y towards u n i t y , is 
expressed , f o r H a r t s h o r n e , in a person's exper ience . As i n d i v i d u a l s , we 
r e f l ec t what is ex is ten t t h r o u g h o u t the un iverse and one of these th ings is 
the process of u n f o l d i n g and becoming exempl i f ied in the process of creat ive 
syn the s i s . The presence of c rea t ive synthes is is recognised in that there is 
an inde te rmina te element in a l l that we do and exper ience , which is in some way 
t i ed to the laws of the un iverse w h i c h , r e f l e c t i n g only s ta t i s t ica l p r o b a b i l i t y , 
lead us to the conclusion that the un ive r se is i t s e l f , at least in p r i n c i p l e , 
unde t e rmined . Crea t ive synthes is in becoming is well i l l u s t r a t ed by J . Cobb 
in his Process Theo logy : An I n t r o d u c t o r y Exposi t ion ^^^^ when he l ikens i t 
to a reel of motion f i l m . Each f rame is an e n t i t y unique in i t se l f wi th i t s 
own d ep th and v a r i e t y , and yet i t is not f u l l y explained unless i t be seen in 
the con tex t of the p reced ing f r ames . Each f rame is a becoming dependent 
upon the past , t hough paradoxica l ly d i s t i nc t as an en t i t y in i t se l f . The 
weakness of the i l l u s t r a t i o n is that i t does not show that each event , w i t h i n 
i t s own span, i t se l f becomes. Since a frame is static i t cannot of course do 
t h i s . However , i t is h e l p f u l i n tha t i t i l luminates the general idea of c r ea t i / e 
syn thes i s in becoming. Take , f o r ins tance , frames A , B and C: in the 
becoming of C ne i ther A nor B is created or changed - they do not become. 
However , the re la t ionsh ip between C and B does become. The ve ry fact 
that f rame C has become has made B a predecessor of C, and C a successor 
of B . T h e r e f o r e , the r e l a t ionsh ip of the event - in -becoming to former events 
does become; and , th i s being the case, a connection between events is found 
to exis t in the crea t ive synthes is of fo rmer events . In this sense creative 
synthes is is cumula t ive - i t is b u i l t up as the process of becoming cont inues . 
There is no s t r i c t causal connect ion between events : a connection exists 
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bclwecn successors anci pi-edecessors in becoming which enables (he past 
to have a real in f luence on the presen t , but no predetermined causal l ink 
between events . The present experiences flow f r o m the wealth of 
poss ib i l i t i es which become 'past ' as soon as they become and are perce ived; 
actual occasions ( i . e . events) only exist in the past and these provide the 
basis f o r a new becoming t h r o u g h a c rea t ive synthes is of these occasions in 
the p resen t . 
Har t shorne has made a case f o r ex tend ing the e f fec t of c r e a t i v i t y as 
an element in our personal make-up to a posi t ion where i t is fundamental to 
ou r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what i t is to be a pe r son . This emphasis is to be 
welcomed. C r e a t i v i t y is at the heart and root of a l l human a c t i v i t y and 
exper ience . I f we are looking f o r 'ways in to' a desc r ip t ion of human 
i n d i v i d u a l existence sure ly c r e a t i v i t y , based as i t is in our personal 
development f r o m b i r t h onwards , p rov ides t h i s . C r e a t i v i t y is perhaps the 
s ingle most impor tan t f ac to r in Har t shorne ' s phi losophy so perhaps i t comes as 
no s u r p r i s e that he would i n t e r p r e t i n d i v i d u a l exper ience in terms of i t . 
But the fact that c r e a t i v i t y is so impor tan t to Har t shorne is not s u f f i c i e n t 
reason to be suspicious of his a rgument : whatever is thought of Hartshot-nc's 
o v e r a l l ph i losophy his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of percept ion and experience seems 
v e r y sound . To conclude th i s section Har t shorne ' s own words w i l l be used in 
summary: 
Let me restate the basic a rgument : the s t imul i moulding 
an exper ience are many: the f i v e o r more senses are 
o p e r a t i n g , memory is r e l a t i ng us, at least unconsciously , 
to thousands of inc iden ts of the past , but a l l th is 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of in f luences is to produce a single u n i t a r y 
exper ience , yours or mine r i g h t now, let us say. The 
e f f ec t is one; the causes, however , are many, l i t e r a l ly 
h u n d r e d s of thousands , b i l l ions even , cons ider ing the 
cells i n our bra ins f o r example. This vast mul t i tude of 
f ac to r s must f low together to produce a single new e n t i t y , 
the exper ience of the moment. The many st imuli are 
g i v e n , and ce r t a in ly they te l l us much about the response. 
But i t is a logical imposs ib i l i ty that they should te l l us 
a l l . An emergent synthes is is needed, to decide jus t how 
each item is to blend in a single complex sensory-emotional 
in te l l ec tua l whole, the e x p e r i e n c e . . . To experience must 
(22) 
be a f r ee act , or n o t h i n g i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
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The arguments in this chapter liave not as yet been developed, they h;.\c 
merely been presented . Clear ly there are connections between various sections 
but these also have not as yet been d rawn out and i n t e r p r e l e d . For what 
remains of th is chapter an at tempt w i l l be made to synthes ise , i n t e r p r e t and 
draw out possible conclusions f r o m the arguments presented here . 
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Section Two 
Even the most c u r s o r y of glances at the arguments leads to the 
recogni t ion that there are two impor tan t concepts which fo rm both the under -
l y i n g s t r u c t u r e and the overa l l t h r u s t of th is chapter ; they are: personal 
(23) 
development and i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t i v i t y . Both are impor tant to a proper 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of personhood; they both act to u n i f y and c l a r i f y the many 
dispara te elements i n v o l v e d in any desc r ip t ion of person , and as f a r as this 
chap te r is concerned , they also f u n c t i o n as p r inc ip les of synthesis and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Personal development or the g r o w t h of personhood is clearly involved 
as a phi losophical p resuppos i t ion in the material r e f e r r e d to and used in this 
chap te r . As a concept i t has acted as a backdrop to many of the arguments 
and as such is v i t a l to t he i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l 
c r e a t i v i t y has become more ev iden t as an impor tant concept as the chapter 
has p rogressed . I t has acted as the motive f o r c e , the general t h r u s t , of the 
chap te r . Development, as a conceptual f r a m e w o r k , seems to have more to 
do w i t h those f ac to r s which are i n v o l v e d in the cons t ruc t ion of our personal i :y 
and i d e n t i t y , h a v i n g something of the ' f e e l ' of succession or temporal 
p rogress ion about i t . C r e a t i v i t y , on the o ther hand , seems more s ign i f i can t 
m the area of u n d e r s t a n d i n g what we mean when we say that we i n t e n d , act 
or t h i n k . As such c r e a t i v i t y seems to be of less importance to temporal 
p rogress ion and the f u t u r e span of l i f e and is more concerned w i t h the pres(;nt 
as the nexus of c r ea t ion . 
At f i r s t s ight i t would appear that these statements about development 
and c r e a t i v i t y are m e a n i n g f u l . However , such clear d iv is ions between the 
concepts can be misleading and may only be h e l p f u l is as f a r as they give 
approximate indica t ions of areas of involvement and provide a r o u g h 
del ineat ion of the p rov ince of each. I n fact both concepts are important to 
each o ther and ne i the r should be allowed to exclude the other or to gain 
a pos i t ion of pr imacy in the desc r ip t ion of personhood. Personal developmerit 
and i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t i v i t y f u n c t i o n as two sides of the same coin , but the 
metaphor has to be modif ied since this coin is t r anspa ren t ; that i s , in looking 
at one side you also gain a glimpse of the o ther and the connections betwee i 
b o t h . I t would seem that the chapter would best proceed and achieve i ts 
aim by focuss ing f i r s t on one of these concepts and then on the o ther . 
Pcrsonal development (The g r o w t h of personhood) 
E r i k Er ikson has been impor tant in showing that there are oppor tu t i i t i es 
f o r personal development at al l stages t h roughou t l i f e . I n showing this he 
has p rov ided an impor tant e laborat ion of the Freudian psychological system. 
He has shown that i t is not on ly chi ldhood which is important f o r the way 
we l ive and in te rac t in adul t l i f e , but the whole of l i f e , which he divides in to 
e ight stages. C lea r ly , f rom the evidence that Er ikson and others who have 
fol lowed him present , i t is co r rec t to t h i n k of human beings as in a process 
of development . This process can be seen f rom two d i f f e r e n t perspect ives; 
f i r s t , in how we see ourselves develop; secondly, how those around us see 
the process e v o l v i n g . I t is not enough to ta lk of the existence of an ' I ' 
wh ich is cons tan t ly present t h r o u g h o u t l i f e . Our in terac t ion wi th the wor ld 
develops as those t h ings which in i t i a t e a response in our psychological make-
up change and develop , t h o u g h seen f r o m a d i f f e r e n t angle both the 
i n d i v i d u a l and others recognise th i s change. Some elements of our personal 
make-up may remain unchanged t h r o u g h o u t l i f e , but this does not imply the 
existence of an 'e lusive I ' . Some elements wi l l have negative and some posit ive 
e f fec t s on the way we relate to o the r s , but even the pers i s ten t ly negative 
elements can be joined by o ther pa t te rns of in te rac t ion which may not r i d 
the people of these negat ive e f f ec t s but may, which seems be t te r , am.eliorate 
or r e d i r e c t them. What may have once caused a negative response may resul* 
in something qui te d i f f e r e n t . I n m.any cases v i r t ue s seem to be our vices 
t u r n e d on t h e i r head. For ins tance , i f those th ings which may produce 
arrogance or p r ide in a person are conjoined w i t h a clear percept ion of the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s value of himself and others it may resu l t in a cons t ruc t ive 
assessment of personal w o r t h and also lead to real g r o w t h . 
Mary Midgley has added a h e l p f u l co r rec t ive to what might be a tendency 
in developmental psychology and other branches of the behavioural sciences. 
By es tab l i sh ing the importance of innate and genetical ly inhe r i t ed tendencies 
and i n s t i nc t s to the overa l l p i c t u r e of personal make-up she has countered 
the tendency to see e v e r y t h i n g f r o m a r e l a t i v i s t i c pos i t ion . She does not 
challenge the overa l l s t r u c t u r e , bu t seeks to p rov ide a more accurate 
de sc r i p t i on of the general area f r o m which personal development can w o r k . 
She believes that it is a mistake to claim that human freedom is only possible 
i f there are no inhe r i t ed tendencies . There are many factors invo lved in 
our development but th i s does not mean that we play an en t i re ly passive 
ro le . We have the capab i l i ty of shaping our own f u t u r e and doing those 
th ings which are in us to do. We are not simply at the mercy of the innate 
tendencies which we possess or to the capricious elements and forces in our 
env i ronment . This is not in tended to sound over ly opt imis t ic . We can make 
'wrong choices as well as r i g h t , we can even red i rec t r igh t choices to create 
less o p p o r t u n i t y f o r personal i n t e g r a t i o n and more alienation f rom our 
fel low human beings and f r o m our env i ronment . I f v i r tues are of ten vices 
t u r n e d on the i r head the reverse is also t r u e . 
The cent ra l and most impor tan t point which developmental psychology 
seems to make is to es tabl ish a temporal process in which we are all i n v o l v e d . 
L ike a r i v e r our personal i t ies move t h r o u g h a landscape of space and t ime. 
Ear ly in l i f e we take the shor tes t rou tes , c u t t i n g gorges and valleys in to the 
mountains of i n fo rma t ion which c o n f r o n t us . Later we slow down, t ak ing our 
time to choose the course that we want to take , f u l l of the a l luvia l deposits 
wh ich we have b rough t w i t h us f r o m the h ighlands of our y o u t h . Personal i ty 
and i d e n t i t y are not in s tasis . I f there are elements which are essential to 
us and remain unchanged t h r o u g h o u t the span of l i f e the evidence f rom the \\i 
we develop and respond to our w o r l d seems to go con t r a ry to that conclusion. 
I n an attempt to c l a r i f y the var ious s t rands of thought about personal 
development which are present w i t h i n this chapter , reference wi l l be made to 
two impor tan t examples of areas in which personal development takes a 
s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t . These examples w i l l not only th row l i g h t onto the subject of 
personal development but w i l l also give an ins igh t into the role of i n d i v i d u a l 
c r e a t i v i t y in our development . The f i r s t example w i l l be discussed under the 
broad heading of autonomy and recogni t ion and the second under in te rac t ion 
and i n t e g r a t i o n . 
( i ) Autonomy and recogn i t ion 
Autonomy seems to be dependent upon two k inds of r ecogn i t ion . The 
f i r s t sort of r ecogn i t ion is that wh ich is needed to grasp the d i f f e rence 
between the wor ld and y o u r s e l f ; that i s , the ab i l i t y to d i f f e r en t i a t e between 
what is ex te rna l to you and what is essential to y o u . The second sort of 
r ecogn i t ion is that vyhich leads to an unde r s t and ing of one's ab i l i t y to mani-
pulate r e a l i t y . The a b i l i t y to s t r u c t u r e , shape and inf luence the wor ld around 
animate and inanimate, human and non-human . 
I n some ways the two forms of recogni t ion at the root of personal 
autonomy are amongst the earl iest t h ings learned in a person's l i f e . The 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n recognised by the ch i ld which occurs between mother and baby 
happens ear ly on in a ch i ld ' s l i f e and forms par t of the basis of the autonomy 
of percept ion anci act ion and a g r o w t h away f rom the pract ical monism whic l i 
character ises Ihe f i r s t months of a ch i ld ' s l i f e . I n another sense, however, 
autonomy is learned over a longer pe r iod , both in specific phases, d u r i n g 
adolescence f o r example, and day to clay. The resul ts of a chi ld learn ing 
1o place wooden blocks on top of one another is the same as a young adult 
l ea rn ing to d r i v e . Both ac t iv i t i e s are pushing back the boundaries of 
exper ience , both are p r o v i d i n g new areas of rea l i ty over which the person 
has a new f o u n d c o n t r o l . Autonomy in th is sense is cumulat ive , in that 
each new experience of autonomy leads to greater confidence in fac ing new 
s i tua t ions . A person w i t h a lack of confidence in his own abi l i t ies may well 
have a l imi ted u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the d i s t i nc t ion betv^een himself and others 
or may even doubt his a b i l i t y to a f f ec t the world around h im. An i l l u s t r a t i on 
of a way in which many people f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to a t ta in independence and a 
sense of autonomy is seen when young people o f ten f i n d i t impossible to make 
an e f f e c t i v e phys ica l and psychologica l break wi th the i r parents and family 
when they have to s t a r t a career or get mar r i ed . A g rowing body of research 
is being devoted to the subject of ch i ld r en leaving the parental home. Daniel 
Goldman w r i t i n g on the subject of the gradual disengagement f rom parents 
and fami ly that al l y o u n g people need to achieve has said: 
E r ik son points out that in each phase of the l i fe cyc le , 
a p a r t i c u l a r issue takes centre stage. In adolescence, 
that issue is leaving home, in the symbolic sense of 
f i n d i n g an autonomous i d e n t i t y . . . Without leaving home 
in th i s i nne r sense, i t is impossible to become 'mature ' 
in the sense of Freud 's d i sa rming ly simple de f in i t i on 
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to have the capaci ty to work and to love. 
Autonomy and a sense of i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y are v e r y closely re la ted . In 
many ways they appear to be the same t h i n g seen f rom two d i f f e r e n t angles; 
autonomy f r o m the point of view of the ex te rna l ly observed e f fec t s of an 
i n d i v i d u a l ac t ion ; i d e n t i t y viev/ed f r o m the angle of the ind iv idua l ' s perception 
of his own a c t i v i t y . As well as bear ing th is close re la t ionship to i d e n t i t y , 
autonomy appears to be impor tan t f o r an unders t and ing of personal f reedom. 
Any sense of f reedom must su re ly stem f i r s t f rom a recogni t ion that freedom 
of action is possible . I n some ways personal freedom is the sign of autonomy 
and is one of the impor tan t v.'ays in which autonomy can be asserted in an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i v i t y . Such a recogni t ion can only be learned f rom the 
person's own exper ience of the a b i l i t y to act pu r^pose fu l l y in the w o r l d . 
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Autonomy, i d e n t i t y and f reedom do seem to bear a close re la t ionship to 
one ano ther . A l l r e q u i r e a recogni t ion of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and an unders tanding 
of personal and p u r p o s e f u l ac t ion . A l l three also seem to bear a close 
re la t ion to the area of personal a c t i v i t y to be out l ined in the next section -
in t eg ra t ion and i n t e r a c t i o n . An unde r s t and ing of autonomy and i ts related 
concepts are a r r i v e d at by a person's in te rac t ion w i t h those people and 
th ings which make up his env i ronmen t , and in te rac t ion of this sort is 
dependant upon a person's a b i l i t y to in tegra te the various pat terns of 
behaviour and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n learned f r o m the past . 
( i i ) I n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n 
Our in t e rac t ion w i t h people and events and our unders tand ing of the 
present i s , as has a l ready been no ted , dependent upon our in tegra t ion of 
the past . But th is i n t e g r a t i o n of our learned pa t te rns of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
behaviour and even percept ion is dependent upon something else. The patte:-ns 
of r e f e r e n t i a l systems s tored w i t h i n our memories as symbols of i n t e r -
p re t a t ion by which we are able to unders tand and o rde r our experience of t h 
moment. Our memory, w o r k i n g on d i f f e r e n t levels of consciousness, is al l thi 
time ' t r y i n g out ' var ious systems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and behaviour re la t ive to 
the s i tua t ion which c o n f r o n t s us in the presen t . Like a chi ld t r y i n g f i r s t one 
piece of the j igsaw then another , memory is s o r t i n g , s h u f f l i n g and selecting 
the images and symbols f r o m the past and a l ign ing them, wi th the present . 
I n doing this i t is p r o v i d i n g oppo r tun i t i e s f o r creat ive connections between 
what we have learned in the past and what we experience in the present . 
The actual appl ica t ion of these pa t te rns need not necessarily be easy and can 
be more or less success fu l in p r o d u c i n g an adequate response. Some 
s i tua t ions are more simple than o the r s , some are merely ' r u n of the m i l l ' , 
o thers present enormous complicat ions . Our response to the question 'What is 
the time?' is less complicated than and d i f f e r e n t f rom a s i tuat ion where we 
are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the death of a f r i e n d . Our response to any s i tuat ion 
depends upon our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i t and th i s in t u r n is dependent upon 
what we can remember and apply f r o m what we have learned in the past . 
Memory in th is sense is not s imply descr ibed in terms of what can be consciously 
remembered, but is ope ra t ing at a l l levels of consciousness. In t eg ra t ion is 
p i c t u r e d as an almost i n f i n t e l y f l e x i b l e system, constant ly moni to r ing , tes t ing 
and check ing sense data' against pa t te rns of behaviour and symbols of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h e r e b y i n i t i a t i n g a response. I t would be wrong to 
descr ibe th i s system as autonomous; i t would be more adequate to describe i t 
as being la rge ly an i n t eg ra t i on of the unconscious and subconscious levels 
and thereby related to all par ts of the psyche, though perhaps not consciously 
recognised as being so. Some would disagree wi th this analysis , however; 
in some ways arguments about what in i t ia tes personal action is the watershed 
of the phi losophy of m i n d . 
Problems arise when there are obvious d iscont inui t ies between the past 
and the present or where there is l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r ad jus t i ng previous 
pa t te rns to ' f i t ' the present c i rcumstances . Si tuat ions which have never 
been encountered before need f i r s t to be recognised as such . This is not 
easily achieved i f no adequate unde r s t and ing or response is avai lable. I f 
i t is poss ible , the process of a t t empt ing a creat ive synthesis of a number of 
pa t te rns w i t h the present may achieve an under s t and ing of the s i tua t ion . 
For th i s to occur i t would r e q u i r e the ' s lowing down' of the process of 
pa t t e rn selection so that the var ious pa t te rns can be aligned wi th one 
another and ' t r i e d ' as a possible response. This slowing down is r equ i r ed 
because normally the unconscious process of i n t e r p r e t i n g what the sense organs 
are r e c e i v i n g is being cons tan t ly matched almost simultaneously by the 
process of response ( i n fac t de sc r ib ing them as two processes may be m.istaken • 
however convenient i t may happen to b e ) . The process of slowing down is 
va r ious ly called r e f l e c t i o n , r a t ioc ina t ion or even contemplat ion. The process 
w i l l be enhanced i f some pa t te rns are p rov ided f rom externa l sources - the 
parent w i l l teach the ch i ld f r o m his own store of remembered pat terns of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and response, or a f r i e n d w i l l l is ten and advise and open up 
new poss ib i l i t ies in so d o i n g . Each time a problem is resolved by the 
i n t eg ra t i on of personal and ex t e rna l sources another stage of development is 
completed. The process can be called 'education' or 'coming to terms wi th 
the real i t ies of l i f e ' , bu t i t is s t i l l personal development. Each successive 
stage in development bestows an inher i tance of new and more complex pat terns 
of u n d e r s t a n d i n g and response to the f u t u r e . 
The process of i n t e g r a t i o n and in te rac t ion is involved in every area of 
l i f e and is o c c u r r i n g in innumerable ways al l the t ime. I t may however be 
less e f f e c t i v e in p a r t i c u l a r par t s of some people's l i ves , wi th the system 
d i s p l a y i n g more in the v.'ay of a t r o p h y than f l e x i b i l i t y , old pat terns being 
con t inua l ly appl ied to s i tua t ions to which they may not be f u l l y su i t ed . Like 
the charac te rs in iMervyn Peake's desc r ip t ion of the imaginary wor ld of 
Gormenghast , a person may lose touch wi th the need f o r change and 
c r e a t i v i t y . Gormenghast was a complete society inside the walls of an ancient 
castle, where past t r ad i t i ons so r u l e d the present that time seemed to stand 
s t i l l . I n T i t u s Groan , the f i r s t in Peake's t r i l o g y of Gormenghast, the Lo rd 
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n p l l y named Scpulchrave would have his daily i t i n e r a r y set by Sourdus! , the 
l i b r a r i a n , who was the only person who knew all the t r ad i t i ons which 
d ic ta ted eve ry moment of the Lo rd ' s day . Al though maybe not to the same 
e x t e n t , some people do seem to have many of the i r l i f e decisions dictated 
by pa t te rns of behaviour which have remained unchanged and unchallenged 
f o r years • As well as r e l y i n g on outmoded pa t t e rns , some people re ta in 
pa t te rns which they value more h i g h l y than o thers , and which they the re fo re 
inves t w i t h more power . I n many ways some value system is inev i t ab le , o f ten 
necessary, and f o r the most par t presents few problems, but it can also, it 
would seem, lead to a para lys is in a person's response to s i tuat ions and an 
exper ience of the classic 'double b i n d ' . A double bind is a s i tuat ion which 
p reven t s people, f r o m e f f e c t i v e l y i n t e r a c t i n g wi th circumstances which face them. 
I f a person has a v e r y p o w e r f u l pa t t e rn of behaviour (which may manifest 
i t s e l f in a p r o h i b i t i v e command - ' thou shalt no t ' ) which allows f o r no 
d i scuss ion , then that person is r ipe f o r a double b ind s i t ua t ion . Examples of 
th is m u l t i p l y and can be shown to be p a r t i c u l a r l y evident amongst conservat ive 
adherents of var ious r e l i g i o n s . I f a person has, f o r ins tance, a s t rong pa t te rn 
of behaviour which p r o h i b i t s d i sp l ays , even fee l ings , of anger , that person 
w i l l have to f i n d ways of deal ing wi th that p a t t e r n . I f a person, bel ieving 
t h i s , does get a n g r y , he or she w i l l seek to sublimate i t , r ed i rec t i t to 
another area where i t may be more socially acceptable, or become ' t r apped ' and 
the re fo re more suscept ible to neurosis as the emotional paralysis advances. 
For a double b ind to occur three th ings are needed; f i r s t l y , a h i g h l y valued 
command about personal behaviour ; secondly, no meta-communication, that i s , 
no dialogue about the command; and t h i r d l y , no poss ib i l i ty of obeying the 
command g iven the s i tua t ion ( the command i t se l f may be impossible to obey 
l ike 'do not d o u b t ' , or i t may con f l i c t w i t h another equal ly impor tant comm.and 
held by the p e r s o n ) . 
The decision which c o n f r o n t e d Sophie in William S lyron ' s book Sophie's 
Choice, between the l i f e of her son and her daughte r as she a r r i v e d at the 
concent ra t ion camp is j u s t such a s i t ua t ion . A German o f f i c e r responsible f o r 
meeting the in ternees o f f the t r a i n and segregat ing them, gave her the choice 
of sav ing the l i f e of one of her c h i l d r e n . How could she possibly choose 
between the two? She was caught in a most vicious double b i n d . 
Th i s neurosis wh ich may f o r some become a serious condi t ion was f i r s t 
recognised as a cond i t ion of a double b ind by Pavlov, whose experiments 
w i t h dogs are well k n o w n . Pavlov f i r s t taught a dog to recognise a circle 
by r e w a r d i n g it eve ry time it d i s t ingu i shed the shape f rom all o the rs . 
Then he tested the dog to see whether it could d i s t i n g u i s h a c i rc le f rom an 
el ipse. I f it c o u l d , he would lessen the distance between the two focal 
points of the el l ipse so that even tua l ly the ellipse was ind i s t ingu ishab le f rom 
a c i r c l e . At th i s stage the clog, not knowing how to obtain the reward fo r 
r ecogn i s ing the c i r c l e , would become confused , agitated and d is t ressed . 
I f the exper iment was repeated several times the dog would become reluctant 
even to go in to the room where the experiments were ca r r i ed ou t . The dog , 
unable to obey the command to f i n d the c i rc le which its ins t inc t f o r g r a t i f i -
cation r e q u i r e d , exh ib i t ed the neurot ic para lys is which is evident amongst 
people in a s imilar s i t u a t i o n . I n psychological terms drawn f rom Freud , a 
double b ind might be descr ibed as o c c u r r i n g when the ego is not in a 
pos i t ion of s u f f i c i e n t con t ro l over the superego and the id to halt the ensuing 
bar ter f o r supremacy which resu l t s in stalemate, w i t h the id des i r ing 
sa t i s fac t ion and the superego exact ly counterbalancing the id 's demands w i t h 
a p r o h i b i t i v e command or ve to . 
The example of the double b ind is one which seems to i l l u s t r a t e how the 
i n t e g r a t i o n of learned pa t te rns of behaviour can go wrong in t he i r in terac t ion 
w i t h the p resen t , but converse ly i t also serves to show that i f in tegra t ion 
is success fu l then i t w i l l work in the opposite d i rec t ion f rom the double b i n d , 
that is - i t w i l l p roduce oppor tun i t i e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l g rowth and development. 
The double b ind is an example of a process which has broken down . I t 
shows how s i tua t ions can be d ic ta ted by p o w e r f u l pa t te rns of behaviour . I n 
th is i t d i sp l ays , i f in a negat ive f a sh ion , how the in t eg ra t ion of pa t te rns f r o m 
the past work in the present and as such may i l l u s t r a t e , i f ext rapola ted in 
a pos i t ive d i r e c t i o n , how the process is u s e f u l l y employed in the development 
of the pe r son . E r i k B y r n e , in his small book The Games People Play, shows 
again that even the most negat ive pa t te rns of behaviour which take the fo rm 
of 'games' in which more than one i n d i v i d u a l plays a role can not only have 
negat ive but also posi t ive e f f e c t s , especially i f the 'p layers ' become aware 
of the game and t u r n i t to pos i t ive e f f e c t . There fo re the game which Byrne 
calls ' K i c k Me' , wh ich is where a person provokes a response in the other 
p layers of aggress ion towards himself so that he can have the chance of 
say ing 'Why does th i s always happen to me?', can have a posi t ive side. 
The c e n t r a l p layers are those who f o r one reason or another are depressive 
and pers i s ten t f a i l u r e s or who del ibera te ly set out to become mar ty r s to some 
cause. I f the game is t u r n e d a round and the person is helped to become able 
to face the real i t ies of l i f e so that they become bet ter adapted and more 
success fu l , or i f the game is played by someone who has become successful 
f o r o ther reasons, the typ ica l statement 'Why does this always happen to me?' 
can be t u r n e d to posi t ive e f f e c t . I t can lead to ser ious, cons t ruc t ive 
r e f l ec t ion and the statement even t rans formed into 'What d id 1 real ly do to 
<ksUJi>^ ? ' 
The in t eg ra t i on of the past wi (h !he present has been shown to be v i ta l 
to our in t e rac t ion wi th our wor ld and to a proper unde r s t and ing of personal 
development . There are p a r t i c u l a r phases in l i fe when the b r i n g i n g to bear 
on the present of pa t te rns of behaviour and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i i apo r t an t . The process is o c c u r r i n g al l the while but there are stages when 
the importance of the process is exempl i f ied in p a r t i c u l a r . The two periods 
r e f e r r e d to are adolescence and the re i t rement years of l i f e , each a period 
of r ecap i tu l a t ion and t h e r e f o r e impor tant as learn ing y e a r s . ' They can both 
lead to a p a r t i c u l a r l y impor tan t phase of personal development and an a b i l i t y 
to success fu l ly in te rac t w i t h matters of l i f e . The fo rm which the r ecap i t u -
la t ion takes in adolescence can help in the successful l aunching of an adult l i f e 
charac te r i sed by g e n e r a t i v i t y and s t a b i l i t y . I n la ter l i f e i t can lead to a deep 
r e f l e c t i o n r e s u l t i n g in the wisdom o f t en associated w i t h those in old age. 
There are of course many l i nks of connection between the various issues 
discussed here and in the previous section 'Autonomy and recogni t ion ' but 
they al l possess and share a f u r t h e r connect ion, the v e r y one which unites 
them to i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t i v i t y . The closer the inves t iga t ion gets to the 
mechanisms of personal a c t i v i t y and thought the closer i t gets to c r e a t i v i t y . 
Viewed in a broad sense personal development seems to prov ide a p r inc ip le of 
u n i t y by w h i c h the o v e r a l l process beg inn ing at b i r t h and ending at death 
can be i n t e r p r e t e d . When viewed in a more pa r t i cu l a r sense, however , another 
concept is needed to exp la in the processes by which we can be said to act 
and t h i n k - such a concept is i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t i v i t y . 
I n d i v i d u a l c r e a t i v i t y 
The basis of c r e a t i v i t y as a developmental component in our personal 
make-up has been shown by A n t h o n y S to r r to be f o u n d in our i n f a n c y . The 
dependence of the ch i ld on o thers to unders tand r e a l i t y , and his i n a b i l i t y to 
c o n t r o l and co-ord ina te his motor f u n c t i o n s , are the experiences which act 
as a spur to c r e a t i v i t y . S to r r contends that th i s ' d iv ine discontent ' is 
present t h r o u g h o u t l i f e , there is always an i n s u f f i c i e n c y - a gap - between 
achievement and a s p i r a t i o n . This being so, there is a need f o r the i n d i v i d u a l 
to c o n t r o l and o rde r his f r u s t r a t i o n by c a p t u r i n g rea l i ty in creat ive enterprise . 
I t is as t h o u g h c r e a t i v i t y f u n c t i o n s to ' t ie down' r ea l i ty into manageable areas. 
A r t h u r Koest ler has been e f f ec t i ve in showing something of the 
mechanism i n v o l v e d in c rea t ive a c t i v i t y . He has shown that there is a need 
f o r a ' r ipeness ' w i t h i n any given con tex t , f o r c r e a t i v i t y in the form of 
'b isocia t ion ' or 'b isocia t ive t h i n k i n g ' to take place. Bisociation is involved in 
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many areas and resu l t s in the u n i f y i n g and s^'jjhesising of prev ious ly separate, 
even d i spa ra t e , frames of r e fe rence . The coming together of d i f f e r e n t 
associative contex ts in personal c r e a t i v i t y occurs at almost every level of 
human exper ience and endeavour , according to Koes t ler , f r o m the w r i t i n g 
of a shopp ing l i s t to the making of an epoch-changing d i s cove ry . 
Ha r s tho rne broadens the vis ion s t i l l f u r t h e r by sugges t ing that creat ive 
syn thes i s is not r e s t r i c t e d to those ac t iv i t ies which can be recognised as 
c r e a t i v e , and is c e r t a in ly not r e s t r i c t e d to a few i n d i v i d u a l s whom we 
descr ibe as c r ea t ive , f o r ' to be is to create ' . C r e a t i v i t y is invo lved in our 
most basic of a c t i v i t i e s : even our experience of the w o r l d , mediated t h r o u g h 
our pe rcep tua l senses, must invo lve c r e a t i v i t y and , t h e r e f o r e , c r e a t i v i t y is 
at the hear t of al l human knowledge and forms the founda t ion of our episte-
mology. 
I f c r e a t i v i t y is i n v o l v e d at a l l levels of human a c t i v i t y , some s t ruc tu r e 
is needed to p rov ide an i n s igh t in to how i t is at w o r k . A f ramework is 
r e q u i r e d tha t w i l l d i s t i n g u i s h the d i f f e r e n t sorts and levels of c r e a t i v i t y and 
delineate them in to manageable areas. Such an approach is possible using 
one of the basic psychological models of the d iv is ions w i t h i n a person's psyche 
the consc ious /subconsc ious /unconsc ious model. This is h e l p f u l in as f a r as 
i t can be used to i n t e r p r e t any number of creat ive en te rpr i ses and can show 
how the var ious levels of our consciousness con t r i bu t e in the many act iv i t ies 
of e v e r y d a y l i f e . No single a c t i v i t y w i l l be e n t i r e l y r e s t r i c t e d to a single level 
of consciousness, of course b u t , hav ing made th i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , i t would seem 
j u s t i f i e d to descr ibe and categorise ac t iv i t ies accord ing to the level of 
consciousness ab which they seem to be most evident and which accounts best 
f o r what is happening when the a c t i v i t y takes place. 
( i ) Conscious c r e a t i v i t y 
Conscious c r e a t i v i t y is the area of c r e a t i v i t y most o f t e n recognised by 
people when they descr ibe someone as being ' c rea t ive ' . Th is is because the 
p r o d u c t s of conscious c r e a t i v i t y are o f ten d i r e c t l y observable in the fo rm of 
some completed a r t i s t i c or sc ien t i f i c v e n t u r e . I f such an under s t and ing is 
used to l imi t the scope of c r e a t i v i t y i t is c lear ly u n h e l p f u l . However, the 
s tress on an observable p roduc t is h e l p f u l to an e x t e n t , in that i t provides 
a l ine of demarcat ion between conscious c r e a t i v i t y and all o the rs . Such 
c r e a t i v i t y usua l ly invo lves the conscious creat ive synthes is or bisociation 
of two ( o r more) i n d i v i d u a l l y recognised frames of r e fe rence . I t may not be 
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descr ibed by the person invo lved in the a c t i v i t y in qui te the same way, they 
may f i n d d i f f i c u l t y in exp la in ing any par t of the process. Conscious creat-
i v i t y docs not necessari ly r equ i r e a f u l l y worked out nomenclature or a h igh 
level of a r t i c u l a t i o n . But that which enables a painter to p o r t r a y the 
landscape before h im, t r a n s f e r his vis ion of rea l i ty onto canvas, is the 
same mechanism which enables a dancer to t rans la te an emotion in to a 
recognisable pa t t e rn of body movements - it is conscious creat ive synthesis or 
b i soc ia t ion . I t would seem that the desire f o r excellence or even unders tanding 
of any c rea t ive ven tu re that a person might under take requ i res the conscious 
r ecogn i t i on of the r e f e r e n t i a l systems i n v o l v e d in the en t e rp r i s e . In other 
w o r d s , some level of r e f l ec t ion is r e q u i r e d i f a person wants to develop an 
a b i l i t y o r i n t e r e s t . Th is does not necessari ly mean that i f you want to improve 
you have to sit down and ' t h i n k ' about i t , a l though it m igh t . Modern teaching 
and coaching methods ce r t a in ly invo lve some degree of r e f l ec t ion of this so r t . 
The most common way that an a c t i v i t y is raised to the level of consciousness, 
and is examined and i m p r o v e d , is by p rac t i ce . A tennis player w i l l practise 
g r o u n d s t rokes over and over again; an a r t i s t w i l l attempt to draw one or two 
objects u n t i l some level of sa t i s fac t ion is achieved; a dancer w i l l do a few 
movements repeatedly u n t i l they are r i g h t ; a scient is t w i l l c a r r y out the same 
or s imilar exper iments u n t i l the techniques have been r e f i n e d to such a degree 
that they become u s e f u l and repeatable; and so o n . Once the pa r t i cu la r 
level of re f inement or excellence has been achieved the a c t i v i t y can be allowed 
to move to the level of the subconscious so that i t becomes almost automatic. 
C h i l d r e n are perhaps be t te r at th is p a r t i c u l a r fo rm of l ea rn ing and develop-
ment , not because they are more c rea t ive , but because they are more f l ex ib le 
in approach ing problems and have fewer p o w e r f u l pa t te rns of i n t e rp re t a t i on 
and behaviour c o n f l i c t i n g and v y i n g f o r a t t e n t i o n . 
Almost eve ry impor tan t a r t i s t i c ven tu re or sc ien t i f i c d iscovery has 
i n v o l v e d a h i g h level of conscious r e f l e c t i o n . Leonardo da V i n c i spent years 
in anatomical research u n t i l he was able to represent almost pe r f ec t l y the 
human f o r m in two dimensions. Einste in would spend hours devis ing 'mental 
exper iments ' (even as he t r ave l l ed on the t ram to w o r k ) imagining such 
t h i n g s as that he was being ca r r i ed on a beam of l i g h t and was able to see 
what was happening to the dimensions of space t h r o u g h which he t r ave l l ed , 
u n t i l he had unders tood some of the most p r o f o u n d mysteries of the un iverse . 
Gut ienberg, the f a t h e r of modern p r i n t i n g , spent a considerable amount of 
time wa tch ing block p r i n t i n g and a large amount of his f o r t u n e tes t ing 
var ious methods of lead block p r i n t i n g and press ing u n t i l he had devised 
an e f f i c i e n t , workable machine. The examples could of course be mul t ip l ied 
many l imes . Sometimes crea t ive p roduc t s occur m a s u r p r i s i n g way as a 
' f l a sh of i n s p i r a t i o n ' or a 'bolt out of the b lue ' . Th is is not due to any 
novel fo rm of c r e a t i v i t y , but is due to the fact thai o f t en the i nd iv idua l l y 
recognised frames of reference do not easily or simply bisociate or synthesise 
a n d , because of t h i s , are allowed to move to the subconscious level where , 
f r ee f r o m the conscious r e s t r a i n t s , the creat ion takes place; this Koestler 
calls a 'Eureka moment' . 
( i i ) Subconscious c r e a t i v i t y 
A l l c rea t ive a c t i v i t y which occurs at th is level can be b rought to the 
conscious w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of ease and r e g u l a r i t y . Some act iv i t ies lie 
f o r some j u s t below the level of conscious awareness, o thers lie deeper. 
For one reason or another many of the processes and ac t iv i t i es at this level 
of consciousness are not genera l ly recognised as being c rea t ive . The 
reasons f o r th i s are many and range f r o m the personal and environmental to 
the c u l t u r a l . Th i s lack of recogni t ion may acpunt f o r why the ' l i gh t bu lb ' 
or ' sudden f l a s h ' t heo ry of c r e a t i v i t y is s t i l l so popula r . Accord ing to this 
view c r e a t i v i t y is the myster ious possession of a few ' g i f t e d ' ind iv idua l s and 
a f l e e t i n g occur rence to the res t . The theo ry has led to f u r t h e r theories 
as to the o r i g i n or source of such occurrences and they range f rom God 
being the main cause, to the abi l i t ies being passed on f rom parent to chi ld 
t h r o u g h the genera t ions . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g that two of the most popular 
explanat ions of c r e a t i v i t y are similar to the t r a d i t i o n a l theories about the 
o r i g i n of the soul : creat ionism and t r aduc ian i sm. 
Of course , none of these theories are necessary i f we realise tha t , 
below the t h r e s h o l d of conscious a c t i v i t y , we are con t inua l ly invo lved in 
the combinat ion of many d i f f e r e n t pa t te rns of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and behaviour and 
are c o n t i n u a l l y r e spond ing to the wor ld by so r t i ng and selecting d i f f e r e n t 
f rames of r e fe rence , which are u n i f i e d and synthes ised in the course of our 
normal exper ience . 
Many impor tan t dai ly ac t iv i t i e s invo lve the subconscious level of 
c r e a t i v i t y . D r i v i n g a car is a good example of an a c t i v i t y wh ich , a l though 
r e q u i r i n g a h i g h level of co -o rd ina t ion and competence, is o f t en ca r r ied out 
l a rge ly at a subconscious l e v e l . O f t e n , m.any other ac t iv i t ies are car r ied out 
whi l s t d r i v i n g a car . I t would seem that once a cer ta in level of competence 
has been achieved by the conscious l ea rn ing of a l l the procedures i n v o l v e d , 
a d r i v e r can c a r r y out a conver sa t ion , l i s ten to music, t h i n k about the 
menu f o r d i n n e r , do almost a n y t h i n g . I n fac t i t would seem that as long as 
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the f ee t , hands and eyes are f r ee 1o monitor and i n t e r p r e t and respond, 
a n y t h i n g is possible! This is ce r t a in ly the case when the complications arc 
few, as on motorways , but is decreas ingly t rue as the pa r t i cu la r manoeuvres 
become more complicated, 
( i i i ) Unconscious c r e a t i v i t y 
Unconscious c r e a t i v i t y cannot normally be recognised except in unusual 
or extreme s i tua t ions where a person's deepest levels of consciousness are 
t e m p o r a r i l y or a r t i f i c i a l l y exposed. Cer ta in methods in p s y c h i a t r y , such as 
h y p n o s i s , are designed to fac i l i t a te t h i s . Unconscious pa t t e rn selection would 
seem to account well f o r the e f f ec t that per ina ta l and postnatal experiences 
have on our in t e rac t ion w i t h our env i ronment . However , the area that it 
seems to account f o r best is that of i n d i v i d u a l exper ience . The vast sum 
of a l l sense data cannot s imply account f o r ou r exper ience . There is a need 
f o r some sort of conceptual f r a m e w o r k , learned ear ly in l i f e (possibly using 
i n h e r i t e d abi l i t ies as a p l a t f o r m ) and p rogress ive ly developed throughout l i f e . 
Th i s conceptual f r amework enables us to make sense of the chaotic collection 
of sense data which is being con t inua l ly received by the body. Two people, 
when asked to look at the same scene, w i l l focus on d i f f e r e n t th ings and 
w i l l notice th ings and o rde r the i r experience in d i f f e r e n t ways . We seem 
able to focus o u r exper ience and ignore a l l o ther data at w i l l , and concentrate 
on on ly one t h i n g , as when someone is engaged in sewing or w r i t i n g . .At 
o ther times we seem able to remove many of the ' f i l t e r s ' f rom our perceptual 
senses and take in a vast vis ta w i t h al l i ts va r i e ty of colour , sound and smell. 
I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note that those who have been congeni ta l ly b l ind and 
receive t h e i r s i g h t , recognise only patches and areas of shape and colour when 
they f i r s t begin to 'see'. The a c t i v i t y which produces our experience, though 
unconsc ious , seems to be as well descr ibed us ing words such as c r e a t i v i t y 
and bisociat ion as does any o ther a c t i v i t y at any other leve l . 
I t has a l ready been noted that al l levels of consciousness are involved 
in a l l c rea t ive ac t iv i t i e s in as f a r as a l l levels of consciousness are involved 
in almost eve ry occasion of l i f e ( w i t h the possible exception of such th ings as 
deep s l eep ) . I t would seem that there is a constant in terchange of informat ion 
between the var ious levels and a l though the exact role of the countless 
f i r i n g neurons is s t i l l u n k n o w n , there would appear to be a physical basis 
f o r th i s process. (However , a discussion of the possible neurological basis 
of c r e a t i v i t y is not possible g iven the space ava i l ab le ) . I t would seem that 
the b read th of subjects that could be invo lved in a descr ip t ion of personhood 
is b c w i l d e r i n g l y vas t . Th i s should not however deter us f rom the pro jec t . 
The arguments presented in this chapter c lear ly show that it is possible to 
d iscover p r inc ip le s by which the vast wel ter of in fo rmat ion can be i n t e r -
p r e t e d . The p r inc ip les developed in this chapter are not the only ones. 
Others may exist and some might even be found to be moi-e usefu l than 
personal development and i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t i v i t y . 
The approach o f f e r e d here der ives f r o m a recogni t ion that the 
r e d u c t i o n i s t techniques employed by such as H . D . Lewis need to be balanced 
by more hol is t ic and inc lus ive ones; and that the discussion needs to be 
broadened and f r e e d f r o m the cul-de-sac of Cartesian constants . The polemic 
e x h i b i t e d in the var ious arguments is a sign that th is mode of dialogue has 
been exp lo red ot i ts l imits and needs r e f r e s h i n g by material drawn f rom 
o the r areas, such as the ones c i ted here . 
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SOiVlE T H E O L O G I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S 
S e c t i o n 1. 
As a w r i t e r a n d t h i n k e r L e w i s has t w o main a reas of i h f l u e r i c e w h i c h 
a f f e c t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d . L i k e a y a c h t s m a n w h o , once he 
is c o n f i d e n t of h i s e q u i p m e n t , has t w o e l emen t s w h i c h o v e r l a p a n d i n f l u e n c e 
h i m i n t h e s e t t i n g of h i s c o u r s e - t h e w i n d a n d t h e sea - L e w i s has t w o 
m a j o r a reas o f academic i n f l u e n c e w h i c h set t he p a r a m e t e r s of h i s a p p i ' o a c h , 
t h a t i s , p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e o l o g y . T h e y a r e o f c o u r s e d i s t i n c t b u t t h e y a lso 
i n t e r a c t , c r e a t i n g a d y n a m i c t e n s i o n i n L e w i s ' w o r k . A t t imes one may be 
more e v i d e n t t h a n t h e o t h e r , b u t , l i k e t he y a c h t s m a n w h o c a n n o t i g n o r e 
t h e sea c u r r e n t s a n d c o n d i t i o n s because he is i n an a rea o f s t r o n g p r e v a i l i n g 
w i n d s , n e i t h e r can L e w i s i g n o r e one i n f l u e n c e a n d c o n c e n t r a t e w h o l l y on t i i e 
o t h e r . I t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t an a t t e m p t w i l l be made to d i s c o v e r 
s o m e t h i n g o f L e w i s ' t h e o l o g i c a l b a c k g r o u n d a n d a lso s o m e t h i n g of t h e f a i t h 
to w h i c h t h i s t h e o l o g y a t t e m p t s to g i v e an e x p r e s s i o n . I t has been seen 
t h a t L e w i s has a s t r o n g l e a n i n g t o w a r d s D e s c a r t e s a n d a r a t h e r i d e a l i s t 
e p i s t e m o l o g y , b u t w h e r e does he s t a n d t h e o l o g i c a l l y ? 
T h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f L e w i s ' t h e o l o g y w i l l be f o l l o w e d b y an a t t e m p t to 
p r o d u c e a t h e o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k w h i c h is a p p l i c a b l e to t he a l t e r n a t i v e 
a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d . B o t h s e c t i o n s w i l l f o l l o w the same s t r u c t u r e : f i r s t 
t h e g e n e r a l a n d m a j o r t h e o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s w i l l be b r o u g h t i n t o h i g h 
r e l i e f a n d s e c o n d l y , t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p a r t i c u l a r t h e o l o g y to t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d w i l l be h i g h l i g h t e d i n one area o f t h e o l o g i c a l 
a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e l f e c t i o n , n a m e l y l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . T h i s s h o u l d r e s u l t i n 
a more c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e of b o t h a p p r o a c h e s w h i c h , t h o u g h s k e t c h e d i n 
f a i r l y b r o a d s t r o k e s a n d w i t h o u t m u c h f i n e d e t a i l , s h o u l d p r o v i d e a more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of t he two a p p r o a c h e s . 
L e w i s is a man of f a i t h , he is b o t h t h e i s t a n d C h r i s t i a n a n d h i s 
t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n b e a r s w i t n e s s to t hese f a c t s . O f t e n L e w i s makes i t 
c l e a r i n t h e c o u r s e o f an a r g u m e n t t h e w a y s i n w h i c h he is i n f l u e n c e d a n d 
o r i e n t a t e d t h e o l o g i c a l l y , b u t i t is no t o n l y b r i e f p e r s o n a l t e s t i m o n i e s w h i c h 
p r o v i d e t h i s i n s i g h t . Some o f h i s b o o k s , i n c l u d i n g Jesus i n the F a i t h of 
C h r i s t i a n s a n d O u r E x p e r i e n c e o f God dea l w i t h t h i s s u b j e c t q u i t e 
e x t e n s i v e l y a n d make b o t h h i s f a i t h a n d h i s t h e o l o g y v e r y c l e a r . 
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As w e l l as g i v i n g a g e n e r a l t h e o l o g i c a l i n s i g h t , L e w i s is at pa ins in much of 
h i s w o r k , i n c l u d i n g t h e t w o p u b l i c a t i o n s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , to p r e sen t t he 
C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n a n d a lso r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i n g e n e r a l as b o t h r ea sonab le a n d 
r e l e v a n t to t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d . As he w r i t e s i n Jesus in the F a i t h 
o f C h r i s t i a n S p ^ ^ 
A n age c o m m i t t e d to e x c l u s i v e l y s e c u l a r p u r s u i t s a n d 
t h o s e n o t a l w a y s t h e most e l e v a t e d , can h a r d l y e x p e c t 
to be w e l l a p p r a i s e d o f t h i n g s t h a t h a v e to be ' s p i r i t u a l l y 
d i s c e r n e d ' . What S imone Weil a n d o t h e r s have r e m i n d e d 
us a b o u t ' h e e d i n g a n d w a i t i n g on G o d ' is immense ly 
r e l e v a n t , a n d t h i s means more t h a n b e i n g r e l i g i o u s l y 
a t t e n t i v e i n a g e n e r a l w a y : i t means a lso t h e c o n t i n u a l 
r e s p o n s e , i n p r a c t i c e as i n t h o u g h t , o f i n d i v i d u a l s 
i n t h e e b b a n d f l o w o f t he i l l u m i n a t i o n t h e y have i n t h e i r 
o w n r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d w h a t t h e y a s s imi l a t e f r o m 
t h e r e l i g i o u s l i f e o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y . 
S i m i l a r passages o c c u r i n a n u m b e r of L e w i s ' w o r k s - most w i t h t he same 
sense o f u r g e n c y a n d m a n y w i t h a s i m i l a r c o n c e r n . H o w e v e r , he is not 
s i m p l y c o n c e r n e d to r e c o g n i s e t h e p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i e t y a n d p r e s e n t 
r e l i g i o u s f a i t h as r e a s o n a b l e w i t h i n t h a t s e t t i n g , he is a lso c o n c e r n e d to d e f e n d 
a m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l a p p r o a c h to C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y t r a d i t i o n a l 
C h r i s t o l o g y f r o m t h e a r g u m e n t s o f more r a d i c a l t h e o l o g i a n s l i k e Wi le s , Lampe 
a n d M a c k e y . I t w o u l d seem t h a t L e w i s is s e e k i n g to a r g u e f o r w h a t he t akes 
to be t h e s i m p l e a n d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f b o t h the New T e s t a m e n t 
a n d t h e e c c l e s i a s t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s h a n d e d d o w n t h r o u g h t h e ages , a n d to r e n d e r 
i m p l a u s i b l e a n y t h e o l o g y w h i c h r e l i e s o v e r m u c h on e m p i r i c i s m , a d e m y t h o l o g i s i n ^ 
o f t h e New T e s t a m e n t , o r on a ' C h r i s t o l o g y f r o m be low ' w h i c h b e g i n s w i t h a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f C h r i s t as man b e f o r e a n y t h i n g e l se . L e w i s v i g o u r o u s l y d e f e n d s 
h i s p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t a n y d o u b t s t h a t may be c a s t on t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of 
d e s c r i b i n g C h r i s t as b o t h God a n d Man a n d s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e f e n d s , w i t h a 
l a r g e m e a s u r e of s u c c e s s , t h e o r t h o d o x b e l i e f s based on t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
C h r i s t o l o g y . A t t h e c lose o f one s u c h d e f e n c e L e w i s a f f i r m s : 
B u t i n t h e mean t ime I m u s t d e c l a r e , i f I may e n d on a 
p e r s o n a l n o t e i n t h i s l e c t u r e , t h a t w'hen we e n c o u n t e r 
w h a t seems to me i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p l a u s i b l e s u b s t i t u t e s 
f o r w h a t , i n common s e n s e , we w o u l d t a k e to be the 
c e n t r a l a n d l a s t i n g t hemes o f t h e New T e s t a m e n t , and of 
C h r i s t i a n e x p e r i e n c e a n d w i t n e s s t h r o u g h o u t the ages , 
w h e n no t o n l y a l l m i r a c l e - a n d do we h a v e to a b a n d o n 
m i r a c l e s a l t o g e t h e r ? - b u t a l l r e a s o n a b l y r e l i a b l e 
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k n o w l e d g e a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t he h i s t o r i c a l J e s u s , 
a l l f i r m e x p e c t a t i o n o f a ' ' l i f e b e y o n d ' ' a n d s a n c t i f i e d 
c o n d i t i o n o f o u r s e l v e s i n f e l l o w s h i p w i t h God t h r o u g h 
the m e d i a t i o n o f J e s u s , h o w e v e r u n l i k e l y i n o u r n o r m a l 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o u r s e l v e s , w h e n t h i s a n d a l l t h o u g h t 
of God as a b i d i n g l y one w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l Jesus we 
meet i n t h e s t o r y is l o s t i n t h e m i s t s o f a m b i g u o u s 
s e c u l a r e x p e c t a t i o n s - t h e n , I can o n l y s a y , i n t he 
w o r d s of a d e s o l a t e woman o f l o n g a g o , ' T h e y have t a k e n 
a w a y my L o r d a n d I k n o w no t w h e r e t h e y h a v e l a i d h i m " . 
I t is c o m f o r t i n g to t h i n k t h a t i t was i n t h e d e p t h of 
d e s p a i r t h a t she was p e r s o n a l l y a d d r e s s e d a n d a s s u r a n c e 
f l o o d e d i n , o v e r w h e l m i n g . May we n o t a l so , i n t he 
b l a c k n e s s o f so m u c h d e s p a i r , h e a r t h e same vo ice 
a d d r e s s i n g us b y name t o d a y ? 
L e w i s s t a n d s on f a m i l i a r a n d t r a d i t i o n a l g r o u n d i n t h e o l o g i c a l deba te a n d 
he seems to a c h i e v e a l a r g e m e a s u r e o f success i n d o i n g so . He c o u r a g e o u s l y 
s p e a k s o u t f o r w h a t he b e l i e v e s w h e r e m a n y o t h e r s i n h i s p o s i t i o n a n d of h i s 
s t a t u r e i n t h e academic w o r l d w o u l d n o t . He o b v i o u s l y be l i eve s w h a t he 
w r i t e s a n d s e r v e s h i s r e a d e r w e l l b y b e i n g c l e a r a n d b y f o r g i n g many l i n k s 
b e t w e e n t h e o l o g y a n d p h i l o s o p h y . He o b v i o u s l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e are many 
l in l c s b e t w e e n t h e t w o b u t t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is n o t t h e r e to p r o v i d e p r o o f s a n d 
c l e v e r a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e t h e o l o g i a n s . I t is to be u s e d , as f a r as L e w i s is 
c o n c e r n e d , as a m e t h o d o f m a k i n g e x p l i c i t t h e n a t u r e a n d s t a t u s of r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e f s a n d t h e r e f o r e c l a r i f y t h e t h e o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k w h i c h is d e p e n d e n t u p o n 
s u c h b e l i e f s . P h i l o s o p h y a i d s r e f l e c t i o n a n d r a t i o c i n a t i o n because i t l a y s o u t 
r o u t e s w h i c h a re b o t h c l e a r a n d c o h e r e n t a n d o f f e r means of access to the 
v a r i o u s a reas of t h e o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h . I t has been s h o w n t h a t L e w i s h o l d s to 
t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , b u t wha t is i t t h a t l ies at t h e 
h e a r t o f t he se b e l i e f s a n d w h a t i s i t t h a t most c l e a r l y d e f i n e s the l i nes of 
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t h e o l o g i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of h i s f a i t h a n d h i s p h i l o s o p h y ? 
S i m p l y p u t , i t i s r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . R e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e g i v e s b o t h t h e 
s t r u c t u r e a n d c o n t e n t o f f a i t h a n d a l l o w s b o t h t h e o l o g y a n d p h i l o s o p h y to 
' t o u c h c l o w n ' i n t h e p r e s e n t . 
L e w i s b e g i n s w i t h a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a b e l i e f i n t he e x i s t e n c e o f a God 
is common to a lmost a l l t h e p e r i o d s o f t h e h i s t o r y o f man i n almost e v e r y 
s o c i e t y a n d soc ia l g r o u p . T h i s f a c t i n i t s e l f is r e m a r k a b l e , b u t more r e m a r k a b l i 
s t i l l is t h a t m a n y of t h e e l e m e n t s o f b e l i e f a re s i m i l a r . What c o u l d a c c o u n t f o r 
s u c h a p h e n o m e n o n ; w h e r e is t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s common b e l i e f to be f o u n d ? 
F o r L e w i s t h e bas i s o f s u c h b e l i e f s i n I he e x i s t e n c e of a God is f o u n d in wh.at 
a r e b r o a d l y d e s c r i b e d as n u m i n o u s e x p e r i e n c e s . R u d o l f O l i o and h is T h e Idea 
o f T h e H o l y is i m p o r t a n t f o r L e w i s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h i s . T h e e x p e r i e n c e 
o f w o n d e r e n g e n d e r e d b y t h e ' m y s l e r i u m t r e m e n d u m et f a s c i n a n s ' is f o i - L e w i s 
a! t h e h e a r t o f a n y r e c o g n i t i o n o r e x p e r i e n c e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of G o d . We 
a re d r a w n b y t h e c a p t i v a t i n g w o n d e r o f v a r i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s of the w o r l d -
t h e s u n r i s i n g o v e r t h e sea, t h e v i s t a f r o m a m o u n t a i n t o p - and ye t what we 
a p p r e h e n d to be the c a p t i v a t i n g f o r c e b e h i n d these e x p e r i e n c e s p a r a d o x i c a l l y 
h o l d s us at a d i s t a n c e , e v e n f o r c i n g us a w a y b y i t s m a g n i t u d e a n d o t h e r n e s s . 
L i k e t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f s t a n d i n g c lose t o a f i r e , we a re d r a w n to the 
f a s c i n a t i o n a n d w a r m t h o f t h e f l a m e s a n d y e t t hose v e r y f l ames w h i c h so 
c a p t i v a t e us a lso k e e p us at a d i s t a n c e - o u t of r e a c h . T h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e 
n u m i n o u s g i v e s us an i n s i g h t i n t o t h e m y s t e r i o u s u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y w h i c h is 
b e y o n d a l l t h a t we n o r m a l l y k n o w o f t h e u n i v e r s e . T h i s a p p r e h e n s i o n , l i k e 
t h e s o u n d o f d i s t a n t n e r , a f f o r d s no d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n a n d a d m i t s o f no 
A 
d e s c r i p t i o n , o n l y w o n d e r . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e a r e t w o e l e m e n t s i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f G o d : w o n d e r a n d 
p a r a d o x . T h e p a r a d o x o f a n o n - s e l f - e x i s t e n t a n d n o n - s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y u n i v e r s e 
l eads to w o n d e r a n d w o n d e r u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t s i n r e l i g i o n . B u t r e l i g i o u s w o n d e r 
m u s t be d i s t i r m i s h e d f r o m o t h e r f o r m s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n so many t h i n g s i n t h e 
c o n t e m p o r a r y scene a r e d e s c r i b e d as ' w o n d e r f u l ' . T h e r e i s , a f t e r a l l , t h e 
' W o n d e r f u l W o r l d o f D i s n e y ' , so L e w i s i s more e x p l i c i t ; 
T h e w o n d e r w h i c h is bas ic t o r e l i g i o n , a n d i n w h i c h i t 
b e g i n s , comes w i t h t h e r e a l i s a t i o n , u s u a l l y s h a r p a n d 
d i s r u p t i n g , t h a t a l l e x i s t e n c e as we k n o w i t s t a n d s i n a 
r e l a t i o n o f d e p e n d e n c e to some a b s o l u t e o r u n c o n d i t i o n e d 
b e i n g o f w h i c h we can k n o w n o t h i n g d i r e c t l y b e y o n d t h i s 
i n t u i t i o n o f i t s u n c o n d i t i o n e d n a t u r e as t h e s o u r c e o f a l l 
( 4 ) 
o t h e r r e a l i t y . 
R e l i g i o n s t a r t s w i t h w o n d e r : w o n d e r is at t h e r o o t o f t h e n u m i n o u s a n d 
t h e n u m i n o u s a t t h e h e a r t o f r e l i g i o n . T h e m y s t e r y o f t h e a p p r e h e n d e d o t h e r , 
w h i c h l i es b e y o n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f w o n d e r a n d b e y o n d t h e n o r m a l b o u n d s of 
t h e u n i v e r s e , l eads to r e v e r e n c e a n d r e v e r e n c e leads to w o r s h i p a n d w o r s h i p 
is r e l i g i o n . W o n d e r c a n , i t w o u l d seem, i n v o l v e d i f f e r e n t con tex t s i n c l u d i n g 
a e s t h e t i c a n d m o r a l c o n t e x t s ; t h e r e is a w o n d e r i n f i n e p o e t r y a n d a r t , 
t h e r e is a l so a w o n d e r i n s e l f l e s s a c t s o f l o v e a n d u n e x p l a i n e d p r o v i d e n t i a l 
o c c u r r e n c e s . B u t t h e most i m p o r t a n t w o n d e r , t h e f a s c i n a t i o n v / h i c h f o r L e w i s 
l i es c lose t o t h e c ^ o t r e o f r e l i g i o n a n d f a i t h , is t h a t w h i c h is e n g e n d e r e d b y 
t h e r e l a t i o n a l d e p e n d e n c e of a l l t h i n g s i n t h e u n i v e r s e to each o t h e r and 
b e y o n d to w h a t may o n l y be d e s c r i b e d as a b s o l u t e u n c o n d i t i o n e d b e i n g . 
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T h e f ac t tha t t h e c o m p l e x p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n a n d m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c e of 
t he v a r i o u s b i o l o g i c a l a n d p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s i n the u n i v e r s e do not f i n a l l y 
e x p l a i n t h e i r o w n e x i s t e n c e o r t he e x i s t e n c e of t he w i d e r u n i v e r s e leads to 
m y s t e r y : a m y s t e r y w h i c h t u r n s to w o n d e r t h r o u g h the m e d i a t i o n of 
i n t u i t i o n a n d a p p r e h e n s i o n , a n d f o r L e w i s t h i s w o n d e r a n d m y s t e r y p o i n t to 
o n l y one t h i n g : G o d . 
T h e s e c o n d f u n d a m e n t a l e l ement i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e of God is p a r a d o x . T h e 
w o r l d e x i s t s a n d y e t i t i s n o t s e l f - e x i s t e n t - o r at leas t i t does not seem to be 
so . B e g i n n i n g w i t h t h i s bas ic p a r a d o x L e w i s goes on to e x t e n d t h e p a r a -
d o x i c a l n a t u r e of b e l i e f i n G o d . God ' s e x i s t e n c e a n d h i s c r e a t i v e r e l a t i o n to 
t h e w o r l d may be a m y s t e r y b u t i t is no t an a b s u r d i t y . I t is because of ' h i s 
t h a t L e w i s r e l i e s so h e a v i l y on t h e idea o f p a r a d o x . Un less p a r a d o x is 
e m p l o y e d i n o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f God a n d i n o u r d e s c r i p t i o n 
of o u r b e l i e f t h e n o u r l a n g u a g e may q u i c k l y f a l l i n t o i n c o h e r e n c e a n d a l t e r -
n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e u n i v e r s e seem to become more 
p a l a t a b l e a n d , V v ' h i c h i s more i m p o r t a n t , more t e n a b l e . He w a n t s to a v o i d an 
a m b i g u o u s d e s c r i p t i o n o f o u r b e l i e f i n God a n d a c o n f u s e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 
t h e p o s s i b l e e x i s t e n c e o f God b u t he does seem close to one of t h e c h a r a c t e r s 
i n J o h n Wisdom' s w e l l - k n o w n i l l u s t r u a t i o n of t h e s t a t e of t he d e b a t e i n 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of G o d . T h e i l l u s t r a t i o n b e g i n s 
w i t h t w o men w h o come a c r o s s an o d d p h e n o m e n o n : a p a t c h of v e g e t a t i o n i n 
a d e s e r t . T h e f i r s t man h e r a l d s t h i s as a r e m a r k a b l e f i n d a n d se ts to w o r k 
to d i s c o v e r t h e cause f o r s u c h an o c c u r r e n c e . T h e o t h e r sees i n i t s o m e t h i n g 
e l s e , he sees t h e e v i d e n c e o f an u n k n o w n b e i n g c u l t i v a t i n g t h e d e s e r t - w h a t 
t h e y h a v e b e f o r e t h e m is a g a r d e n . T h e t w o men d i s a g r e e a n d a r g u e b u t 
f i n a l l y come to t h e c o m p r o m i s e o f s e t t i n g a n u m b e r of t e s t s d e s i g n e d to 
d i s c o v e r w h o o r w h a t t h e g a r d e n e r i s . T h e y w a t c h t h e g a r d e n , b u t no one 
t u r n s u p . T h e y set a g u a r d a r o u n d t h e p e r i m e t e r b u t s t i l l no one is s een . 
F i n a l l y , t h e y a t t a c h an a l a r m to t h e f e n c e w h i c h is t u n e d to r eac t to t he 
sma l l e s t d i s t u r b a n c e , b u t s t i l l t h e r e is no t a n g i b l e e v i d e n c e of t h e g a r d e n e r . 
M u c h less t h a n s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l e m i t becomes w o r s e , because the man w h o 
b e l i e v e s i n a g a r d e n e r now b e l i e v e s t h a t he mus t be an i n v i s i b l e , i m p e r c e p -
t i b l e , e v e n u l t i m a t e b e i n g , ab l e to c a r r y o u t h i s g a r d e n i n g w i t h o u t b e i n g 
d i s c o v e r e d a n d y e t l eave t h e e v i d e n c e o f h i s h a n d i w o r k f o r a l l to see. L e w i s 
d i f f e r s f r o m t h i s c h a r a c t e r i n t h a t he does no t s i m p l y p o s t u l a t e t he e x i s t e n c e 
of God i n t h e f a c e o f a l l t h e e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e ; he uses a t y p e of l a n g u a g e 
t h a t moves t o w a r d s a d e s c r i p t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t c o n c e d i n g 
g r o u n d to e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n : hence t h e use of paradox . . F o r L e w i s , 
to u n d e r s t a n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of God r e q u i r e s p a r a d o x . 
A l l t h i n g s p o i n t to t h e e x i s t e n c e of an u l t i m a t e b e i n g a n d yet he is u r . k n o w i i . 
God mus t be i n v o l v e d i n a l l t h i n g s a n d ye t not as an o b s e r v a b l e f a c t . We 
do no t k n o w , we cannot m f a c t c o m p r e h e n d t h e i n f i n i t e and yet we cxperuMice 
the i n f i n i t e b r e a k i n g i n t o t h e p r e s e n t . H e r e he is c lose to o t h e i - recent 
e x p l o r a t i o n s i n t o t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d a c t i v i t y of G o d , p a r t i c u l a r l y t hose in 
F i n i t e a n d I n f i n i t e b y A u s t i n F a r r e r a n d T h e O p e n n e s s of B e i n g by E r i c 
M a s c a l l . L e w i s seems to be g i v i n g e x p r e s s i o n to one o f the d e e p e r m y s t e r i e s 
o f t he C h r i s t i a n f a i t h as he s a y s : 
He ( G o d ) is i n v o l v e d i n t h e b e i n g of e v e r y t h i n g bes ides 
h i m s e l f , b u t n o t i n v o l v e d as t e r m s are r e l a t e d in an 
i n f e r e n c e b u t i n a q u i t e p e c u l a r r e l a t i o n of d e p e n d e n c e 
o f a l l t h i n g s u p o n H i m . He is c l o s e r to a l l t h i n g s 
t h a n d i s t i n c t f i n i t e t h i n g s e v e r a re to one a n o t h e r , a n d 
a lso r e m o t e b e y o n d a l l c o n c e p t i o n . T h i s we see, not 
as i n f e r e n c e , b u t i n one i n s i g h t o r l eap o f t h o u g h t . 
I t w o u l d seem t h a t we come to the e n d of n o r m a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a r c 
p r e s e n t e d w i t h a m y s t e r y a n d p a r a d o x . A l l t h a t seems p o s s i b l e is an 
a f f i r m a t i o n of t h e m y s t e r y a n d u n i q u e n e s s of t he b e i n g we desc r i ' oe as G o d , 
b u t f o r L e w i s r e l i g i o n f i n d s i t s genes i s i n s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e we a sk hov.- we can 
go f u r t h e r t h a n t h e s e i n i t i a l ' r a d i c a l a n t i n o m i e s ' ^ w h i c h f o r c e us to r e c o g n i s e 
t h e m y s t e r y o f a n u n c o n d i t i o n e d b e i n g . I t p r o v i d e s o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a ' w h y 
(S) 
q u e s t i o n ' w h i c h is f u n d a m e n t a l to a i l k n o w l e d g e a n d e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t 
i n t a k i n g a p e r s o n b e y o n d t h e i n i t i a l a p p r e h e n s i o n of G o d . I t is as t h o u g h 
t h e r e w e r e an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l v a c u u m w h i c h p r o m p t s t h e q u e s t i o n ' w h y ' a n d 
w h i c h i n t u r n a l l o w s t h e v a c u u m to be f i l l e d by a r e c o g n i t i o n o f w h a t t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f God m u s t e n t a i l f o r t h e u n i v e r s e a n d f o r h i s o w n n a t u r e . T h e 
a n s w e r to t h e w h y q u e s t i o n i s f o u n d i n a v i s i o n of God w h o is b o t h u l t i m a t e 
a n d u n c o n d i t i o n e d , w h o i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d e x p l a n a t i o n o f a l l 
t h a t we k n o w . N o r m a l l a n g u a g e a n d e x p l a n a t i o n ends h e r e . O n l y e x p l a n a -
t i o n s w h i c h i n v o l v e s u c h t h i n g s as t r a n s c e n d e n c e , b e y o n d n e s s , c o m p l e t e n e s s 
a n d p e r f e c t i o n a re p o s s i b l e . I t w o u l d seem t h a t f o l l o w i n g on f r o m the i n i t i a l 
a p p r e h e n s i o n t h e r e is an e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s w h i c h is c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h t h e 
f o r m e r i n s i g h t a n d w h i c h f i l l s i n t h e p i c t u r e o f w h a t God mus t be l i k e . L e w i s 
has a r r i v e d at t h e p e r f e c t , t r a n s c e n d e n t c r e a t o r a n d s u s t a i n e r of t he w o r l d 
f r o m h i s i n i t i a l n u m i n o u s e x p e r i e n c e . A c r e a t o r w h o is t h e r e b y d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
a l t o g e t h e r f r o m h i s c r e a t i o n b y h i s o w n b e i n g a n d n a t u r e . 
H o w e v e r , God is n o t s i m p l y i n f e r r e d f r o m the w o r l d : f o r L e w i s , he is 
not l i k e t h e u n s e e n p l a n e t t h a t can be i n f e r r e d f r o m the movement of t he 
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o t h e r s w h i c h can be s e e n . T h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t he t \ \ : i s tcnce o l t h e w o r l d is 
i n c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t h i m . We a re u n a b l e to d e d u c e the e x p l a n a t i o n of the 
u n i v e r s e f r o m o u r n o r m a l e x p e r i e n c e . God is not a p o s t u l a t i o n w o r k e d out 
on the bas is o f t h e laws o f l o g i c . We a re not ab le to a r r i v e at an a s s e r t i o n 
of t h e e x i s t e n c e o f God a f t e r some l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s i o n , as was a t t e m p t e d by 
T h o m a s A q u i n a s w i t h h i s f i v e w a y s . God does n o t ' f i t ' i n t o s u c h a s t r u c t u r e 
o f l o g i c ; he is a b o v e a n d b e y o n d i t . T h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f God ' s e x i s t e n c e is 
e x p l a i n e d b y a s i n g l e i n t u i t i v e l eap w h i c h i t s e l f seems to t r a n s c e n d the n o r m a l 
p r o c e s s o f r e f l e c t i o n . 
A l s o f o r L e w i s t h e e x p e r i e n c e of God is no t a s i n g l e u n r e p e a t a b l e e v e n t 
g i v e n to i n d i v i d u a l s o r a g e n e r a t i o n , i t o c c u r s m a n y t imes a n d t a k e s p lace 
at e v e r y s t a g e of h u m a n l i f e a n d r e l i g i o u s d e v o t i o n . H o w e v e r , t h e many a n d 
v a r i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s do n o t r e m a i n u n c o n n e c t e d a n d u n s y s t e m a t i s e d f o r l o n g . 
T h e y a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o L e w i s , i n t e g r a t e d w i t h p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s and s h a r e d 
a m o n g s t t h e v a r i o u s r e c e i p i e n t s o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e s . I n O u r E x p e r i e n c e of G o d , 
L e w i s c o n t e n d s t h a t we r e t a i n s y m b o l s i n o u r m i n d s w h i c h a r e h e l d in o u r 
m e m o r y as a p p r o x i m a t i o m a n d c o n d e n s e d p a t t e r n s o f e x p e r i e n c e . We use these 
to i n t e r p r e t o u r l a n g u a g e o f r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d a lso to u n d e r s t a n d a l l 
o t h e r s u b s e q u e n t e x p e r i e n c e s , b o t h o u r s a n d o t h e r s , a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
e f f e c t t h a t t h e y may h a v e h a d . T h i s , L e w i s a r g u e s , enab le s us to r e c o g n i s e 
i n a r e l i g i o u s c o n t e x t f e e l i n g s o f f o r g i v e n e s s , peace , j o y e t c . w h i c h may 
a c c o m p a n y a n y s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d i n t e g r a t e t h e m i n t o t h e 
p a t t e r n s o f o u r p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s . I n t h i s w a y t h e s y s t e m o f s y m b o l s 
b u i l d s u p as t h e y a r e i n t e g r a t e d w i t h one a n o t h e r a n d i n so d o i n g l i n k pas t 
a n d p r e s e n t e x p e r i e n c e s a n d f o r m an e x p e r i e n t i a l bas i s to o u r b e l i e f and 
p r a c t i c e . A f r a m e w o r k is c o n s t r u c t e d i n t o w h i c h we may place o u r f u t u r e 
e x p e r i e n c e a n d f u r t h e r a p p r e h e n s i o n s o f G o d . G i v e n t ime a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i o n 
o f a n u m b e r o f p e o p l e t hese p a t t e r n s w i l l d e v e l o p i n t o a s y s t e m of b e l i e f . F o r 
L e w i s t h e c o m m u n i t y a s p e c t seems v i t a l to t h i s p r o c e s s . As d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s 
i n t e r a c t a n d e n g a g e w i t h one a n o t h e r i n t h e p o o l i n g of s h a r e d o r common 
e x p e r i e n c e s a n d as t h e y j o i n t o g e t h e r i n t h e w o r s h i p a n d c o n t e m p l a t i o n of t h e 
o b j e c t o f t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s a t r a d i t i o n w i l l d e v e l o p w h i c h each g e n e r a t i o n w i l l 
i n h e r i t f r o m t h e p a s , t a n d pass on t h e f r u i t s of i t s e x p e r i e n c e to the n e x t . 
T h e c o m m u n i t y b e i n g c o n t i n u o u s t h r o u g h t ime p r o v i d e s a l i v i n g i n t e r f a c e of 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e p r e s e n t w i t h i t s r o o t s s t r e t c h i n g b a c k t h r o u g h 
h i s t o r y , g a i n i n g d e e p e r m e a n i n g a n d s i g n i f i c a n c e as i t t ap s the r i c h e s of t he 
p a s t . I n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e s may h a v e l i t t l e c o h e r e n c e , b e i n g d i f f i c u l t to 
p lace a n d d e f i n e , b u t w h e n set i n t h e o v e r a l l t r a d i t i o n t h e y f i n d an e x p l a n a t i o n 
a n d a f u l l e r m e a n i n g ; 
L e w i s a r g u e s that d u r i n g the h i s t o r y of a r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n t h i ' r e may 
o c c u r p a i ^ t i c u l a r l y important phases of r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h may be 
intei 'pretecl by t h e community as s i g n i f i c a n t d i s c l o s u r e s o r relevationS of G o d . 
T h e s e w i l l become d e f i n i t i v e p e r i o d s of d i s c l o s u r e a n d may r e o r i e n t a t e the 
w h o l e , o r p a r t of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , i n v e s t i n g i t w i t h new u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g , b e l i e f s a n d i n s i g h t s . S u c h p e r i o d s w i l l t h r o w u p t h e i r o w n 
s y m b o l s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h w i l l be a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o t h e communa l a n d 
i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e . T h e s e s y m b o l s a r e wha t L e w i s desc i - ibes as ' f i r s t 
( 9 ) 
o r d e r s y m b o l s ' . As t h e y a r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e o v e r a l l t r a d i t i o n t h e y 
w i l l p r o v i d e a f u r t h e r a n d c l o s e r a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the p e r s o n o f God a n d may 
a i d more m e a n i n g f u l e x p r e s s i o n s a n d d e s c r i p t i o n s of h i s n a t u r e a n d a c t i v i t y . 
F o r L e w i s , C h r i s t i a n i t y has made a u n i q u e c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e g e n e r a l 
a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of G o d , w h i c h can be summed u p i n t w o 
w o r d s - g r a c e a n d r e d e m p t i o n . T h e t w o c o n c e p t s t h a t l ie b e h i n d those w o r d s 
h a v e g i v e n b o t h m o t i v a t i o n a n d o r i e n t a t i o n to the o v e r l a l r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n 
o f C h r i s t i a n i t y . T h e p a r t i c u l a r phases o f d i s c l o s u r e w h i c h p r o d u c e these 
d e f i n i t i v e c o n c e p t s a r e c l e a r l y i m p o r t a n t f o r L e w i s ' t h e o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h a n d 
a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e o f t e n d e s c r i b e d i n a d i f f i c u l t a n d c o m p l e x f a s h i o n i t is 
a lso c l e a r t h a t he u n d e r s t a n d s r e v e l a t i o n to t a k e p lace i n t h e same way a n d 
f o r t h e same r e a s o n s p o s i t e d b y a more o b v i o u s l y t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o l o g y . As 
he s a y s : 
F o r r e l i g i o n , as I u n d e r s t a n d i t , has a l w a y s an e lement 
of r e v e l a t i o n at t h e c o r e of i t : a n d i n r e v e l a t i o n t h e 
t r a n s c e n d e n t d i s c l o s e s a n d shapes i t s e l f f o r o u r 
i l l u m i n a t i o n i n a p e c u l i a r i n v o l v e m e n t o f i t s e l f w i t h 
a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , a t ime a n d p lace at w h i c h 
t h e r e v e l a t i o n h a p p e n s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t i t may 
n o t a l w a y s be p r e c i s e l y s p e c i f i a b l e . 
A l t h o u g h L e w i s h o l d s t h i s v i e w of r e v e l a t i o n he does no t w a n t to e x c l u d e o t h e r 
r e l i g i o n s f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e of r e v e l a t i o n a n d i n f a c t s u g g e s t s t h a t a d h e r e n t s 
w o u l d do w e l l to s t u d y o t h e r r e l i g i o n s to d i s c o v e r t h e i r i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i -
b u t i o n s . L e w i s a d m i t s t h a t i t i s h a r d f o r h i m to d e l i m i t t h e a reas o f 
e x p e r i e n c e v / h i c h a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r e x p e r i e n c e of G o d . T h e y a r e no t 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t r u s i v e i n t o t h e n o r m a l occas ions o f l i f e a n d a re no t s i m p l y to 
be seen as g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s o f t h e p r o c e s s o f p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e . I s o l a t i n g 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e is as d i f f i c u l t , L e w i s w o u l d c o n t e n d , as d e l i m i t i n g a n d 
p l a c i n g a p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i e n c e of p a i n . S p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c i ' S 
seem to h a v e a r e c o g n i s a b l e c o r e i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to be f o r m a l i s e d i n t o 
s y m b o l s o r a p p r o x i m a t i o n s of G o d , b u t t h e y h a v e s e m i - p e r m e a b l e b o u n d a r i e s 
so t h a t o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e s i n c l u d i n g m o r a l a n d a e s t h e t i c o n e s , can h a v e an 
e f f e c t on t h e m . E m o t i o n does h a v e a p a r t to p l a y b u t L e w i s is s u s p i c i o u s o 
too m u c h of a f o c u s on t h e e m o t i o n s : 
P r i 
••.V-
E m o t i o n p l a y s i t s p a r t , but t h e co re o f r e l i g i o u s 
( P ) 
e x p c i - i e n c e , I s u b m i t , is e s s e n t i a l l y c o g n i t i v e . 
T h e r e is l i t t l e d o u b t t h a t w h e n L e w i s uses ' c o g n i t i v e ' he is r e f e r r i n g to 
t h e p r o v i n c e o f t he m i n d . I n f a c t a l l of w h a t has been p r e s e n t e d of L e w i s ' 
a p p r o a c h is bes t i n t e r p r e t e d i f i t i s r e m e m b e r e d t h a t he p r e s u p p o s e s the 
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e m i n d as t h a t w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s , i n t e g r a t e s . a n d s t r u c t u r e s 
o u r r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . T h e b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of t h e sou l has 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r one p a r t i c u l a r a rea of L e w i s ' t h e o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n a n d 
r e f l e c t i o n - h i s a p p r o a c h to l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . 
L i k e b e l i e f i n G o d , a b e l i e f i n a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h is v i r t u a l l y u n i v e r s a l , 
L e w i s a r g u e s . I n P e r s o n s a n d L i f e A f t e r D e a t h he o b s e r v e s t h a t t he idea ot 
i m m o r t a l i t y o r e t e r n a l l i f e is no t s o m e t h i n g is h e l d o n l y by C h r i s t i a n s , b u t 
by a d h e r e n t s o f a lmos t a l l t h e w o r l d ' s r e l i g i o n s . F o r L e w i s t h i s i s to be 
e x p e c t e d because as t h e p r o c e s s of t h e g r a d u a l d e e p e n d i n g of f a i t h c o n t i n u e s 
t o t a k e p l a c e a n d as e x p e r i e n c e o f God p r o g r e s s e s a n d b u i l d s u p , p a r t i c u l a i 
b e l i e f s , s u c h as a b e l i e f i n a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h , a re e n c o u r a g e d : 
God is G o d , b u t t h e p o i n t o f t r u e r e l i g i o n is t h e 
d i s c o v e r y o f o u r p l ace i n t h e l i f e of God h i m s e l f , a n d 
as t h e d i s c l o s u r e d e e p e n d s a n d t h e e s s e n t i a l l y s e l f -
g i v i n g c h a r a c t e r o f i t r e v e a l s i ' - se l f , as t h e b o n d 
t i g h t e n s , we k n o w t h a t we a r e ' o f G o d ' a n d h a v e 
no home b u t G o d . T h e i n e s t i m a b l e w o r t h t h a t is 
p l a c e d on e a c h . . . p u t s t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e e l i m i n a t i o n 
o f a n y o n e o u t o f t h e q u e s t i o n . 
I n C h a p t e r T w o some o f t h e i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s a n d s p e c u l a t i o n s 
a b o u t a d i s e m b o d i e d e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s o u l i n an a f t e r - l i f e w h i c h L e w i s o f f e r s 
(14) 
w e r e o u t l i n e d . I f t h e s e a r e c o m b i n e d w i t h w h a t L e w i s be l i eve s a b o u t t he 
m i n d i n g e n e r a l a n d w h a t he b e l i e v e s a b o u t t h e a s s u r a n c e of l i f e a f t e r d e a t h 
t h a t a C h r i s t i a n ( o r an a d h e r e n t o f a n y r e l i g i o n f o r t h a t m a t t e r ) h a s , i t is 
no g r e a t s u r p r i s e t h a t he a r g u e s so s t r o n g l y f o r t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of a l i f i ; 
a f t e r d e a t h . F o r L e w i s i t w o u l d seem t h a t b e l i e f i n l i f e a f t e r d e a t h is n o t 
o n l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o t h e r b e l i e f s i n God a n d t h e s o u l b u t e s s e n t i a l to t h e m . 
L e w i s b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e b o d y is n o t r e q u i r e d f o r a f i n a l d e s c r i p t i o n of w h a t a 
p e r s o n i s . He a lso b e l i e v e s t h a t once o u r t o t a l d e p e n d e n c e u p o n God f o r o i , r 
e x i s t e n c e is r e c o g n i s e d t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e a r g u m e n t f o r a f u t u r e l i f e , i s one t h a t 
r e s t s on t h e s o u l . T h e b o d y , he c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t , i s e i t h e r b u r n e d o r 
b u r i e d a n d b o t h r e s u l t i n a r a p i d d e c a y a n d d i s s o l u t i o n i n t o d u s t soon a f t e r 
we cease l i f e . O n l y i f s o m e t h i n g o f o u r e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e can s u r v i v e d e a t h 
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can we be a s s u r e d of l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . 
As a C h r i s t i a n , L e w i s b e l i e v e s t h a t i t is i m p o r t a n t , i f not v i t a l , to 
h o l d a n d w i t n e s s to t h e b e l i e f i n e v e r l a s t i n g l i f e . A p a r t f r o m a n y t h i n g else 
he b e l i e v e s t h i s because f o r h i m i t s p e a k s to many p e o p l e ' s deepes t n e e d . 
I t a l so k e e p s f a i t h f u l t o t h e C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n a n d g i v e s s u b s t a n c e to the 
u n i v e r s a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e r e is a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . .Added to t h i s L e w i s 
'oel ieves i t a lso e x p l a i n s some of t h e g r o w i n g e v i d e n c e o f p h y s i c a l r e s e a r c h in 
w h i c h h e , f o l l o w i n g o t h e r s l i k e H . H . P r i c e a n d C . D . B r o a d , is v e r y 
i n t e r e s t e d . H o w e v e r , he a l so r e c o g n i s e s t h a t i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s b e l i e f i n 
l i f e a f t e r d e a t h is a t e n e t o f f a i t h . I t is God w h o c r e a t e s a n d God w h o s u s t a i n s 
l i f e a n d i f t h e r e is to be a n y f u t u r e l i f e a f t e r t h i s e a r t h l y e x i s t e n c e i t is v.- t h 
God t h a t t h e a n s w e r s a r e to be f o u n d . H e r e as m o t h e r p laces the u n d e r l y i n g 
c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n L e w i s ' p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e o l o g y s u r f a c e a n d o f f e r a 
g l i m p s e o f t h e c o n s i s t e n t a n d c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r c h a n g e b e t w e e n the t w o i n h i ; -
t h o u g h t a n d w o r k . 
0_ 
S e c t i o n T w o 
T h e r e seems m u c h to commend i n H . D . L e w i s ' a p p r o a c h to t h e o l o g y . 
H i s d e f e n c e o f a t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t o l o g y is b o t h c l e a r a n d c o u r a g e o u s a n d 
e x h i b i t s w e l l h i s a b i l i t y to ge t to t he h e a r t of t he m a t t e r . E q u a l l y h i s 
c o n s i s t e n t a t t e m p t s to ' make t h e d i s c u s s i o n a n d d e b a t e of r e l i g i o u s i s sues 
r e l e v a n t to t h e m o d e r n s e c u l a r age a re most l a u d a b l e a n d r e f l e c t c l e a r l y b o t h 
h i s s i n c e r e f a i t h a n d h i s a b i l i t i e s as a C h r i s t i a n a p o l o g i s t . . T h e r e a re also 
m a n y t h i n g s m h i s a p p r o a c h to r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h a r e e s p e c i a l l y 
i n t e r e s t i n g a n d p r o v o k e o n l y a s s e n t . T h e r o l e of t h e s y m b o l s of i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n i n t e r l i n k i n g pas t a n d p r e s e n t p e r c e p t i o n s is v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g . I f 
i t w e r e e x t e n d e d a n d b r o a d e n e d a l o n g w i t h L e w i s ' i n s i g h t s i n t o the place of 
t h e c o m m u n i t y i n r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d w e r e a p p l i e d to h i s o v e r a l l a p p r o ; . c h 
to m i n d , i t w o u l d o p e n u p m a n y new areas o f d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e deba tes w i t l i n 
t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d a n d t h e t h e o l o g y of m a n . 
H o w e v e r , p r o b l e m s r e m a i n . H i s a p p r o a c h to b o t h r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 
a n d t o l i f e a f t e r d e a t h e x h i b i t w e a k n e s s e s . As s u c h t h e y c a n n o t be s i m p l y 
t r a n s f e r r e d a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a t h e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e w h i c h is acceptab le 
a n d a p p l i c a b l e to t h e bas ic s u p p o s i t i o n s of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h to perse n -
h o o d o f f e r e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e . T h e r e a r e a l t e r n a t i v e s to t h e way t h a t L e w i s 
v i e w s t h e s e a r e a s w h i c h a r e e q u a l l y t e n a b l e a n d at leas t as m e a n i n g f u l . A l so 
t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s m a y p r o v e to be more able to e x p l a i n c e r t a i n a reas v.-ith w h ' c h 
L e w i s seems to h a v e p r o b l e m s ; f o r i n s t a n c e , t he t h i n g s t h a t can be d e c i d e d 
a b o u t t h e p e r s o n a n d n a t u r e o f God f r o m r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n an a p p r e h e n s i o n o f God a n d God ' s s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n . 
C l e a r l y t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f a p p r e h e n s i o n is i n v o l v e d i r j ' r e v e l a t i o n b u t how f a r 
is r e v e l a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n a p p r e h e n s i o n ? W h e r e , i f t h e y e x i s t , a re the l i ne s of 
d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n God ' s i n i t i a t i v e i n s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n a n d t h e g e n e r a l 
e x p e r i e n c e o f God i n t h e w o r l d ? 
P e r h a p s t h e bes t w a y o f a n s w e r i n g these q u e s t i o n s is to d e c i d e wha t c i n 
be r e c o g n i s e d to be t h e l i m i t s o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e of God i n t h e w o r l d w h i c h 
L e w i s d i s c u s s e s i n t e r m s o f t h e n u m i n o u s . As w e l l as these a reas o f d i s c u s s i o n 
w i t h i n r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e L e w i s ' a p p r o a c h to l i f e a f t e r d e a t h r e m a i n s one o f 
t h e most c o n t e n t i o u s a reas o f d e b a t e a n d seems to l eave l a r g e p r o b l e m s u n r e s o l v e d . 
I f t h e a r g u m e n t s i n C h a p t e r T h r e e w e r e s u c c e s s f u l i n s h o w i n g t h a t more t h ; n 
a s o u l is r e q u i r e d to d e s c r i b e w h a t i s e s s e n t i a l to a p e r s o n , t h e n the idea c f 
a d i s e m b o d i e d e .x i s tence i n a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h seems to f a l l i n t o i n c o h e r e n c e . 
A n a p p r o a c h to e x i s t e n c e i n a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h w o u l d need to i n c l u d e at least 
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e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h is n e c e s s a r y f o r a p r o p e r d e s c r i p t i o n of p e r s o n in t h i s l i f e 
a n d t h a t w o u l d seem to r e c j u i r e t hose t h i n g s w h i c h w e r e e x p a n d e d u p o n in the 
las t c h a p t e r . I n t h e f i n a l p a r t o f t h i s s e c t i o n an a t t e m p t w i l l be made to 
o u t l i n e s u c h an a p p r o a c h . 
L e w i s o f t e n uses ' a p p r e h e n s i o n ' o r ' i n s i g h t ' to d e s c r i b e the a c t i v i t y o r 
p r o c e s s o f r e c o g n i s i n g t h e p r e s e n c e o f God w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . He i m p l i e s t h a t 
t h e a b i l i t y to a p p r e h e n d is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h a l t h o u g h possessed by a l l l ies 
b e y o n d t h e n o r m a l p r o c e s s o f p e r c e p t i o n a n d r e c o g n i t i o n . I t l ies more i n 
t h e r e a l m o f i n t u i t i o n t h a n does n o r m a l p e r c e p t i o n . T h e o b j e c t of t he 
a p p r e h e n s i o n is G o d , b u t t h e i n s i g h t i t s e l f i s a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e r e a l s t a t u s 
a n d n a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h we l i v e . U n d o u b t e d l y G o d , as a unique- b e i i i g 
l i e s b e y o n d t h e scope of o u r c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d c a n n o t t h e r e f o r e be c a t e g o r i s e d 
a c c o r d i n g to t h e n o r m a l f r a m e w o r k of l a n g u a g e a n d m e a n i n g . He c a n n o t be 
f i n a l l y o r f u l l y d e s c r i b e d because a l l o u r m e t h o d s a n d modes of d e s c r i p t i o n 
a r e d r a w n f r o m a u n i v e r s e to w h i c h he has no c o n t i n g e n t r e l a t i o n . G i v e n t h i s 
i t is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e f o r L e w i s t o s u g g e s t t h a t a f o r m o f p e r c e p t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n 
o t h e r t h a n t h a t w h i c h we n o r m a l l y use to r e c o g n i s e , i n t e r p r e t a n d u n d e r s t a n 1 
t h e u n i v e r s e is n e e d e d i n t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f G o d . U n d e r s t a n d a b l e - b u t is 
i t p o s s i b l e ? A n d i f i t is p o s s i b l e how do we a p p r e h e n d God? I f we h a v e a 
s o u l u n r e l a t e d t o s p a c e , t h a t , a t l e a s t , may o f f e r a s t a r t , b u t i f n o t , wha t 
t h e n ? L e w i s seems to r e l y on some m y s t e r i o u s p r o p e r t y w i t h i n a p e r s o n ' s 
p e r c e p t u a l a b i l i t i e s , p r o b a b l y based u p o n an e l u s i v e m i n d , f o r h i s u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e of G o d , b u t is t h e r e an a l t e r n a t i v e ? I f t h e r e w e r e 
a n a l t e r n a t i v e i t w o u l d need to r e m o v e t h e m y s t e r y f r o m t h e p e r c e p t i o n a n d 
y e t g i v e some e x p l a n a t i o n o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e of G o d . 
T h e r e is no m y s t e r y a t t a c h e d to o u r s ide of a n y e x p e r i e n c e o f G o d ; i f 
t h e r e w e r e i t w o u l d o n l y be t h a t w h i c h is a t t a c h e d to h u m a n p e r c e p t i o n i n 
g e n e r a l . How t h e n a r e we to u n d e r s t a n d t h e n u m i n o u s a n d r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 
i n g e n e r a l ? T h e bas i s of t h e n u m i n o u s i s , as L e w i s r i g h t l y p o i n t s o u t , w c n d e r , 
a v . 'onder c r e a t e d b y t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p e r s o n a n d t h e w o r l d . 
T h e r e is a g u l f o f n o n - u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h e n we a t t e m p t to c a t e g o r i s e o u r 
v i s i o n o f t h e w o r l d w i t h o u r n o r m a l r e f e r e n t i a l f r a m e w o r k . We may h a v e - 'n te r -
p r e t i v e s y m b o l s o f b e a u t y , p o w e r a n d m a j e s t y w h i c h we use to u n d e r s t a n d a n d 
c a t e g o r i s e t h e n o r m a l e v e n t s o f o u r l i f e , b u t w h e n scenes s u c h as m o u n t a i n s 
r i s i n g f r o m o u t o f t h e e a r l y m o r n i n g m i s t s , g i l d e d w i t h t h e f i r s t r a y s o f he 
s u n , a r e e x p e r i e n c e d these s y m b o l s d i s s o l v e a n d h a r d l y h e l p at a l l i n an 
a t t e m p t to d e s c r i b e w h a t we see, s t i l l less w h a t we f e e l . S u c h a c o n f r o n t a t i o n 
is o f c o u r s e t h e r a w m a t e r i a l o f c r e a t i v i t y a n d the bas is of t he s t r u g g l e to 
c a p t u r e a n d e x p l a i n t h e r e a l i t y o f o u r w o r l d . B u t w h e r e is God? T h e 
=91-
n u m i n o u s we a r c t o l d leads to an a p p r e h e n s i o n of G o d . B u t t w o people seeir .g 
t he same e v e n t o r v i e w i n g the same scene w i l l come a w a y w i t h d i f f e r e n t 
e x p e r i e n c e s . One may h a v e h i s b e l i e f i n God e n h a n c e d , a n o t h e r may have 
h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b e a u t y e n r i c h e d a n d r e f i n e d , a n d t h e s e , e x c e p t on the 
most m y s t i c a l o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a re c l e a r l y v e r y d i f f e r e n t . I t w o u l d seem 
t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n h e r e n t e i t h e r i n man o r t h e un ive i - s e t h a t l eads 
i n v a r i a b l y to a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t he e x i s t e n c e of G o d . H o w e v e r , i f God is 
i n v o l v e d i n a c t i v e l y d i s c l o s i n g h i m s e l f t h e n the e x p e r i e n c e can be e x p l a i n e d . 
T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e w o r l d a n d o u r n o r m a l p a t t e r n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
w i l l o f t e n l ead to v a r i o u s e n t e r p r i s e s c a l c u l a t e d to a c h i e v e a g r e a t e r u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f o u r w o r l d . T h e e x t e n s i o n of u n d e r s t a n d i n g is basic to h u m a n l i f e 
a n d i t is a lmos t u n n e c e s s a r y to say t h a t t h i s has r e s u l t e d in many a d v a n c e s 
in s c i e n c e a n d a r t . On a p e r s o n a l l e v e l i t c o n t r i b u t e s to a more comple t e a n d 
i n t e g r a t e d a p p r o a c h to l i f e . B u t i t i s also an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r God to ' s t e p 
i n ' b ecause t h e r e is a l w a y s a t h r e s h o l d b e y o n d w h i c h o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g has 
no t r e a c h e d u p u n t i l n o w . T h e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e o f God c a n f i l l t h e chasm t h a t 
s e p a r a t e s o u r l i m i t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m o u r o b j e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n . I n 
d e s c r i b i n g r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i n t h i s w a y t h e i n i t i a t i v e r e m a i n s w i t h G o d . 
I t a l so means t h a t c l a i m e d e x p e r i e n c e s of God b y ' p r i m i t i v e ' peop le s w h o 'see' 
God i n a s t o r m n e e d n o t be s i m p l y p u t d o w n to t h e i r l a c k o f k n o w l e d g e . 
T h e i r e x p e r i e n c e may be g e n u i n e , God may w e l l h a v e d i s c l o s e d h i m s e l f at t he 
v e r y b o u n d a r y o f t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f God is g i v e n i n 
e v e r y case u s i n g an u n r e f i n e d m e d i u m , t h a t i s , a m e d i u m w h i c h e x i s t s 
p r i m a r i l y i n t h e b o r d e r l a n d s o f o u r c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k b e t w e e n t h e 
r e c o g n i t i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n of an o b j e c t a n d i t s f i n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d 
c a t e g o r i s a t i o n . As w i t h a l l o t h e r p e r c e p t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e is a 
b r o a d m a r g i n w h e r e t h e s t r u c t u r e s a n d s y m b o l s a r e i n c o m p l e t e a n d u n w o r k e c . 
o u t . T h i s m a r g i n is t h e r e a l m b o t h of p e r s o n a l c r e a t i v i t y a n d r e l i g i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e . 
I t w o u l d seem t h a t at t imes t h e n a t u r a l d e s i r e to u n d e r s t a n d the w o r l d 
u s i n g o u r c o n c e p t u a l t oo l s can w o r k i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n f r o m t h e r e c o g r i t i o n 
o f G o d ' s i n v o l v e m e n t . I f we a r e a l w a y s c o n t e n t to f i n d o u r o w n e x p l a n a t i o n a n d 
m e a n i n g t h e r e w i l l be l i t t l e r o o m f o r a n y d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e . B u t i f we r e c o g n i s e 
o u r i n a b i l i t y f i n a l l y to e x p l a i n a n y t h i n g t h e n God may d i s c l o s e h i m s e l f a n d 
r e v e a l h i s i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e w o r l d . As e a r t h l y a n d t i m e b o u n d c r e a t u r e s \-e 
a r e u n a b l e to r e c o g n i s e a n y t h i n g o f God a n d h i s c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y i n t he we r i d 
u n l e s s he chooses to d i s c l o s e h i m s e l f . T h e r e f o r e o u r e x p e r i e n c e of God se .'ms 
to be d e p e n d e n t u p o n a d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e a n d u p o n r e v e l a t i o n not a p p r e h e n s i o n : 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e f i r s t r e q u i r e s a d i s c l o s u r e b e f o r e we can move to 
e x p l a n a t i o n . 
=9?-
Does t h i s a c c o u n t of r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e h a v e a n y i m p l i c a t i o n s foi" wl i a t 
we can say a b o u t God? I f we w e r e to t a k e s e r i o u s l y b o t h o u r ro le and God ' s 
i n i t i a t i v e i n o u r r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e t h e n the answc i " to t h i s q u e s t i o n w o u l d 
be a f f i r m a t i v e . We e x p e r i e n c e God no t f i r s t as b e y o n d , b u t as one who is 
i n v o l v e d , n o t f i r s t as t r a n s c e n d e n t b u t as one w h o is i m m a n e n t . We are not 
s i m p l y g r a n t e d a v i s i o n o f God ' s b e i n g b u t an e x p e r i e n c e of h i s becoming 
w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . T h e r e c o g n i t i o n of God b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s of o u r u n i \ ' e r s e . 
as t h e u l t i m a t e , i n f i n i t e , i m m o r t a l a n d p e r f e c t c r e a t o r o f the w o r l d , comes 
a f t e r o u r e x p e r i e n c e of h im i n t h e p r e s e n t , p a r t i c i p a t i n g w i t h us in o u r w o r l d . 
T h e r e c o g n i t i o n of d i v i n e t r a n s c e n d e n c e may be r e q u i r e d f o r o u r f u l l u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d a more c o m p l e t e d e s c r i p t i o n of t he o b j e c t 
o l t h a t e x p e i ' i e n c e , but t h a t r e c o g n j t i o n comes a l t e r t h e e x p e r i e n c e i t s e i l , 
w h i c h b y i t s v e r y n a t u r e is b o t h d y n a m i c a n d g r o u n d e d in the h e r e and n o w . 
W o n d e r may be at t h e h e a r t of r e l i g i o n b u t t h i s does no t i m p l y t h a t o u r f i r s t 
e x p e r i e n c e of God is o f h i s t r a n s c e n d e n c e . W o n d e r is s i m p l y a w o r d a r o u n d 
w h i c h we can c l u s t e r a n u m b e r of e x p e r i e n c e s a l l o f w h i c h have emot ion at 
t h e i r c o r e . L e w i s ' s u s p i c i o n of e m o t i o n seems o d d i f i t is i m p o r t a n t f o r an 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w o n d e r , a n d h i s r e l e g a t i o n o f e m o t i o n as s e c o n d a r y to 
c o g n i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e is e v e n more o d d . E m o t i o n is s u r e l y i n v o l v e d i n a n y 
n u m i n o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d as s u c h f o r m s a m a j o r b u i l d i n g b l o c k in o u r u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f G o d . E m o t i o n s i n c l u d i n g l o v e , g u i l t , peace , f e a r a n d j o y are 
media t h r o u g h w h i c h God can r e v e a l h i m s e l f a n d , as s u c h , a rc not b a r i - i c r s 
b u t a v e n u e s o f h i s s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e . L e w i s seems too r e a d y to r a r e f y o u r 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d too q u i c k to move f r o m w o n d e r to t r a n s c e n d e n c e . 
W h i t e h e a d , a l t h o u g h p r o b a b l y g u i l t y o f h a v i n g m o v e d too c lose to a p u r e l y 
i m m a n e n t i s t d e s c r i p t i o n of God seems c o r r e c t i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t many t h e o l o g i a n s 
a r e too r e a d y to make God a m e t a p h y s i c a l e x c e p t i o n : 
God is n o t to be t r e a t e d as an e x c e p t i o n to a l l m e t a -
p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s to save t h e i r c o l l a p s e . He is 
t h e i r e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n . ^ 
N e i t h e r i s o u r e x p e r i e n c e of God d i f f e r e n t f r o m e v e r y t h i n g e l se , a n d a l t h o u g h 
t h e o b j e c t of t h a t e x p e r i e n c e may on r e f l e c t i o n t u r n o u t to be t o t a l l y u n i q u e , 
t h e e x p e r i e n c e , to h a v e a n y c o h e r e n t c o n t e n t , m u s t be g r o u n d e d i n wha t we 
k n o w a n d can e x p e r i e n c e , n a m e l y o u r w o r l d . T h e r e f o r e r a t h e r t h a n t a k i n g 
t h e c o u r s e o f a r g u m e n t t h a t s t a r t s w i t h God ' s t r a n s c e n d e n c e a n d moves to an 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f h i s i m m a n e n t i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e u n i v e r s e , t he p roces s s h o u l d be 
t h e o t h e r w a y r o u n d . C l e a r l y f o r an e x p e r i e n c e of God to t ake place t h e r e 
needs to be a God w h o i n i t i a t e s a d i s c l o s u r e b u t t h i s does not mean tha t o u r 
e x p e r i e n c e is o f d i v i n e t r a n s c e n d e n c e , i n f a c t because we are b o u n d e d by 
o u r p h y s i c a l a n d t e m p o r a l w o r l d , t h i s c a n n o t be . I t can o n l y be an e x p e r i e n c e 
oi ihv d i v i n e immanence g i v i n g us an app i "ox i ina (e i m p i T S s i o n o l Cioci's i n v o l v i > -
ment a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
T h e r e f o r e t h e r e is a c lose c o n n e c t i o n to be f o u n d b e t w e e n r e v e l a t i o n and 
o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f G o d , i n f a c t i t does not seem t h a t r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 
w o u l d be p o s s i b l e at a l l i f i t w e r e no t f o r t h e f a c t t h a t b o t h a d i v i n e i n i t i a t i v e 
a n d h u m a n p e r c e p t i o n w e r e i n v o l v e d i n a c r e a t i v e t e n s i o n . T h i s is not to say 
t h a t e ach s u c c e s s i v e e x p e r i e n c e s t a r t s f r o m s c r a t c h i n c o n v e y i n g an i m p r e s s i o n 
o f G o d ' s a c t i v i t y . T h e c u m u l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e of d i v i n e d i s c l o s u r e b u i l d s u p , 
i n m u c h t h e w a y t h a t L e w i s d e s c r i b e s , a n d is u sed to i n t e r p r e t o u r e x p e r i e n c e 
o f God i n t h e p r e s e n t . T h i s can h a v e b o t h p o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s . 
P o s i t i v e l y i t can e x t e n d o u r c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k a n d r e f i n e o u r a p p r o x i m a t e 
k n o w l e d g e of t he p e r s o n a n d n a t u r e of G o d . B u t i t can also s e r v e to s t u l t i f y 
o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y f o r c i n g p r e v i o u s l y d i s c o v e r e d s y m b o l s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o n t o new s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h w i l l n o t b e a r t h e m . 
T h e i n i t i a l r e v e l a t i o n o f God as i n v o l v e d i n h i s c r e a t i o n seems to be b o r n e 
o u t i n t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e i n c a r n a t i o n . T h e v i e w t h a t sees God as p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d is h i g h l i g h t e d i n t h e h o r r o r of t he t r i a l a n d 
c r u c i f i x i o n of J e s u s , a n d t h e hope w h i c h is g e n e r a t e d b y a b e l i e f i n God is 
f o c u s s e d most f i n e l y i n t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n . B u t t h e w h o l e l i f e of C h r i s t f r o m 
b i r t h to d e a t h a lso s p e a k s most e l o q u e n t l y o f God ' s c o n c e r n to s h a r e i n the 
l i f e o f m a n . T h e i n c a r n a t i o n is t h e d e f i n i t i v e r e v e l a t i o n o f God 's i n v o l v e m e n t 
a n d u n b o u n d e d l o v e f o r h i s c r e a t i o n a n d i t s p e a k s o f h i s g r a c e a n d o u r 
f r e e d o m a n d h o p e . A l t h o u g h t h e i n c a r n a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t hese t h i n g s i t a lso 
s h o w s t h a t r e v e l a t i o n can n e v e r be f i n a l . T h e i n c a r n a t i o n g i v e s many a n s w e r s 
b u t i t seems to pose a t l eas t as m a n y q u e s t i o n s as w e l l , a n d t h e q u e s t i o n s 
t h a t i t t h r o w s u p seem to be b o t h e s s e n t i a l a n d y e t f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n a n s w e r a b l e . 
Q u e s t i o n s s u c h as w h a t is t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n God a n d man i n 
J e s u s C h r i s t a r e v i t a l , a n d y e t t h e y r e m a i n i n t h e r e a l m of m y s t e r y . 
I n s u m m a r y , t h e e x p e r i e n c e of God a n d t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n g e n e r a l 
f i n d t h e i r bas i s i n t h e d y n a m i c t e n s i o n c r e a t e d b e t w e e n d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n a n d 
o u r p e r c e p t i o n of t h e w o r l d , immanence s h o u l d be seen on t h a t bas is to be mad(; 
o f r e c o g n i t i o n p r i o r to d i v i n e t r a n s c e n d e n c e w h i c h can o n l y be d e d u c e d f r o m 
t h e e v i d e n c e of God ' s r e v e l a t i o n a n d o u r e x p e r i e n c e , a n d a l t h o u g h s u c c e s s i v e 
e x p e r i e n c e f i l l s o u t o u r p i c t u r e of God t h e i n c a r n a t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e f u n d a -
m e n t a l c o m p o n e n t o f b o t h C h r i s t i a n f a i t h a n d t h e o l o g y . 
I n s t a r t i n g w i t h d i v i n e immanence i n t h i s way t h e a p p r o a c h o f f e r e d h e r e 
s h o u l d n o t be too c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e ' i m m a n e n t i s t ' a p p r o a c h to 
I h c o l o g y f o u n d in p r o c e s s ( h c o l o g y . C h a r l e s H a i M s h o r n e f o l l o w i n g Whileheaci 
a n d h i m s e l f b e i n g f o l l o w e d b y s u c h as C o b b a n d Pi 11 en g c r ^ ^ is o v e r l y 
i m m a n e n t i s t because t h e y f o r c e a w e d g e b e t w e e n w h a t he ca l l s t he c o n c r e t e 
po le o f God ' s e x i s t e n c e ( h i s i m m a n e n c e ) a n d h i s p r i m o r d i a l o r a b s t r a c t pole 
( h i s t r a n s c e n d e n c e ) . O n l y t h e c o n c r e t e pole o f G o d ' s e x i s t e n c e is seen to b j 
a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e d w i t h i n t h e w o r l d a n d because o f t h i s H a r t s h o r n e c r ea t e s 
c o m p l i c a t i o n s f o r h i m s e l f a n d p r o d u c e s a f u n d a m e n t a l w e a k n e s s in p r o c e s s 
t h e o l o g y . C o l i n G u n t o n in B e c o m i n g a n d B e i n g has s h o w n q u i t e e f f e c t i v e l y 
t h a t t h i s d i v i s i o n w i t h i n t h e d i v i n e b e i n g has r e s u l t e d i n wha t can o n l y be 
d e s c r i b e d as an A r i a n C h r i s t o l o g y in t h e p a r t i c u l a r a p p r o a c h o f C h a r l e s 
H a r t s h o r n e . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e t h i n g s w h i c h can be u sed f r o m t h e more 
c o n v i n c i n g p a r t s of p r o c e s s t h e o l o g y . I n d e s c r i b i n g God ' s p r e s e n t a c t i v i t y i n 
t h e w o r l d , p r o c e s s t h e o l o g i a n s s u c h as P i t t e n g e r a n d H a r t s h o r n e , use 
c r e a t i v i t y as an i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t . H e r e a lso t h e r e a p p e a r s to be an 
u n f o r t u n a t e a n d u n n e c e s s a r y t e n d e n c y to r a i s e t h e p o s i t i o n o f c r e a t i v i t y to 
t h e l e v e l o f m e t a p h y s i c a l a u t o n o m y a c t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t o f G o d , b u t i f t h i s 
t e n d e n c y is a v o i d e d t h e n t h e bas ic idea of u s i n g an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 
c r e a t i v i t y as a w a y of d e s c r i b i n g d i v i n e a c t i v i t y seems h e l p f u l . 
B y u s i n g c r e a t i v i t y i n t h i s w a y i t is p o s s i b l e to d r a w on the i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
o f p e r s o n h o o d a n d p e r s o n a l c r e a t i v i t y a n d use i t as a t h e o l o g i c a l t o o l i n 
p r o v i d i n g a r o u g h l y s k e t c h e d p i c t u r e of God ' s a c t i v i t y . I n so d o i n g i t is of 
c o u r s e r e c o g n i s e d t h a t i t is o n l y p r o v i d i n g one p o s s i b l e a p p r o a c h o r model 
of d i v i n e a c t i v i t y a n d e v e n as a s o l i t a r y m o d e l may o n l y a c h i e v e a b r o a d 
d e l i n e a t i o n o f t h e w a y s i n w h i c h God is a c t i n g a n d c r e a t i n g . E v e n a l l o w i n g 
t h e s e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i t does seem to p r o v i d e a u s e f u l i n s i g h t . 
I n m a k i n g c r e a t i v i t y c e n t r a l to a d e s c r i p t i o n of d i v i n e i n v o l v e m e n t a n d 
a c t i v i t y i t i s p o s s i b l e to r e c o g n i s e w a y s i n w h i c h God w o u l d combine the 
d i s p a r a t e e l emen t s o f t h e pas t i n a c o n t i n u o u s c r e a t i o n of t he p r e s e n t . Gad 
does n o t , on t h i s v i e w , so m u c h s u s t a i n h i s c r e a t i o n as c o n t i n u a l l y c r e a t e 
i t each m o m e n t . T h i s w o u l d r e s u l t i n a d i f f e r e n t v i e w of c r e a t i o n f r o m the 
one w h i c h s u p p o s e s t h a t God has c r e a t e d t h e who le w o r l d i n t he pas t a n d is 
p r e s e n t l y s u s t a i n i n g i t . T h e d i m e n s i o n s o f space a n d t ime c o u l d be seen as 
a f r a m e w o r k w h i c h God s t r u c t u r e s f o r h i s o w n p u r p o s e s . T h e r a w m a t e r i a l 
o f G o d ' s a c t i v i t y w o u l d be seen t o be t h e c o n t i n u a l f l o w o f m a t t e r , space a n d 
t ime f r o m t h e pas t i n t o t h e p r e s e n t . God c o m b i n i n g , s y t h e s i s i n g , s e l e c t i n g 
a n d s t r u c t u r i n g w o u l d be m o u l d i n g the p r e s e n t a c c o r d i n g to h i s p u r p o s e s . 
God seen i n t h i s w a y w o u l d be a p a r t i c i p a t o r i n t h e s u f f e r i n g and s t r u g g l e of 
t h e w o r l d a n d we c o u l d be seen i n some sense as c o - w o r k e r s w i t h h i m , 
s e e k i n g to r e s p o n d to h i s w i l l as we p c r c i e v e i t to be . T h e i n c a r n a t i o n 
w o u l d t h e n be a n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n o f t he c o n t i n u a l d i v i n e i n v o l v e m e n t in 
c r e a t i o n . A l t h o u g h God is l o g i c a l l y u n r e s t r i c t e d by h i s c r e a t i o n , e x c e p t w h e r e 
he chooses to l i m i t h i m s e l f , s u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s as f o u n d i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
' a t t r i b u t e s o f G o d ' s u c h as i m p a s s i b i l i t y a n d i m m u t a b i l i t y w o u l d be la i -ge ly 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e i f a p p l i e d to t h i s v i e w o f t he d i v i n e a c t i v i t y and n a t u r e . 
As T . F . T o r r a n c e has w r i t t e n i n h i s Space , T ime a n d I n c a r n a t i o n : 
I f God is m e r e l y i m p a s s i b l e He has not made room f o r 
H i m s e l f i n o u r a g o n i e d e x i s t e n c e , a n d i f He is m e r e l y 
i m m u t a b l e , He has n e i t h e r p lace n o r t ime f o r f r a i l 
e v a n e s c e n t c r e a t u r e s i n H i s u n c h a n g i n g e x i s t e n c e . 
B u t t h e God w h o has r e v e a l e d H i m s e l f i n Jesus C h r i s t 
as s h a r i n g o u r l o t is t h e God w h o is r e a l l y f r e e to 
make H i m s e l f p o o r , t h a t we t h r o u g h His p o v e r t y m i g h t 
be made r i c h , t h e God i n v a r i a n t i n l o v e b u t not 
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i m p a s s i b l e , c o n s t a n t i n f a i t h f u l n e s s b u t not i m m u t a b l e . 
E n v i s i o n e d i n t h i s way God is p i c t u r e d on t h e c r e a t i v e t h r e s h o l d of t he 
u n i v e r s e o r at t h e c e n t r e o f e ach ' n o w ' ( i n a u n i v e r s e w h e r e s i m u l t a n e i t y 
o f t ime n o w seems i m p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e a d v e n t o f E i n s t e i n i a n p h y s i c s ) o f e v e r y 
t i m e , s t r u c t u r i n g t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f space a n d t ime a n d c o m b i n i n g the v a r i o u s 
e l e m e n t s o f t h e pas t i n h i s c o n t i n u a l c r e a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h he chooses to 
w o r k a n d r e v e a l h i m s e l f . T h e r e f o r e , r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i n v o l v e s a r e c o g n i t i o n 
o f G o d ' s p r e s e n t a c t i v i t y a n d s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n , t h e p r o c e s s b e i n g i n i t i a t e d b v 
God b u t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h h i m a n d r e s p o n s e t o h i s r e v e l a t i o n b e i n g o u r s . 
A n o t h e r a rea i n w h i c h t h e r e may be an a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h to t h a t 
o f f e r e d b y H . D . L e w i s is t h a t o f l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . J o h n M a c q u a r r i e a n d J i h r g e n 
M o l t m a n 
^19) 
h a v e e x p r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f hope not o n l y f o r a p r o p e r u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f C h r i s t i a n i t y b u t a l so f o r n o r m a l h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . T h e r e is a bas ic 
h o p e f u l n e s s a t t a c h e d to a l l h u m a n a c t i v i t y - we w o u l d do n o t h i n g un l e s s we 
h a d some hope o f a c h i e v i n g o u r e n d o r c o m p l e t i n g t h e t a s k . Hope seems o 
g i v e m o t i v a t i o n to h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . I f we lose hope we d ie o r go m a d . H j p o 
n o t o n l y m o t i v a t e s b u t o r i e n t a t e s o u r l i v e s , we h a v e goals and aims w h i c h 
g i v e m e a n i n g to o u r e n t e r p r i s e s a n d e n d e a v o u r s . I t is not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
h u m a n b e i n g s s h o u l d h a v e hopes t h a t e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e g r a v e . Hope o f 
l i f e a f t e r d e a t h is n e i t h e r a r e s t r i c t e d o r a new p h e n o m e n . E v e n n e o l i t h i r 
man s h o w e d s i g n s f r o m t h e w a y t h a t he b u r i e d h i s dead t h a t he b e l i e v e d :n a 
f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e a f t e r d e a t h . T h e bod ie s w e r e b u r i e d w i t h too ls a n d weapons 
f o r t h e n e x t l i f e a n d p l a c e d i n a f o e t a l p o s i t i o n r e a d y f o r ' r e - b i r t h ' in t he 
l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . B u t h o w e v e r w i d e s p r e a d t h i s b e l i e f is a n d h o w e v e r a n c i ' n t , 
t h e r e r e m a i n t h e q u e s t i o n s o f h o w we a r e to u n d e r s t a n d a f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e 
a n d on w h a t g r o u n d s we can e x p e c t a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . Gene ra l h o p e f u l n . ' s s a n d s p e c i f i c aims h a v e m e a n i n g in o u r izirc^sent i - x i s t ence because we can u'c 
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a n d e v a l u a t e t h e i r r e s u l t s , b u t as soon as wc d ie a l l s u c h e v i d e n c e d ies w i t h 
u s . L e w i s has t r i e d to show t h a t a b e l i e f a n d r e c o g n i t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e of 
t h e s o u l may g i v e at leas t some hope o f l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . B u t i f a l i f e a f t e r 
d e a t h is p o s s i b l e t h e n , w h a t e v e r i t s e x a c t n a t u r e , i t d e p e n d s u p o n G o d , 
w i t h o u t w h o m e v e n d i s e m b o d i e d e x i s t e n c e ( u n l e s s t h e s o u l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e ) 
is i m p o s s i b l e . M a u r i c e VViles^^^^ has n o t e d t h i s as has L e w i s h i m s e l f , b u t f o r 
L e w i s t h e s o u l seems to p r e s e n t f e w e r p r o b l e m s . As N i c h o l a s L a s h has p u t ; t : 
A s o u l i n t h e h a n d is w o r t h t w o i n t h e e s c h a l o n . ^ ^ '^ 
B u t i f i t is God t h a t we a r e r e l y i n g on f o r a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h how i t is a c h i c / e d 
is o f less i m p o r t a n c e t h a n w h a t is r e q u i r e d f o i ' a r e a l p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e . 
C l e a r l y e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s r e q u i r e d f o r p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e i n t h i s p r e s e n t 
l i f e is r e q u i r e d , a n d i f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d o f f e r e d i n 
t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r is a n y t h i n g to go b y t h e n t h a t means many t h i n g s . I t 
w o u l d seem t h a t some f o r m o f ' r e c a p i t u l a t i o n ' is r e q u i r e d , w h e r e o u r w h o l e 
l i v e s i n c l u d i n g a l l o f o u r d e v e l o p m e n t , memor ies a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p s a re summed 
u p a n d f o c u s s e d i n t o a new l i f e . I f we a re n o t to s i m p l y ' j u m p the t r a c k s ' 
at t h e e n d o f o u r l i f e a n d c o n t i n u e w h e r e we l e f t o f f w i t h w h a t e v e r s tage of 
s e n i l i t y o r m e m o r y loss t h a t we h a d i n t h i s l i f e , somie a p p r o a c h w h i c h i n d u c e s 
t h e w h o l e o f o u r l i v e s b e i n g u s e d as t h e bas i s f o r a new o n e , mus t be 
a t t e m p t e d . \ ' Iemories a n d b o d i e s , d e v e l o p m e n t a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p s a re a l l r e q i i r c d 
i f God is to c r e a t e a new l i f e w h i c h can be d e s c r i b e d as p e r s o n a l . A c c o r d i n g 
to t h i s v i e w God w o u l d c o n t i n u a l l y d r a w to him.self a l l t h e e lements of o u r 
l i v e s b y c r e a t i n g each s u c c e s s i v e m o m e n t . God is d r a w i n g t h e e lements of 
t h e pas t i n t o t h e s p h e r e o f h i s a c t i v i t y no t o n l y as t h e bas is of h i s c o n t i n u a l 
c r e a t i o n b u t a lso as t h e bas i s o f o u r r e d e m p t i o n , a c h i e v e d by b r i n g i n g t h e 
r e c o r d o f o u r l i v e s i n t o t h e r e a l m o f h i s b o u n d l e s s p u r i f y i n g l o v e . I n d o i n g 
t h i s God c o u l d be sa id to be ' r e c o r d i n g ' o r ' s t o r i n g ' each moment , each e v e n t , 
each a c t i o n a n d m e m o r y f o r a f u t u r e r e - c r e a t i o n based u p o n the r edeemed 
r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of o u r l i v e s . T h e r e is a c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e of each o f o u r l i v e s 
w i t h God a n d he is ab le to use t h i s as t h e b u i l d i n g b l o c k s of a f u t u r e 
e x i s t e n c e a f t e r d e a t h , e n s u r i n g o u r i d e n t i t y a n d c o n t i n u i t y . B e i n g 
r e d e m p t i v e t h e r e c a p i t u l a t i o n w i l l f r e e a n d e x t e n d o u r p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e an . i 
e n a b l e us t o l i v e i n c o m m u n i o n w i t h God i n t h e w a y t h a t he chooses , w h i c h , 
i f i t is to be i n some way c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h i s l i f e , w i l l i n c l u d e some s o r t of 
b o d i l y e x i s t e n c e . I n t h e same w a y t h a t t h e D N A d o u b l e h e l i x a n d o u r 
g e n e t i c c o d i n g a re t h e bas i s f o r h u m a n l i f e i n t h i s e x i s t e n c e , t he s t o r e d 
c o m p l e t e r e c o r d of t h i s l i f e f o r m s t h e bas i s of t h e n e x t . T h i s s o r t of a p p i o a c h 
seems to p r o v i d e more t h a n L e w i s ' r a t h e r s t e r i l e s o u l - w o r l d e x i s t e n c e a n d s 
a lso c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e o f r e s u r r e c t i o n . • 
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l l w o u l d seem q u i t e c l e a r t h a t b o t h L e w i s a n d the a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h 
to p e r s o n h o o d can a n d do have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s . Some 
of t he se i m p l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e t h e s o r t o f l a n g u a g e a n d the c o n c e p t s w h i c h a r e 
u s e d to d e s c r i b e a n d d e f i n e r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e a n d d i v i n e a c t i v i t y . L e w i s ' 
\ ' i ew o f a t e m p o r a l , a l t h o u g h n o n - s p a t i a l , s o u l seems to g i v e r i s e to an 
a p p r o a c h to r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h d e p e n d s on t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f God 
i n h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t s t a t e of b e i n g a n d an i n s i g h t i n t o t h e d e p e d e n c e of t h e 
w o r l d u p o n h im f o r b o t h i t s e x i s t e n c e a n d e x p l a n a t i o n . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t 
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e can be so i m p o r t a n t f o r L e w i s i n 
so m a n y d i f f e r e n t a reas o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . F o r L e w i s 
i t is o u r p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h l eads to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t he se l f o r 
s o u l a n d e q u a l l y i t i s i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e t h a t r e s u l t s i n o u r b e l i e i i n God 
a n d o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i m as t h e u l t i m a t e b e i n g a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t c r e a t o -
o f t h e u n i v e r s e . H i s a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d a n d the e s s e n t i a l s of i n d i v i d u ; ! 
e x i s t e n c e no t o n l y i n f l u e n c e h i m i n t h i s g e n e r a l w a y b u t a lso i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
s e n s e , e s p e c i a l l y i n h i s v i e w s a n d s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t l i f e a f t e r d e a t h . 
T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h is d e p e n d e n t u p o n a d i f f e r e n t set of p r e -
s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d a n d e x p e r i e n c e p r o d u c e s v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . C o n c e p t s s u c h as c r e a t i v i t y a n d s y n t h e s i s a re more eas i l ; -
a p p l i e d to t h e a c t i v i t y o f God because a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k has been 
p r o v i d e d t h a t i n v e s t s t hese c o n c e p t s a n d ideas w i t h m e a n i n g . A l s o , a n d 
p r o b a b l y more m a r k e d l y , a v i e w o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e t h a t r e l i e s on many t h i r . g s 
i n c l u d i n g a b o d y a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r s f o r a p r o p e r d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l 
a f f e c t t h e w a y t h a t a l i f e a f t e r d e a t h is e n v i s a g e d . 
I t w o u l d seem t h a t a n y v i e w o f p e r s o n h o o d i f p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d w i l l 
t r a n s f o r m t h e o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e o l o g y i n many d i f f e r e n t w a y s . A c l e a r a n d 
c o h e r e n t a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d is v i t a l to t h e o l o g y i f i t is to be m e a n i n g f u l 
a n d s u c c e e d i n o f f e r i n g an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w o r l d a n d man i n r e l a t i o n 
to G o d . As s u c h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t i t i s to be h u m a n ac t s as a se' 
o f j o i n t s i n t he i n t r i c a t e l a t t i c e w o r k o f t h e o l o g y , f o r g i n g , l i n k i n g a n d h o l d n g 
t o g e t h e r t h e d i f f e r e n t e l emen t s a n d s t r a n d s of t h o u g h t . O r , l i k e a j u n c t i o n 
b o x i n a h o u s e h o l d w i r i n g s y s t e m o r an e x c h a n g e i n a t e l e p h o n e n e t w o r k , 
an a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d is v i t a l i f t h e p e r c e p t i o n s a n d i n s i g h t s of one p a r t 
o f t h e o l o g y a r e to i l l u m i n a t e , r e v i v e a n d t r a n s f o r m o t h e r s , and f a c i l i t a t e 
d i a l o g u e a n d i n t e r c h a n g e b e t w e e n t h e d i f f e r e n t a reas in t h e o l o g y w h i c h m i g n t 
o t h e r w i s e r e m a i n u n c o n n e c t e d . 
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C H A P T E R 5 
Cone l u s i o n 
T h i s t h e s i s has f r o m t h e o u t s e t c o n s i d e r e d w h i c h c r i t e r i a a re a d m i s s i b l e 
a n d a p p r o p r i a t e to be u s e d i n a d e s c r i p t i o n a n d d i s c u s s i o n of p c r s o n h o o d . 
T h e r e h a v e been t w o p o s s i b l e a p p r o a c h e s p r e s e n t e d , b o t h o f w h i c h use 
d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a a n d d i f f e r e n t a r g u m e n t s a n d t h e r e b y a r r i v e at a d i f f e r e n t 
m o d e l of p e r s o n h o o d . I t w o u l d seem t h a t i n some w a y s each a p p r o a c h is 
s t r o n g e s t w h e r e t h e o t h e r is w e a k e s t . L e w i s ' a p p r o a c h is s t r o n g e s t i n i t s 
r e c o g n i t i o n of c o g n i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e at t h e h e a r t o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e of s e l f h o o d . 
T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h is s t r o n g e s t i n t h a t i t a c c o u n t s f o r p e r s o n a l d e \ ' c l -
o p m e n t a n d c r e a t i v i t y a n d t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e f i n d i n g s of t he ' sc iences o f 
m a n ' - p s y c h o l o g y a n d s o c i o l o g y . I t is p r e c i s e l y i n these areas t h a t t h e 
o t h e r is w e a k e s t . L e w i s t a k e s too l i t t l e a c c o u n t of p e r s o n a l developm.ent ana 
seems to set l i t t l e s t o r e b y t h e b e h a v i o u r a l s c i e n c e s . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h 
on t h e o t h e r h a n d seems to f a l l s h o r t i n p r o v i d i n g an a d e q u a t e e x p l a n a t i o n of 
t h e ' I ' o f e x p e r i e n c e . I s t h e r e a n y hope t h a t t hese weaknesses may be 
o v e r c o m e b y e i t h e r o r b o t h o f t h e a p p r o a c h e s ? 
L e w i s has a d o p t e d a d u a l i s m t h a t is b o t h r a d i c a l a n d r e d u c t i o n i s t : 
r a d i c a l i n t h a t i t p o s t u l a t e s a f u n d a m e n t a l d i v i d e b e t w e e n b o d y a n d s o u l ; 
r e d u c t i o n i s t i n t h a t i t has a t e n d e n c y to move t o w a r d s a d e s c r i p t i o n o f w h a t 
i s seen to be t h e essence of p e r s o n h o o d , c u t t i n g a w a y u n n e c e s s a r y a n d o b s c u r e 
a r eas a n d f o c u s s i n g m o r e a n d more on w h a t is t a k e n to be n e c e s s a r y a n d 
e s s e n t i a l . I t i s t h i s t e n d e n c y i n t h e w o r k o f L e w i s t h a t r e s u l t s i n t he 
w e a k n e s s of n o t r e c o g n i s i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f p e r s o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t o r t h e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of p s y c h o l o g y a n d s o c i o l o g y t o a n y d i s c u s s i o n of m a n . I t w o u l d 
seem to be e v i d e n t t h a t f o r L e w i s to r e d r e s s t h i s w e a k n e s s he w o u l d not 
o n l y h a v e to a c c e p t i t as s u c h , w h i c h i n i t s e l f i s d o u b t f u l , b u t t h e n a t t e m p t 
a m a j o r r e d i r e c t i n g o f h i s a r g u m e n t s w h i c h seem at t h e moment to move i n 
one d i r e c t i o n o n l y , a n d t u r n t h e m to become more i n c l u s i v e . W h e t h e r t h i s 
i s p o s s i b l e o r w i l l e v e r t a k e p lace is d o u b t f u l - i t w o u l d r e q u i r e too m u c h of 
a r e v o l u t i o n i n L e w i s ' w o r k . 
T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h , h o w e v e r , is a d i f f e r e n t p r o p o s i t i o n a l t o g e t h e r . 
I t has an e m p i r i c i s t f o u n d a t i o n a n d r e l i e s to a l a r g e d e g r e e on s c i e n t i f i c 
m e t h o d a n d s t a t i s t i c a l m a t e r i a l w h i c h can be f o u n d i n t h e b e h a v i o u r a l s c i e n c e s . 
B u t t h e t e n d e n c y w i t h i n t h e a p p r o a c h is f a r f r o m r e d u c t i o n i s t , i n f a c t i l 
l eads in t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h d e l i b e r a t e l y se ts 
o u t to be i n c l u s i v e a n d has a t e n d e n c y t o w a r d s h o l i s m . I t is h o l i s t i c i n 
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as f a r as it p o s t u l a t e s t h a t t h e c o m p o n e n t s of a p e r s o n ' s l i f e a re not s u f f i c i e n t 
to e x p l a i n h i s o v e r a l l e x i s t e n c e , t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g m o r e : t h e r e is h i s i n t e r -
a c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s . I t is b o t h t h e c o m p o n e n t s a n d t h e i r m u t u a l i n t e r a c t i o n 
tha t e x p l a i n p e r s o n h o o d . A l t h o u g h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h does not f u l l y 
a c c o u n t f o r t h e e x p e r i e n c e a n d p e r s o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f s e l f h o o d , i t seems to 
be on t h e r i g h t t r a c k . I t may be t h a t t he h o l i s t i c t e n d e n c y w i l l need to 
be e n h a n c e d a n d d e v e l o p e d , b u t w i t h t h e p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d s i n c l u s i x ' e n c s s 
as w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d as i t i s w i t h i n t h e a p p r o a c h t h i s s h o u l d p r e s e n t f ew 
p r o b l e m s . A g a i n i t may be t h a t f u r t h e r i n s i g h t s need to be g l eaned f r o m 
o t h e r a r e a s . One p a r t i c u l a r a p p r o a c h w h i c h b e g i n s f r o m a b r o a d l y s i m i l a r 
base a n d w h i c h makes a r e a l a t t e m p t at r e s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l e m of s e l f -
k n o w l e d g e is t h a t w h i c h D o u g l a s H o f s t a d t e r a d v a n c e s i n G-^del, E s c h e r , B a c h : 
A n E t e r n a l Goden B r a i d , a n d a g a i n i n T h e M i n d ' s I : Fan tas i e s a n d 
R e f l e c t i o n s on Se l f a n d S o u l w i t h h i s c o - w r i t e r / c o l l a t o r D a n i e l D e n n e t . 
T h e r e is n o t e n o u g h space t o i n c l u d e a d i s c u s s i o n of h i s a r g u m e n t s w h i c h a r e 
a d v a n c e d i n t h e t w o b o o k s ( G t i d e l , E s c h e r , B a c h is i t s e l f o v e r 700 pages i n 
l e n g t h ! ) . B u t b a s i c a l l y H o f s t a d t e r , m o v i n g f r o m a c o m p l e x p h i l o s o p h i c a l b a s j , 
a d v a n c e s the t h e o r y t h a t r e f l e c t i o n , r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e ' I ' o f e x p e r i e n c e a n d 
t h e h u m a n t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s i n g e n e r a l , d e p e n d u p o n a c y c l i c a l o r h e l i c a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t of s e n s o r y i m p u l s e s a n d s t o r e d i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e b r a i n . S e l f -
a w a r e n e s s seems to be g a i n e d b y t h e c o n s t a n t c i r c u l a t i n g f l o w of i n f o r m a t i o n . 
E a c h moment p r o d u c e s a n e w t h r e s h o l d of e x p e r i e n c e a n d p e r c e p t i o n . T h e 
T h r e s h o l d ac t s as a r e f l e c t i v e a n a e x p e r i e n r i a l p l a t f o r m w n i c n enaotes a 
m o n i t o r i n g o f w h e r e t h e p r o c e s s has come f r o m : t h i s s e c o n d a r y f o r m of 
r e f l e c t i o n is i n i t s e l f w h a t m i g h t be d e s c r i b e d as a s u b - a n g l e of t h e o v e r a l l 
p r o c e s s , .At f i r s t t h e p r o c e s s w o u l d be v e r y m o m e n t a r y , b u t as a c h i l d g r o w s 
to a d u l t h o o d the r e c o g n i t i o n o f i d e n t i t y g r o w s a n d t h e d e v l e o p m e n t of t h e 
p r o c e s s becomes more r e f i n e d . P e r h a p s w i t h some a l t e r a t i o n s a n d w i t h 
f u r t h e r t h o u g h t a n d r e s e a r c h t h i s s o r t of u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u l d be i n v e s t i g a t e d 
a n d e v e n i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h to p e r s o n h o o d a n d f o u n d 
h e r e , t h e r e b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g i t s t h e o r e t i c a l bas i s a n d g i v i n g a c l e a r e r a c c o u n t 
o f s e l f h o o d . Of c o u r s e t h e b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of H o f s t a d t e r ' s a p p r o a c h is not 
s u f f i c i e n t f u l l y to comment i t . T h e d i r e c t i o n o f h i s t h e s i s h o w e v e r may 
i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e s o r t of a p p r o a c h w h i c h is o f f e r e d i n t h i s t h e s i s as an a l t e r -
n a t i v e to L e w i s ' d u a l i s m may h a v e m a n y more p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r d e v e l o p m e n t 
a n d r e f i n e m e n t . I t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t more a p p r o v a l has been e x p r e s s e d 
f o r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h r a t h e r t h a n f o r t h a t of L e w i s . I t seems to o f f e r 
a g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y a n d more o f a hope o f r e s o l v i n g i t s m a j o r p r o b l e m s a n d 
w e a k n e s s e s . As f a r as L e w i s is c o n c e r n e d the f i n d i n g s of t h i s t h e s i s w o u l d 
commend h im to a b r o a d e n i n g o f h i s a p p r o a c h . I f t h i s is i m p o s s i b l e t h e n 
he s h o u l d at least come to t e r m s w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s h i s a p p r o a c h poses f o r 
a c o n t e m p o r a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f space a n d t i m e , as was o u t l i n e d in 
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thc^ f i n a l p a r t o f t he c h a p t e r on H . D . L e w i s . 
I n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r some o f t h e t h e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t he two 
a p p r o a c h e s w e r e o u t l i n e d . As a c l o s i n g t h o u g h t , p e r h a p s one f u r t h e r area 
of t h e o l o g y as y e t not m e n t i o n e d s h o u l d be b r o a c h e d , t h a t o f p r a c t i c a l 
t h e o l o g y . I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t a t h r o u g h g o i n g model of p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e is 
i m p o r t a n t to b o t h t h e o l o g y i n g e n e r a l a n d to c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l areas of 
t h e o l o g i c a l c o n c e r n . One o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t of these p a r t i c u l a r a reas is 
t h a t of p r a c t i c a l t h e o l o g y . I t w o u l d seem t h a t p r a c t i c a l t h e o l o g y is i n m any 
w a y s t h e C i n d e r e l l a o f t h e o l o g y w i t h n e i t h e r e n o u g h a t t e n t i o n o r t ime b e i n g 
g i v e n to i t b y p r o f e s s i o n a l t h e o l o g i a n s . T h i s is r e g r e t t a b l e , because , s u r e l y , 
i t is i n p r a x i s t h a t t h e o l o g y is g r o u n d e d a n d i t is to t h e needs of t he C h u r c h 
a n d the w o r l d t h a t t h e o l o g y m.ust f i r s t be d i r e c t e d . I n some \^'ays p r a c t i c a l 
t h e o l o g y r e m a i n s r e l a t i v e l y u n c h a r t e d g r o u n d i n t h i s c o u n t r y w i t h b u t a 
t r i c k l e o f l i t e r a t u r e d e v o t e d ot i t c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e g r e a t m a e l s t r o m c r e a t e d 
b y o t h e r a r e a s . I f a s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t i n p r a c t i c a l t h e o l o g y is r e k i n d l e d , 
i t w i l l be o f p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e t h a t some a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n h o o d w h i c h is 
f l e x i b l e e n o u g h to be appl ied to t h e m a n y d i f f e r e n t a reas w i t h w h i c h p r a c t i c a l 
t h e o l o g y is c o n c e r n e d a n d b r o a d e n o u g h to a c c o u n t f o r i n s i g h t s of t he 
b e h a v i o u r a l s c i e n c e s is i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e i n i t i a l s t ages o f s t u d y . S u c h an 
a p p r o a c h i s i n d i c a t e d b y t h e a l t e r n a t i v e o f f e r e d i n t h i s t h e s i s . L e w i s ' 
d u a l i s m as a m o d e l o f p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e w o u l d no t o f f e r m u c h t h a t was new 
a n d a p p l i c a b l e to p r a c t i c a l t h e o l o g y . E n d i n g on a p e r s o n a l n o t e , i f I w e r e 
to c o n t i n u e t o s t u d y i n t h i s a rea of t h e t h e o l o g i c a l a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f p e r s o n h o o d i t w o u l d be w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o some o f t h e m a j o r 
themes o f p r a c t i c a l t h e o l o g y t h a t I w o u l d a d d r e s s i t . 
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